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The Investor Compensation Fund
Alicia Davis Evans ∗
The prevailing view among securities regulation scholars is that compensating
victims of secondary market securities fraud is inefficient. As the theory goes, diversified
investors are as likely to be on the gaining side of a transaction tainted by fraud as the
losing side. Therefore, such investors should have no expected net losses from fraud
because their expected losses will be matched by expected gains. This Article argues that
this view is flawed; even diversified investors can suffer substantial losses from fraud,
presenting a compelling case for compensation.
The interest in compensation, however, should be advanced by better means than
are currently in place. The present system relies on securities class action lawsuits to
compensate victims, but these suits not only undercompensate victims, but also
underdeter fraud. To improve compensation and better deter fraud, this Article explores
the creation of an investor compensation fund. Under this proposal, when a share of
stock is sold in the secondary market, a fee, payable by the selling shareholder, will be
placed into a fund for fraud victim restitution. The size of the fee will vary by the fraud
risk rating assigned to the firm whose stock is sold and, naturally, will affect that stock’s
trading price. Therefore, firms will have incentives to institute corporate governance
practices that minimize the likelihood of fraud.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1985, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, in an influential article, asserted that
active traders with diversified portfolios are as likely to be on the gaining side of a
transaction tainted by securities fraud as on the losing side. 1 Therefore, diversified
investors should have no expected net losses from fraud because their expected losses
will match their expected gains. 2 The idea of compensation for securities fraud losses has
been under attack in the legal academy virtually ever since this article was published.
Though Easterbrook and Fischel ultimately argue against ending compensation for
securities fraud losses, 3 scholars, nevertheless, have used Easterbrook and Fischel’s
insight to decry the provision of securities fraud compensation as inefficient and to
promote reforms that would eliminate it from the securities regulation regime. 4 In 2005,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform commissioned an empirical
study to test the theoretical assertion that securities fraud risk can be diversified away.
The study purported to find that large diversified institutional investors generally break
even on their investments in firms accused of fraud. 5 The study captured mainstream
media attention, 6 reflecting the importance of the issue to the business community and
the public more broadly.
This Article challenges the idea that fraud compensation for investors is not
warranted. All investors, including diversified investors, can suffer substantial injury
from securities fraud, and because there is measurable harm from fraud, there is a basis
for granting compensation to its victims. This Article also contends that, as a practical
matter, political exigencies make achieving the end of shareholder compensation in the
post-Enron era unlikely. Therefore, what is most appropriate at this time, in my view, is
an exploration of ways to provide compensation more effectively and efficiently.

1. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
611, 641 (1985).
2. See id.
3. Id. Easterbrook and Fischel state,
[T]he optimal damages in [secondary market fraud] cases are [not] zero just because most gains
and losses net out. There will be the usual net harms of the costs of guarding against and litigating
about the wrong, and there will be an allocative efficiency loss if transactions of a particular sort
create uncompensated risk. The larger the transfer among investors, the more they will spend
guarding against the problem.
Id. Easterbrook and Fischel, however, do argue that “the optimal [damage] award is surely a good deal smaller
than the gross transfer of wealth.” Id. at 641-42.
4. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1487 (1996) (proposing a shift from traditional securities litigation to a system of civil penalties to deter fraud);
A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud
Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 983 (1999) (advocating an end to securities litigation and outlining an
alternative enforcement regime run by stock exchanges with no damages to be paid to victims of fraud).
5. ANJAN V. THAKOR ET AL., THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 12-14
(2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.org/issues/docload.cfm?docId=855.
6. See Jonathan D. Glater, Critics of Shareholder Suits Aim at Big Holders, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at
C (describing the U.S. Chamber study); Kenneth M. Lehn, Commentary, Private Insecurities, WALL ST. J., Feb.
15, 2006, at A16 (providing commentary that refers to the U.S. Chamber study).
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The current compensatory mechanism, the securities class action lawsuit, has
important shortcomings. Defrauded shareholders currently rely primarily on class actions
(so called “fraud on the market suits”) filed against corporations and corporations’
officers and directors for compensation for securities fraud losses. However, these suits
provide limited compensation. The average securities fraud settlement award is trivial in
relation to shareholder losses, with recovery of as little as 2%-3% of estimated damages. 7
Shareholder losses stemming from fraud at a large firm with actively traded stock can
total billions of dollars, easily dwarfing the amounts available for shareholder
compensation from current sources, i.e., payouts under directors’ and officers’ (D&O)
liability insurance policies, company funds, and, occasionally, the personal resources of
officers and directors. Moreover, not only do fraud on the market suits provide minimal
compensation, but they also do a poor job of deterring fraud. These suits often allow the
perpetrators (e.g., corporate officers) to evade personal responsibility by settling such
suits, with no admission of wrongdoing, using the corporation’s money or the proceeds of
D&O insurance policy payouts. 8 This seriously undermines the purported deterrence
effect of such lawsuits on corporate managers.
To improve compensation and better deter fraud, this Article explores the creation of
an investor compensation fund (ICF). Under this proposal, fraud on the market suits will
be eliminated, and a special purpose insurance fund will be created to provide investor
restitution for fraud-related losses. Every time a share of stock or similar security is sold
in the secondary market, a fee (premium) will be collected from the selling shareholder
and placed into the fund. A firm’s fraud risk rating, reflecting the likelihood of fraud
occurring, will determine the size of the fee to be paid by each selling shareholder. The
ICF premium feature acts as a fraud deterrent because the size of the ICF premium will
be reflected in a company’s share price, providing incentives for managers to institute the
control mechanisms necessary to minimize the likelihood of fraud. The ICF also offers
the promise of a large source of funding for defrauded shareholder compensation.
In addition to setting forth a reform proposal, this Article makes another
contribution to the literature. Exploring the creation of an investor compensation fund
provides an opportunity to consider the advantages and disadvantages of ex ante 9 (i.e.,
regulation through the use of fraud risk ratings) and ex post (i.e., litigation) approaches to
limiting harm from securities fraud. There are costs and benefits to both approaches to
managing the securities fraud problem. The ICF, with elements of both approaches, can

7. See LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
SETTLEMENTS, 2006 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 6 (2007) (finding settlements represent a median 2.4% of
“estimated damages” in 2006 and 3.6% of “estimated damages” in 1996-2005), available at
http://www.cornerstone.com/pdf/practice_securities/2006Settlements.pdf. Cornerstone Research cautions that
its damages estimates should not be assumed to be the amount of actual damages borne by shareholders, as the
figure is derived using a highly simplified methodology. Id. at 4. Thus, one should employ caution when
comparing investor recoveries to this measure of damages. Nonetheless, it is clear that, on average, there is a
sizable difference between typical settlement recoveries and investor losses. It should be noted, however, that
there are exceptions to this general rule and that recovery as a percentage of total losses is generally higher in
smaller settlements. See id. at 6.
8. For exceptions to this general rule, see, e.g., Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1055, 1057 (2006) (“In [the Enron and WorldCom settlements], outside directors agreed to make
substantial payments out of their own pockets to settle securities class action lawsuits . . . .”).
9. Of course, the securities laws now employ a robust regulatory mechanism. However, implementing
the ICF would add to this regime significantly.
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be used as a vehicle to highlight some of the more salient issues and tradeoffs in this area.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II addresses what, given the current state of
securities regulation scholarship, is likely to be one of the principal objections to the ICF
Proposal by responding to the argument against compensation for securities fraud losses.
The section does not include a full discussion of all of the considerations relevant to
compensation for securities fraud losses, but rather outlines responses to those who argue
that such compensation is unnecessary. Part III of the Article briefly examines the
securities class action mechanism and describes its shortcomings. Part IV sets forth the
ICF Proposal and addresses potential objections and key implementation challenges.
Creation of the ICF, though in all likelihood an improvement over the current regime as a
theoretical matter, would entail significant implementation and administrative challenges.
This Article, by design, does not address fully all of these challenges, but rather suggests
what the primary concerns about implementation of a proposal of this type might be.
Finally, Part V of the Article considers several alternative reform proposals. After
reviewing these proposals, it should become clear that the ICF is not as unorthodox as it
may seem initially. All of the proposals are in some respects similar to the ICF and have
attractive features. However, in comparing these schemes to the ICF, one will be able to
recognize the unique advantages of the ICF and its ability to provide superior
compensation to securities fraud victims and deter fraud.
II. RESPONSE TO THE ANTI-COMPENSATION ARGUMENT
Many leading scholars oppose the idea of compensation for securities fraud losses.
The following statement, made by Janet Cooper Alexander in a well-known article, is
representative of the prevailing view:
The chance of being on the losing or winning side of a transaction when the
stock price is distorted by a securities violation can be assumed to be random.
The more trades investors make, the more likely that, in the aggregate, their
gains from trading while material facts are withheld will equal their losses. 10
Under this theory, active traders with diversified portfolios will benefit as often from
securities fraud as they will be harmed by it. Therefore, investors should have no
expected overall losses from securities fraud, making efforts to provide compensation
inefficient.
Under the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), investors receive compensation
(investment returns) only for bearing systematic risks. A systematic risk is a risk that
affects almost all stocks trading on the market to a greater or lesser degree (e.g., inflation,
interest rates, general economic conditions). An unsystematic, or idiosyncratic, risk, on
the other hand, is a risk that affects one or a small number of stocks trading on the market
(e.g., a failed product launch, the loss of a key executive). Under this model, proper
diversification virtually eliminates an investor’s exposure to unsystematic risk and thus is

10. Alexander, supra note 4, at 1502. There are two investors (ignoring for present purposes the role of
any “market maker” that matches buy and sell orders) involved in each trade of a stock artificially inflated by
securities fraud. The shareholder (Shareholder A) who purchased stock before the commencement of any fraud
and then sold that stock to another investor (Shareholder B) at an artificially inflated price while the fraud was
occurring but before the fraud was uncovered benefited from the fraudulent scheme and enjoyed a “gain.”
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a prudent investment strategy.
The argument set forth by those who oppose compensation for securities fraud is not
merely that fraud risk is idiosyncratic, like many other business risks, and hence can be
largely eliminated by diversification. Their claim is different. They suggest that, with
respect to securities fraud risk specifically, the risk of loss from fraud is, on average,
equal to the prospect of gain from fraud elsewhere (not just a gain from any other type of
business occurrence). 11 The focus by compensation opponents on the purported equality
of gains and losses, rather than diversification generally, serves as a tacit
acknowledgement that securities fraud risk is different in kind from other types of
business risks and that its effects should be considered separately. 12 Indeed, securities
fraud risk is different. Even risk-seeking investors who intentionally fail to diversify feel
legitimately cheated by securities fraud. Investors understand that the market entails risk
and that some investment decisions will lead to losses. However, buying a stock while
fraud is ongoing disadvantages an investor in an unfair way. Fundamental company
analysis is meaningless when the information upon which that analysis is based is
fraudulent.
Those who oppose compensation for securities fraud losses effectively assert that,
on average, investors are not harmed by fraud on the market. This is a type of corrective
justice argument, though generally not expressed as such. 13 Corrective justice requires
compensation in the face of harm. 14 Thus, even if it were true that, in the aggregate,
gains and losses from fraud are equal, 15 there are a number of instances in which this will
11. A CAPM adherent could make the claim that diversification alone would provide investors with
substantial protection from fraud. Just as an investor could lose 75% of her investment in a company because of
fraud, an investor could see the value of her investment in another company increase because of some
unexpected good news (e.g., a company in which she is invested has discovered the cure for cancer). I leave to
future work exploration of whether securities fraud is fully diversifiable generally. However, because in my
view, as described in this section, fraud risk is different in nature from other business risks, the answer to this
question does not affect the basic thesis of this Article.
12. But see Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 1, 13 (2007) (arguing that “[t]he risk of simple securities fraud is like any other ordinary business
risk”).
13. These are notable exceptions, however. For examples of works in which corrective justice is discussed
in connection with securities litigation, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages In Securities
Fraud Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 371-72 (2007) (describing, but ultimately rejecting, the corrective
justice argument for private securities class actions); William M. Sage, Some Principles Require Principals:
Why Banning “Conflicts Of Interest” Won't Solve Incentive Problems in Biomedical Research, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1413, 1462 (2007) (briefly discussing the failure of fraud on the market suits to advance corrective justice).
14. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 15 (1995)
("[T]hose who are responsible for wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair them . . . ."). In the discussion
that follows, the Investor Compensation Fund will be described as advancing the aims of corrective justice by
requiring the wrongdoers (i.e., the corporate officers participating in the fraud) to contribute to the fund, while
providing an insurance mechanism to cover the gap between the wrongdoers’ ability to pay and the total losses
caused. See text accompanying infra note 316.
15. It should be noted that the gains-equals-losses in the aggregate argument does not hold with respect to
non-insiders in the presence of insider trading. (“Insider trading” is trading by insiders (e.g., company officers)
while in possession of material, non-public information.) If insiders commit securities fraud by deceiving the
market about a firm’s prospects and do so to be on the winning side of trades tainted by fraud, then outside
shareholders, by definition, will be on the losing side of these trades. Thus, when factoring in trades by insiders,
on average, outsiders will be net losers. See generally Pritchard, supra note 4, at 946 n.78 (stating that
“investors cannot diversify away wealth transfers to” traders with an asymmetric information advantage); see
also Booth, supra note 12, at 14 (“Fraud with insider trading constitutes a net loss to investors in the
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not be true for any individual investor. 16 The examples that follow illustrate that
securities fraud can cause substantial injury to investors of all types. Compensation,
therefore, is justified to make these investors whole.
A. Asymmetries Stemming from the Market’s Reaction to Fraud Announcements
The losses of the investors on the losing side of trades tainted by fraud are more
likely to exceed the gains of the investors on the winning side of such trades, without
regard to diversification or trading activity. While fraud is ongoing, but before it is
revealed, investors who sell fraud-tainted stock have an “improper” gain equal to the sale
price of the stock minus the price at which the stock would trade in the absence of fraud.
At the time of the trade, the investor that buys the fraud-tainted stock has an equivalent
unrealized loss in the form of overpayment. However, when the fraud is revealed, the
price of the stock generally does not decline only to where it would have been in the
absence of fraud. Instead, the stock declines further, as the market discounts the price of
the stock for the uncertainty surrounding what additional bad news may be forthcoming
from the company. 17 There is a fundamental asymmetry here. Under this scenario, for
gains and losses from fraud to be equivalent over time, an investor has to find herself on
the winning side of fraud-tainted trades more, by dollar volume, than she finds herself on
the losing side. Being on either side in roughly equal proportions is not sufficient to avoid
net overall losses.
Even if the market’s response upon the fraud disclosure is a temporary overreaction,
compensation for loss is still justified. It may be true that if the market overreacts to the
news of fraud by lowering the stock price too much, then investors who purchase at the
excessively low price are achieving a gain. This result then leads to a situation where
shareholder gains and losses again are equal in the aggregate. However, the type of
investor that decides to sell upon a fraud announcement because of fears of additional bad
news to come is of a different type than the speculative trader who buys the stock
precisely at that moment because she believes she is receiving a bargain. The shareholder
who sells after the fraud revelation suffers harm, and the gain of the speculative trader
does not diminish that harm in any way.
B. The Potential for Loss is Substantial for all Investors
There is empirical evidence that demonstrates that, in any individual case, even
large, diversified investors can suffer significant net harm from securities fraud. In 2005,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, a vocal foe of the current
aggregate.”).
16. “Individual” in this context means “single,” as opposed to multiple. As used here, “individual” does
not refer only to natural persons.
17. See Shantaram P. Hegde, Chris B. Malone & John D. Finnerty, The Financial Impacts of Fraud and
Securities Class Action Suits 41 (Jan. 7, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (“Overall, the [study’s] findings are
consistent with the proposition that investors faced with fraud allegations and ongoing uncertainty about a
firm’s reputation and prospects will exit en-masse such firms, almost without regard to price. Investors are
clearly ‘frightened’ by concerns over agency costs, information asymmetry, bad reputation and uncertainty.”),
available at http://207.36.165.114/Denver/Papers/10b5.pdf; see also Booth, supra note 12, at 5 (describing the
negative effect the anticipation of the company paying damages in a securities class action suit can have on
stock price upon a fraud revelation).
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securities litigation regime, 18 commissioned an empirical study (the “U.S. Chamber
Study”) to test the theoretical assertion that aggregate trading gains and losses from fraud,
over time, are equivalent. The authors of the study, which review trades over a ten-year
period, find that large, diversified institutional investors 19 have an average (median)
fraud-related net trading loss of $5 million ($0.25 million). 20 The authors acknowledge
the potentially devastating effects of securities fraud on undiversified investors, 21 but
conclude the theoretical assertions of the anti-compensation camp are correct—over time,
net losses from securities fraud for large, diversified investors will be approximately
zero. However, the U.S. Chamber Study, while purportedly providing evidence that
compensation for securities fraud is unnecessary for large, diversified investors, finds
results that are telling: even large, diversified investors can be large net losers from
securities fraud.
The data reproduced in the U.S. Chamber Study show that several large institutional
investors suffered significant trading losses during the ten-year study period. Though one
investor (out of 2,596) enjoyed a net gain of over $200 million, 18 investors suffered net
losses exceeding $200 million. 22 Eight of these 18 investors had net losses exceeding
$500 million, and one investor suffered a net loss of over $1 billion. 23 No investor
enjoyed gains exceeding $300 million. 24 These findings are significant because the U.S.
Chamber Study, which purports to describe trading gains and losses from every securities
18. For an example of the securities litigation issues on which the Institute for Legal Reform focuses, see,
Inst.
for
Legal
Reform,
Securities
Litigation,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/issue.cfm?issue=SLI (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
19. Defined as those investors required by the SEC to file quarterly Form 13F statements detailing their
investment holdings. See THAKOR ET AL., supra note 5, at 10-11. Investors that are required to file 13Fs are
investment managers with $100 million or more in assets under discretionary management. SEC, Division of
Investment Management: Frequently Asked Questions About Form 13F, May 2005, available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm. Managers must report all long common stock positions of
at least 10,000 shares or $200,000 in fair market value. Id. One of the limitations of the U.S. Chamber study is
that it must rely on Form 13Fs, which aggregate data for fund families (e.g., all of the Fidelity funds or all of the
Janus funds). No data is available for individual funds within the organization. Investors do not invest in fund
families, but rather in individual funds. Therefore, any insights derived from this study cannot fairly be
described as giving us a sense for what any individual investor would have experienced as a result of securities
fraud over the ten-year study period. However, the study is useful in that it attempts to simulate the experience
of large, diversified investors.
20. This figure does not factor in any potential recoveries from litigation. THAKOR ET AL., supra note 5, at
12.
21. Id. at 19.
22. Id. at 12 fig.2, as confirmed by study authors.
23. Id.
24. Id. The sample in this study includes corporations that issued shares during the class action period, and
the study’s results show that, overall, investor net losses are likely to be greater when the defendant corporation
issues shares during the class action period. See THAKOR ET AL., supra note 5, at 15-17 (discussing this
finding). As the authors explain, this is because, under this scenario, the corporation itself sells shares to the
market, which creates a situation under which the number of shares purchased by investors will exceed the
number of shares sold by investors while the fraud is ongoing. Id. at 15. This finding may explain, in part, the
reason for the asymmetry between the number of extreme net gainers and extreme net losers in the study. One
must note that because the study does not limit its sample exclusively to frauds that affect secondary market
prices only, but also includes cases that affect primary market purchases, the results are somewhat less relevant
to a consideration of the creation of the Investor Compensation Fund, which, as described infra, will provide
recovery for instances of fraud that affect secondary market prices only. It is clear that investors suffer net
losses when purchasing shares at artificially inflated prices directly from the corporation.
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fraud case involving common stock, 25 shows that even professional investors with large,
diversified portfolios can find themselves on the losing side of trades tainted by fraud
more often than on the winning side and incur net losses of $1 billion or more over a tenyear period. Thus, if the study’s authors are correct, not only is it possible for gains and
losses to fail to be exactly equivalent or even approximately equivalent over time, they
can be significantly different. The existence of losses of this magnitude ($5 million on
average or as much as $1 billion) suggests that securities fraud risk is significant—too
significant for a prudent investment manager to ignore. Indeed, potential uncompensated
losses of this magnitude can lead to allocative efficiency losses, as investors expend
resources attempting to guard against the harm from securities fraud. 26 Specifically,
these traders will spend time ferreting out information related to fraud risk, at the expense
of gathering information that bears on company fundamentals (e.g., sales growth
potential and market competition). 27 Even diversified investors want to avoid being on
the losing side of a trade tainted by fraud 28 and will take the necessary steps to achieve
this objective.
Of course, if the U.S. Chamber Study is correct, for large, diversified institutions,
expected net losses from fraud should be approximately zero, even if reality can differ
and differ substantially. If the managers of institutions believe the findings of the U.S.
Chamber Study (i.e., believe that gains and losses, over time, will be equal) and act
rationally, eliminating compensatory mechanisms for securities fraud loss would have no
effect on their behavior. We would expect to see no resources expended by such investors
to guard against the harm of uncompensated (ex post) losses because they have no reason
to believe that their outcomes will differ from the average. However, managers of
institutional investors do not always behave rationally. 29 This suggests that these
managers indeed will engage in what some may term inefficient behavior by expending
resources to minimize their downside exposure. No manager wants to suffer large
investment losses of any sort, including from fraud, regardless of any gains from fraud
she unknowingly may have enjoyed in the past or may enjoy in the future. In fact,
because of loss aversion, 30 investors are likely to be far more worried about fraud losses
than they are pleased by the prospect of fraud gains. Loss aversion applies in many
contexts, but it is reasonable to conclude that its effect would be magnified in the
securities fraud context because the investors that achieve “gains” do not know they are
receiving a gain at the time they receive it and, indeed, may never realize it.
C. Buy-and-Hold Investors are Likely to Suffer Significant Harm from Securities Fraud
The fraud losses of buy-and-hold investors, even those who are well diversified, are
25. The cases studied exclude analyst and IPO cases. Id. app. I at 1.
26. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 641.
27. See generally Pritchard, supra note 4, at 941-42 (discussing the effect of fraud on research and
verification efforts by traders).
28. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 641.
29. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 17-20
(2003) (describing the ways in which institutional managers “suffer from behavioral biases”).
30. Under the theory of “loss aversion,” the loss of, for example, $100 hurts an investor more than gaining
$100 will provide pleasure. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
183, 185 (1999).
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likely to exceed any gains from fraud. 31 Those who assert that expected gains and losses
from fraud over the long-term will be approximately equal assume active trading. 32 This
is because one must sell stocks with prices that are inflated by fraud as often (by
approximate dollar volume) as one buys stocks with prices that are inflated by fraud.
Alexander, a proponent of the anti-compensation argument, acknowledges that the
purported offsetting of fraud-related gains and losses is a reflection of “statistical
probabilities.” 33 As Alexander states, “The more trades that are made and the more
diversified the investments, … the more an individual’s experience is likely to approach
the statistical mean.” 34 Thus, if an investor is risk averse (which is generally the case),
she will want to reduce the variance (a measure of the extent to which potential outcomes
may differ from expected returns) and have her actual outcome be as close to the
expected outcome as possible. 35 This is achieved by active trading, rather than holding a
constant portfolio, no matter how well diversified. 36 Thus, the only way for an investor
to “protect” herself from being a “net loser” from securities fraud is not only by
diversifying, but also by trading frequently.
Imagine the extreme case of the buy-and-hold investor that buys, but never sells
(i.e., she holds the stocks in her portfolio until infinity). If this investor purchases a stock
with a price that is inflated by fraud, the amount of this overpayment will never be
recouped by a gain from selling a stock that also has an inflated price. This investor never
sells. It is, of course, somewhat unrealistic to speak of an investor that never sells stock.
Liquidity needs prompt virtually every investor to sell some stock eventually. However,
the net buyer (rare seller) is not likely to have equivalent gains and losses from fraud.
Thus, it is clear that this type of investor, who is following a rational investment strategy,
is not going to be economically indifferent to the incidence of fraud. 37
31. This analysis relies on the assumption that there are more instances of “bad news” fraud (i.e., fraud
that results in an artificially high stock price because bad news is concealed) than “good news” fraud (i.e., fraud
that results in an artificially low stock price because good news is concealed). This is generally understood to be
the case. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 12, at 6 ( “There are notable examples of both types of fraud, but bad news
fraud is far more common . . . .”).
32. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 639, 646 (1996) (“At least active traders with large, diversified portfolios have roughly the same chance of
being winners as losers from securities fraud . . . .”) (emphasis added).
33. Alexander, supra note 4, at 1502 n.58.
34. Id.
35. See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
84-85 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing how variance decreases with increased numbers of transactions (coin flips in
their simplified example)).
36. Recall the anti-compensation argument is not that fraud risk is diversifiable just like any other business
risk, but that gains and losses from the same risk—namely fraud risk—will be equal.
37. For other arguments that buy-and-hold and long-term investors suffer net losses from securities fraud,
see Booth, supra note 12, at 11 n.23 (describing the “intergenerational conflict” that, according to Julian
Velasco, affects the “equivalent gains and losses” argument). Velasco suggests that younger buy-and-hold
investors are net buyers and suffer disproportionately from fraud that inflates stock prices because they may not
sell as often as they buy. Id. Though they will sell periodically for tax or rebalancing reasons, there is some
question as to whether the number of purchases will outweigh the number of sales. Id. Velasco points out that
these investors will become net sellers as they age, and then the bias will reverse. Id. However, this “may not be
enough to overcome the time-value of earlier lost returns.” Id; see also Jill Fisch, Criminalization of Corporate
Law: The Impact on Shareholders and Other Constituents, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 91, 94 (2007) (arguing,
generally, that though short-term “in and out” traders benefit from fraud, investors in indexed mutual funds
suffer because index funds do not “get out of [the stock of] a company [engaging in fraud].”) [hereinafter Fisch,

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art76

10

Davis Evans:

2007]

The Investor Compensation Fund

111

The evidence suggests that the typical buy-and-hold investor is a retail investor. 38
Therefore, retail investors are more likely to suffer harm from securities fraud than
institutions because individuals generally trade less frequently than institutions. Though
annual market turnover exceeds 100%, 39 suggesting highly active trading in the market
overall, one survey of 2,187 retail investors conducted by the Investment Company
Institute and the Securities Industry Association found that 60% of these investors did not
trade at all in 2004; 57% of those that did trade made fewer than six trades that year. 40
Other studies have found similar levels of trading activity among retail investors. 41
Though they trade infrequently, retail investors, according to a 2000 report on share
ownership by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), directly own approximately 40%
of the value of U.S. stocks 42 and therefore comprise a significant portion of the
investment community. Therefore, the assumption of active trading is not a valid one for
a meaningful segment of the investor population.
One could argue that, even if active trading is required to eliminate the risk of
securities fraud, we simply could encourage retail investors not only to diversify, but to
diversify and trade frequently. However, doing so would have adverse consequences.
Frequent trading is costly for retail investors, and not only because of transaction costs; 43

Criminalization of Corporate Law].
38. “Retail investors” are natural persons.
New
York
Stock
Exch.,
NYSE
Group
Turnover
Statistics,
39. See,
e.g.,
http://www.nysedata.com/nysedata/Home/FactsFigures/tabid/115/Default.aspx (follow “Market Activity”
hyperlink; then follow “NYSE Group Turnover” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 18, 2007).
40. INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 25 fig.34 (2005), available at
http://www.ici.org/shareholders/dec/1rpt_05_equity_owners.pdf. The survey defines an equity trade as either
the sale or purchase of a corporate stock or shares in a mutual fund. Id. at 39. Thus, these figures overstate the
level of direct trading by retail investors.
41. For example, one study analyzing retail trading behavior between 1991 and 1996 finds that the
average turnover rate in portfolios at a retail brokerage house was 7.59% and that the typical retail investor
made fewer than ten trades per year. Alok Kumar & William N. Goetzmann, Equity Portfolio Diversification 8
(Yale
ICF,
Working
Paper
No.
00-59,
2002),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=287998. Another study, which followed the trading
behavior of individual investors over a six-year period, finds that the median number of stocks traded by retail
investors in a month was 0.37. Gina Nicolosi et al., Do Individual Investors Learn from Their Trading
Experience?
19
tbl.1
(unpublished
manuscript)
(2004),
available
at
http://faculty.gsm.ucdavis.edu/~nzhu/papers/learning.pdf; cf. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading is
Hazardous to Your Wealth, 55 J. FIN. 773, 781 (2000) (analyzing a set of discount brokerage data and finding
that “[t]he average household turns over more than 75 percent of its common stock portfolio each year”). Barber
and Odean further note that the high turnover rate among the individuals in their study contributed to lower
returns. Id. at 773. Even if the Barber and Odean study sample is more representative of the overall individual
investor population with respect to trading frequency than those in the studies described above, and this is not
clear, there are still valid reasons, as described in this section, not to provide incentives for excessive trading by
eliminating compensation for fraud losses. Moreover, an investor that owns a small number of stocks (e.g., four
stocks) can turn over 75% of her portfolio in a year by making only a few sell/buy trades (e.g., three) in that
year. Thus, for purposes of this discussion, this still would represent a low level of trading activity.
42. NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., SHAREOWNERSHIP 2000: BASED ON THE 1998 SURVEY OF CONSUMER
FINANCES 34 (2000), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/shareho.pdf. This figure on “household sector”
ownership (41.1%) includes ownership by individuals and nonprofit institutions. Id. at 33. Nonprofit holdings
are estimated to be approximately 5% of the household sector total. Id. It also should be noted that the corporate
stock represented in this data includes some closely held stock. Id. at 32-33.
43. See, e.g., Barber & Odean, supra note 41, at 775 (“Trading costs are high. The average round-trip
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there is evidence that frequent trading leads to lower overall returns for such investors. 44
In addition, for at least the past 70 years, financial economists have warned against the
risk of excessive trading and have worried that investors focused on achieving short-term
gains through speculation would hinder the primary purpose of the market (i.e., allocating
capital to American businesses). 45 So, were compensation for securities fraud
discontinued, investors, in effect, would have incentives to trade more, perhaps more than
is justified by company fundamentals, in order to sell some “lemons” to others and
protect themselves from the risk of fraud. 46
D. The Undiversified Investor Has a Legitimate Claim to Protection From Fraud
There is no question that undiversified investors can suffer substantial harm from
securities fraud. Despite the oft-repeated call to diversify, many retail investors in the
United States do not hold well-diversified portfolios. According to the most recent
Survey of Consumer Finances published by the Federal Reserve Board, almost 60% of
individual investors (households) surveyed hold stock in three or fewer companies, and
approximately 35% hold stock in only one company. 47 Another study of retail investor
diversification finds similar results and shows not only that individuals invest in low
numbers of stocks, but also that even those individuals investing in larger numbers of
stocks invest in the wrong mix of stocks for sufficient diversification. 48 In this study, the
researchers find no evidence that retail investors make up for their lack of diversification
by mutual fund or “safe” investing elsewhere, 49 suggesting the figures reported, in all
likelihood, accurately reflect the lack of diversification in the United States. Though
reasons for the lack of diversification vary 50 and may be economically irrational, the

trade in excess of $1,000 costs three percent in commissions and one percent in bid-ask spread.”).
44. See, e.g., id. at 774 (stating that their study evidence shows “households that trade frequently earn a
net annualized geometric mean return of 11.4 percent, and those that trade infrequently earn 18.5 percent”).
45. See Dean Baker et al., The Case for a Securities Transactions Tax: Taxing the Big Casino 1-2 (Econ.
Pol’y Inst., Technical Paper No. 229, 1995).
46. Doing so, of course, would accomplish nothing with respect to lessening overall investor losses from
fraud, but each investor would have incentives to try to avoid being on the losing side of fraud-tainted trades.
47. Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004
Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL. 2006, at A15 (2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2004/bull0206.pdf.
48. See, e.g., Mark S. Rzepczynski, Portfolio Diversification: Investors Just Don’t Seem to Have Enough,
JWH J. (John W. Henry & Co., Boca Raton, Fla.), 2003, at 2, available at
http://www.jwh.com/Documents/JWHJournal_2003.pdf (discussing results of study performed by Kumar and
Goetzmann, described in note 41, infra). As Rzepczynski explains, the study finds that even for the portfolios
that hold larger numbers of stocks, there is no “appreciable difference in the average correlation across the
stocks.” Id. Thus, the holders of these portfolios do not appear to do a better job at diversifying (other than
because of the higher numbers of stocks owned) than do the holders of portfolios with a small number of stocks.
Id.
49. Kumar & Goetzmann, supra note 41, at 4 (noting that mutual fund allocation was approximately 15%
of the investors’ overall portfolios, on average, and that such allocation did not vary significantly by investor
based on diversification of the studied portfolio).
50. See id. at 31-32 (stating that the reasons for the lack of diversification include (1) search and
monitoring costs, (2) the “false perception” by investors “that they can manage their portfolio risks better by a
thorough understanding of a small number of firms rather than diversifying,” (3) an illusory sense of control
stemming from direct involvement in the investment process in lieu of reliance on others (e.g., through mutual
funds) to make investment decisions, and (4) gambling tendencies).
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reality is that many retail investors, who as a group directly hold over 40% of the value of
U.S. stocks, are not well diversified. Thus, even if being diversified would make one as
apt to be on the winning side of a trade tainted by fraud as on the losing side, this would
not be the case for many retail investors who simply are not diversified. Thus, failing to
provide compensation for securities fraud losses would harm a large segment of the
investment community and could discourage more widespread participation in securities
markets. 51
One of the fundamental tenets of our legal system is that when someone is harmed
by the misconduct of another, she should receive compensation for her loss. The
commission of securities fraud can lead to real human suffering, primarily in cases where
retail investors are not properly diversified and lose virtually all of their savings because
of an investment in a company engaging in fraud. Richard Booth, in accord with the
conventional wisdom in this area, argues that the law should provide no compensation to
investors for fraud-related losses. 52 According to Booth, “it is irrational for an investor
not to diversify,” 53 and diversified investors, in the absence of insider trading, will suffer
no harm from securities fraud. 54 Therefore, because “[s]ecurities law should protect only
reasonable investors,” 55 no compensation for securities fraud losses is necessary.
As previously discussed, not only the undiversified or irrational are harmed by
securities fraud; even diversified investors can suffer measurable harm. However, even if
it were the case that only investors who failed to diversify adequately could suffer fraudrelated losses, it does not necessarily follow that compensation is not warranted. When
corporate officers commit fraud by intentionally misleading shareholders who lose
money on their investments, the investors have a legitimate claim to be made whole,
without regard to whether they could have self-insured against the loss by diversifying. 56
51. There is evidence that individual investors already believe that they are protected against losses from
securities fraud. See OPINION RESEARCH CORP., INVESTOR SURVIVAL SKILLS SURVEY: AN EXAMINATION OF
INVESTOR KNOWLEDGE AND BEHAVIOR 8 (2005) (showing that 92% of individual investors surveyed do not
know that their investments are not insured against losses from securities fraud by the government), available at
http://www.sipc.org/pdf/121305_SIPC_IPT_survey.pdf. Approximately 80% of those surveyed believe their
investments are insured by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and/or the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), which only protects investors
against loss of property (e.g., cash and securities) at failed brokerage firms. Id. One possible source of the
confusion may stem from the reforms passed following the spate of accounting scandals in connection with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, such as the creation of Fair Funds, discussed in Part V.A,, infra. In any event, if there is
another major accounting scandal that leaves investors largely uncompensated for their losses (as will be the
case, with respect to the lack of compensation, in the absence of reform), investors will be disabused of their
mistaken belief in the existence of meaningful insurance protection and may exit the markets. It is worthwhile
to note that the survey participants are current investors. It is, therefore, conceivable that a belief in the
existence of an insurance mechanism gives these investors greater confidence to invest. Providing a real
insurance fund, such as the ICF, discussed in Part IV, infra, and publicizing its existence, may encourage more
individuals to enter the market.
52. Booth, supra note 12, at 11. For a description of exceptions to this view, see id. at n.40.
53. Id. at 12. Booth offers limited exceptions to this general view. See id. at 14-15 & n.40.
54. Id. at 12, 14.
55. Booth, supra note 12, at 10.
56. One might argue that what would be most appropriate given the foregoing arguments is for
compensation for fraud losses to be provided only to undiversified investors. However, such a regime could
have negative unintended consequences. First, it could result in companies eschewing investments by individual
investors on the margin. If managers intend to engage in fraud, in such a regime, they would prefer to have
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E. Political Considerations
Even if one remains unconvinced of the necessity or appropriateness of
compensation in this context, it seems clear that current political exigencies make
achieving the end of shareholder compensation unlikely. The 1995 Republican-led
Congress enacted, over President Clinton’s veto, sweeping reforms to the securities class
action system through the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in an effort
to make securities fraud suits more difficult to bring and win. 57 However, despite the
broad nature of the reforms, neither the PSLRA, nor any proposed legislation leading up
to passage of the PSLRA, eliminated or even substantively reduced the compensation
available for fraud losses. 58 This suggests that Congress may have been far from
enamored with securities litigation, but still saw some value in providing damages for
losses, or found it politically unviable to limit them. If Congress in 1995 was unwilling to
abolish compensation, it is unlikely that any post-Enron era Congress would consider
doing so. If Congress declared an end to compensation for victims of securities fraud,
there undoubtedly would be expressions of outrage from investors. The economic
arguments against investor compensation would not be able to withstand the ensuing
political pressure amid the public demand for justice. 59 Thus, in my view, it is
appropriate for securities regulation scholars to consider ways to provide compensation
effectively and efficiently.

diversified investors (such as large institutions) in the pool of potential claimants. (To discourage individual
stock ownership, firms could fail to do stock splits after significant stock price increases or fail to market their
shares to individual investors. Of course, one may argue that a manager intent on engaging in fraud would
prefer an investor base consisting more of retail investors than institutional investors because retail investors are
less likely to serve as effective monitors. However, there is reason to question whether an investor base
comprised exclusively (or almost so) of institutions would engage in substantially more monitoring than occurs
now. See infra note 113 for further discussion of this point.) In addition, providing compensation for only
undiversified investors could provide incentives for individual investors to avoid mutual fund investments in
favor of direct investment. Though the benefits of diversification that may be achieved through a mutual fund
are substantial, investors may forego that benefit if they feel they will have more protection from fraud by
investing directly in stocks. Finally, administering such a scheme would be very challenging because claimants
would have to prove not only that they were shareholders in the subject company, but also prove that they lack
sufficient additional investments, so as to be considered a true “undiversified investor.” Compensation for all
fraud losses suffered by all investors, therefore, should be an integral part of our securities regulation regime.
57. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
58. See Alexander, supra note 4, at 1488 (recognizing that, despite “the sweeping changes that won
approval in one or both houses,” no reform “addressed the measure of damages”). One limited exception to the
foregoing is the so-called “bounceback” provision (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)) which affects damages
awards by separating fraud-related losses from losses caused by market conditions at the time of the corrective
disclosure. John Finnerty & George Pushner, An Improved Two-Trader Model for Measuring Damages in
Securities Fraud Class Actions, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 213, 224 (2003). The PSLRA accomplishes this by
requiring that plaintiff damages in “bad news” fraud cases be no more than the difference between the price
paid for the stock and (1) the average trading price during the 90-day period following the corrective disclosure
or (2) the average price during the period the stock is held by the investor following the corrective disclosure if
shorter than 90 days. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1)-(2). Comparable provisions apply in “good news” fraud cases.
Despite the enactment of the bounceback provision, the basic calculation of damages for securities fraud losses
was unchanged by the PSLRA.
59. Of course, the creation of an investor compensation fund, as described infra Part IV.C.8., poses its
own set of political challenges.
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III. SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
In the prior section, I argue that compensation is a necessary feature of securities
regulation. However, the primary means of providing compensation to defrauded
shareholders, the securities class action lawsuit, is largely ineffective. 60 Under Rule 10b5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 61 private litigants may
sue a corporation and its officers and directors for securities fraud if the private litigants
either purchased or sold securities during a period when fraud affected the price of the
securities. These so-called “fraud on the market” suits, however, provide limited
compensation for fraud-related losses. According to Cornerstone Research, the average
securities fraud settlement award in each of 2006 and 2005 represented only 2.4% and
3.1%, respectively, before plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, of estimated shareholder
damages. 62 Despite the small recoveries, the securities class action provides more
compensation for investors than any other means. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) itself concluded, “private litigation [rather than SEC enforcement
action] remains the best mechanism for investor recovery of losses.” 63 This is an
unfortunate fact, indeed, given the small amounts available for investor restitution.
The low level of compensation to the shareholder class is driven in part by the
nature of the insurance market. Damages in securities fraud cases equal the difference
between the price paid 64 for the share of stock and what the price would have been in the
absence of fraud, multiplied by the number of shares traded while the fraud is ongoing. 65
For a large firm with actively traded stock, these damages can total billions of dollars.
For example, 18 (out of over 90) of the securities litigation cases settled in 2006 had
estimated damages, as defined by Cornerstone Research, of over $5 billion; half of these
cases had estimated damages exceeding $10 billion. 66 Though there are notable
exceptions, 67 research shows the overwhelming majority (96%, by one estimate) of

60. Securities class actions have been highly criticized along a number of dimensions. In this section, I
focus only briefly on their effectiveness with respect to compensation and deterrence and on the cost of
administration.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007).
62. SIMMONS & RYAN, supra note 7, at 6. See text accompanying note 7, supra, for cautionary language
regarding these damages estimates. Plaintiffs can pursue parties other than the corporation and its officers, such
as auditors, in hopes of achieving higher recoveries. However, according to one plaintiffs’ attorney with over 25
years of securities litigation experience, with whom I spoke on condition of anonymity, establishing liability for
non-insiders and winning such cases is typically more difficult. Telephone Interview with plaintiffs’ attorney
(June 21, 2007) [hereinafter Telephone Interview #1]. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities
Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1550 (2006) (stating,
“Auditors… appear to be named as defendants in only a very low percentage of securities class actions”).
63. SEC, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 20 (2003)
[hereinafter SEC, SECTION 308(C) REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf.
64. This also can be the price sold if the allegation of fraud involves the withholding of “good news” that
would have made the price higher than the one at which the investor sold. These claims, however, occur much
less frequently than claims that the price was inflated by the nondisclosure of bad news. See discussion in note
31, supra.
65. This definition of damages, though accurate, oversimplifies the complicated damages calculation. See
note 122, infra, for further discussion on the damages calculation.
66. SIMMONS & RYAN, supra note 7, at 4.
67. Coffee, supra note 62, at 1556.
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securities class actions settle within D&O insurance policy limits. 68 Corporations cannot
afford the premiums on, and insurers are not willing to offer, policies with liability limits
that even would begin to approach the total measure of damages in large-scale fraud
cases. 69 In fact, there is evidence that insurers generally do not offer policy limits in
excess of $300 million. 70 Therefore, the limits imposed by the D&O insurance
marketplace generally preclude full compensation for investor losses. 71
Not only are fraud on the market suits ineffective at providing meaningful
compensation, they are also largely ineffective at deterring fraud. The securities class
action supplements the efforts of the SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the
two government agencies tasked with securities regulation and anti-fraud enforcement,
and serves as an additional fraud deterrent. On the surface, given the relative
pervasiveness of securities class action suits, one would think they would be effective
fraud deterrents. 72 According to NERA Economic Consulting, within a five-year period,
the average public company has a 6.4% chance of being named a defendant in a securities
class action. 73 Thus, such suits, particularly given their sometimes high profile nature,
occur with sufficient regularity to capture the attention of corporate managers. 74
However, the reality of securities class actions is different from their promise. 75
These suits suffer from several deficiencies brought on by the incentives of the plaintiffs’

68. Id. at 1550-51.
69. Id. at 1556.
70. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’
and Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1806 (2007) (noting that, based on the results of interviews
with D&O insurance executives, “the largest available [D&O] coverage limit is $300 million”), cited in Coffee,
supra note 62, at 1556 n.83. However, one D&O insurance executive (with over 25 years of experience in
various aspects of the industry), with whom I spoke on condition of anonymity, stated that corporations
generally could obtain more insurance than they do. The question is how much protection they are willing to
purchase given the cost. The executive suggested that it might be possible to put together a package of D&O
insurance for a large corporation of as much as $1.1 billion if backed by contingent pools of capital from
reinsurers. Telephone interview with D&O insurance executive (July 11, 2007) [hereinafter Telephone
Interview #2]. Of course, the premiums on this level of insurance coverage would be extremely high and in all
likelihood not cost-effective for the corporation. See Coffee, supra note 62, at 1556 (stating, “No corporation
can afford to insure its board for $1 billion…”). Moreover, this level of insurance, while a significant
improvement over current levels, still would represent only a portion of investor losses in large-scale fraud
cases.
71. Researchers have found the same limiting effect of insurance in medical malpractice lawsuits. See
Kathryn Zeiler et al., Physicians’ Insurance Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed
Claims, 1990-2003, J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 39) (“Although most legislatures have
shied away from capping economic damages, insurance policy limits appear to be an important source of soft
caps on malpractice plaintiffs' total recoveries.”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=981192. The fact that the
same phenomenon occurs in two different, but prominent litigation areas—securities class actions and medical
malpractice suits—suggests that it is unlikely that much more in payments can be extracted from corporate
defendants through securities litigation.
72. See Coffee, supra note 62, at 1548 (stating, “[S]ecurities class actions do seem sufficiently pervasive
to constitute a deterrent threat for most public corporations”).
73. TODD FOSTER ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: FILINGS STAY
LOW AND AVERAGE SETTLEMENTS STAY HIGH—BUT ARE THESE TRENDS REVERSING? 7 (2007), available at
http://www.nera.com/image/PUB_RecentTrends_Sep2007-FINAL.pdf. Estimate based on filing rate from
2005-2007(projected). Id. at 7, 16, n.6. Because of the decline in the number of securities class action filings
over the last two years, the probability of facing suit is lower than it has been in prior years. Id. at 7.
74. Coffee, supra note 62, at 1548.
75 See id.
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attorneys and the corporate managers that control the course of the litigation. Plaintiffs’
attorneys, who, as independent entrepreneurs, are primarily motivated by the size of the
potential recovery and attorneys’ fees, bring and largely manage fraud on the market
suits. All things being equal, the potential recovery in a class action lawsuit involving a
large firm with actively traded shares is likely to exceed the recovery in a case involving
a small firm with thinly traded stock. Thus, securities class actions can underdeter small
firms because such firms are less likely to face suit. 76
In addition, fraud on the market suits often allow wrongdoers to evade financial
responsibility. The typical class action lawsuit is settled. During the settlement process,
the claims against the officers and directors are settled along with those of the
corporation. Settlement agreements often are structured such that there is no finding of
intentional wrongdoing by the corporate officers, thus preserving the officers’ eligibility
for D&O insurance coverage. 77 Therefore, as stated by Adam Pritchard, “managers
[may] avoid personal liability by paying the claims with the corporation’s money.” 78
Empirical evidence shows that corporate officers rarely contribute to settlements, and
when they do contribute, there are special circumstances surrounding such agreements
(e.g., the defendant corporation is judgment proof because it has declared bankruptcy, the
D&O insurance is inadequate or has been rescinded due to fraud in the application, or
individual defendants agree to contribute to the settlement to receive a reduced jail
sentence or avoid indictment). 79 This state of affairs significantly undermines the
deterrence benefits that could flow from securities class actions. 80
Finally, conducting securities litigation is costly. In securities fraud class actions,
though judges and lead plaintiffs monitor attorney awards, studies have shown that
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees can equal from 16% to 32% of class recovery. 81 These figures,
76. See id. at 1543 (noting that, because attorneys’ fees are related to the size of recovery, small market
capitalization companies are not as likely to be sued); see also Telephone Interview #1, supra note 62 (stating
that small market capitalization companies with thinly traded stocks are less likely to be sued because expected
damages, due to the low trading volume, are not high and because class certification issues are more
challenging in these cases because reliance on the alleged fraudulent statements by the individual members of
the class must be shown); c.f. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (setting forth rebuttable presumption
of reliance on misstatements where stock is traded in an efficient market). The SEC, however, has a renewed
focus on prosecuting fraud in smaller companies. See Testimony Concerning A Review of Investor Protection
and Market Oversight with the Five Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement issued by the witnesses representing
the SEC: Christopher Cox, Chairman, Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r., Roel C. Campos, Comm’r., Annette L.
Nazareth, Comm’r., Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r.) (“We have created [a] special working group . . . within our
Enforcement
Division
to
deal
with
.
.
.
microcap
fraud.”),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/ts062607sec.htm. Thus, the extra enforcement resources from the
SEC could offset to a limited degree the lack of attention from plaintiffs’ lawyers.
77. Pritchard, supra note 4, at 957.
78. Id. at 928.
79. Coffee, supra note 62, at 1550-51.
80. However, as Coffee notes, nonfinancial consequences flowing from securities class actions such as the
“risk of ouster” for insiders also can have deterrent effects. Id. at 1554.
81. See THAKOR ET AL., supra note 5, app. III, at Exhibit A (finding total plaintiffs’ attorney fees of $3.1
billion in connection with total gross settlements of $19.8 billion, which reflects attorney fees of approximately
16% of class recovery); Coffee, supra note 62, at 1546 & n.37 (citing a study by Denise N. Martin et al. and
noting that the figure for attorneys’ fees as a percentage of recovery for suits in the 1990s—32%—may have
declined in recent years due, in part, to today’s larger recoveries).
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while high, do not take into account the additional costs exacted by the system, including
defense attorneys’ fees, 82 litigation expenses, court costs, as well as lost productivity of
the defending corporation while the litigation is ongoing. 83 In addition, these suits
consume significant judicial resources. 84 According to data collected by the Federal
Judicial Center, from July 1, 2001 – June 30, 2006, securities class actions represented
approximately 30% of all class actions filed in federal court and were the largest single
category of class actions. 85 Moreover, due to their complexity, securities class action
suits demand a great deal of judicial time and attention. 86 As John Coffee says,
“[S]ecurities class actions [because of their impact on the federal court system] are
essentially subsidized by the U.S. taxpayer, and thus, they raise the question of whether
society is receiving an adequate return on its investment.” 87 Therefore, though there are
compelling reasons to provide compensation for securities fraud victims, the securities
class action is an inefficient way to do so.
IV. THE INVESTOR COMPENSATION FUND PROPOSAL
A. Overview
This Article proposes eliminating fraud on the market suits 88 and explores the
creation of an investor compensation fund to better achieve not only the compensatory,
but also the deterrence goals of securities regulation. This Article is not intended to, and
does not, address all of the many considerations that accompany a major overhaul of the
U.S. securities regulation regime. It is not possible to address all potential concerns in a
82. One group of commentators suggests that defense attorney fees are roughly equivalent to those of
plaintiffs’ attorneys, who they assert generally receive 20%–30% of shareholder recovery. Elliott J. Weiss &
John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs
in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2080 (1995). More recently, one insurance industry executive
estimated that defense costs of 25%-35% of the settlement amount are common; however, defense costs can be
significantly higher. Baker & Griffith, supra note 70, at 1815 n.95, cited in Coffee, supra note 62, at 1546 n.38.
83. See Pritchard, supra note 4, at 953-54 for further discussion of these costs.
84. Coffee, supra note 62, at 1540.
85. E-mail from Emery G. Lee III, Senior Research Associate, Federal Judicial Center, to author
(September 10, 2007, 12:17:42 EDT) (on file with author). These figures include all securities class actions, not
just class actions related to secondary market fraud, the subject of this Article. Figures represent actual class
actions filed before consolidation. Id. After consolidation, securities class actions represent 9.4% of all class
actions filed in federal court. Id. Though this is a significantly lower percentage of class actions than the
percentage on a pre-consolidation basis, judicial time must be expended in the consolidation process. Thus,
considering the number of single filings is worthwhile in the context of this debate. Data were collected as part
of a study by the Federal Judicial Center of "The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 on the
Federal Courts." Id. For a brief description of how the data were collected and the types of actions included in
the study, see THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, THE IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT
OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: THIRD INTERIM REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
ON
CIVIL
RULES
23
(2007),
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa0407.pdf/$file/cafa0407.pdf. See note 111, infra, for a discussion
of the decline (and recent rebound) of securities class action filing activity.
86. Coffee, supra note 62, at 1540.
87. Id.
88. Under this proposal, class actions for primary market fraud (i.e., fraud in connection with initial public
offerings and seasoned equity offerings) will remain. Claims that a related set of misrepresentations affected
both purchasers in an offering and secondary market purchasers will have to be bifurcated into two cases, with
only the secondary market purchasers being eligible for recovery from the ICF.
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single piece. The purpose of this Article, thus, is to suggest that, despite challenging
administrative and implementation issues, creating a compensation fund is worthy of
serious consideration. Though I will outline some of the primary issues in Part IV.C.,
infra, I leave to future work a consideration of solutions to some of these challenges. 89
B. The Proposal
Under the ICF Proposal, a newly created division of the SEC (the “ICF Division”)
will administer an investor compensation system, whose funding will come from
assessments on equity securities transactions. Every time a share of stock of, or similar
security 90 related to, a U.S. listed corporation is sold in the secondary market (except
sales made by exchange specialists and market makers), 91 the selling shareholder 92 will
pay a fee, set as a percentage of the dollar value of the sale transaction (the “ICF
premium”), that will be placed into a fund to be used for investor restitution in the event
of losses from securities fraud. Selling shareholders will not pay these fees directly to the
ICF Division; instead, the ICF Division will collect the fees in the aggregate from the
securities exchanges and associations where the transactions occur in a manner similar to
that currently employed for collecting Section 31 fees. 93 All funds collected will be
89. I acknowledge that the administrative problems inherent in creating an investor compensation fund
may be too difficult to overcome. Therefore, no matter how prudent creating a compensation fund may be as a
theoretical matter, it may not be very practicable. Further study will provide illumination of this important issue.
90. Specifically, the ICF premium also will be levied on equity derivatives. Derivatives are securities that
“derive” their value from other underlying assets. Equity derivatives include securities such as call options
(which give holders the right, but not the obligation, to buy a share of stock) and put options (which give
holders the right, but not the obligation, to sell a share of stock).
91. Exchange specialists and market makers are market liquidity providers that match buy and sell orders
and help stabilize markets as necessary. Sales of stock by exchange specialists and market makers in connection
with making a market in the stocks for which they are contractually bound to provide liquidity will be exempt
from the ICF premium.
92. The seller of the security will pay the ICF premium. Hence, the “statutory incidence” or legal
responsibility for the payment lies with the seller. However, statutory incidence tells us nothing about who, as
between the seller and the buyer, actually will bear the burden of the premium (the “initial economic
incidence”) because the price to be paid by the buyer may in fact increase to compensate for the premium levied
on the seller. Given stock market dynamics (e.g., the demand and supply curves of stock), it is likely that the
buyer will have to pay for as much as half of this protection.
93. Section 31 of the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to collect transaction fees to recover the costs
incurred by the federal government in supervision and regulation of the securities markets. 15 U.S.C. § 78ee(a)
(2000 & Supp. II 2002). Currently, the transactions subject to the fee include sales of publicly traded equity
securities (15 U.S.C. § 78ee(b)-(c) (2000 & Supp. II 2002), and the fee is assessed at a rate of 0.0011% of the
dollar value of transactions. Order Making Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Adjustments to the Fee Rates Applicable
under Section 6(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 13(e), 14(g), 31(b), and 31(c) of the Exchange
Act, Securities Act Release No. 8794, Exchange Act Release No. 55682, 72 Fed. Reg. 25,809 7 (April 30,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2007/33-8794.pdf. Rather than investors paying the SEC the
amount owed directly, the national securities exchanges and associations where the transactions occur report
covered transactions and remit the appropriate payment to the SEC. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78ee(e) (Supp. II 2002); 17
C.F.R. § 240.31(b)(1), (a)(17) (2007). Since collection of the ICF premium will occur in a manner similar to
that which is used to collect Section 31 fees and largely assess the same transactions, the systems for transaction
reporting and fee collection are currently in place. Thus, the exchanges and associations will not have to make
large investments in infrastructure for ICF premium collection. However, the collecting agencies will have to
develop software to enable them to collect different amounts upon the sale of different stocks (as opposed to a
fixed rate for large categories of securities, as is the case with Section 31 fees).
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pooled; there will be no individual company accounts. No selling shareholders will
receive a refund of any amounts deposited into ICF, even if no shareholder of a particular
company ever makes a claim for recovery. 94 Participation in the ICF scheme will be
mandatory for public corporations and investors.
The size of the fee paid upon sale will vary by underlying corporation and depend
on a corporation’s fraud risk rating. An independent, private fraud risk rating agency 95
that has been designated by the ICF Division will be tasked with generating fraud risk
ratings for each corporation traded in the United States. Each year, 96 the designated
rating agency will examine the governance and disclosure-related business practices of
companies under review, specifically considering factors such as a company’s internal
control processes, history of fraud investigations or government enforcement actions, and
ICF damage payouts. The ICF Division also will require input from a firm’s auditor and
D&O insurer on some of the “soft factors” related to corporate governance. 97 The fraud
risk rating given will reflect the rating agency’s assessment of whether the appropriate
safeguards are in place to minimize the chances of securities fraud occurring. 98
Currently, a similar government designated rating agency mechanism is employed
with respect to credit rating agencies. Since 1975, the SEC has recognized a select
number of credit rating agencies as “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations” (NRSROs). 99 The ratings from these agencies not only provide guidance
to debt securities investors, but also are used as benchmarks for investment quality and
safety in a number of federal and state laws and regulations. 100 Though not without its
94. This practice would be consistent with that of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
which gives no rebates. As long as the government correctly sets the ICF premium at the level of expected
losses, there will be no need for rebates. See generally Andrew Kuritzkes, Til Schuermann & Scott Weiner,
Deposit Insurance and Risk Management of the U.S. Banking System: How Much? How Safe? Who Pays? 36
(Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 02-02-B, 2002) (discussing this point in connection with FDIC
insurance), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/02/0202.pdf.
95. See Part IV.C.4., infra, for a discussion of the challenges in generating fraud risk ratings.
96. In addition to the required annual assessment, an interim review will be possible, upon petition by the
corporation or upon recommendation from the ICF Division if a “governance event” (e.g., an accounting
restatement due to fraud) occurs before the next regularly scheduled review date.
97. See Part IV.C.4., infra, for further discussion of the role of auditors and D&O insurers in this process.
98. Just as with private credit ratings, a company will have no right to appeal the rating it receives, but it
will be given an opportunity to correct any factual errors influencing the rating before the rating becomes
effective.
99. Historically, SEC recognition of NRSROs followed a relatively informal determination by the SEC,
that “among other things, . . . the credit rating agency [seeking NRSRO status] [was] recognized nationally by
the predominant users of credit ratings as issuing credible and reliable ratings.” Oversight of Credit Rating
Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No.
55,875, 72 Fed. Reg. 33,563, 33,564 (June 18, 2007) [hereinafter Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies],
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-55857.pdf. Amid claims that the NRSRO designation
process led to anti-competitive behavior and a lack of innovation in credit rating processes, Congress enacted
the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006. Laura Blinkhorn, CQ Bill Analysis: HR2990 - Credit Rating
Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2006, CONG. Q., Oct. 13, 2006. Under the new statute, a rating agency seeking
NRSRO status must undertake a formal application process and be granted registration by the SEC. Oversight
of Credit Rating Agencies, supra, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/34-55857.pdf. As of this
writing, the SEC has recognized seven credit rating agencies as NRSRO’s. Press Release, SEC, Seven Credit
Rating Agencies Register with SEC as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (Sept. 24, 2007),
available at, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-199.htm.
100. Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization; Proposed Rule, Exchange Act
Release, 72 Fed. Reg. 33,8570, 34,51572 (Apr. 25, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-
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critics, 101 this agency designation process serves as a long-standing example of private
actors performing a function that furthers the government’s regulatory goals.
ICF premiums will be set at level equal to (1) a fixed percentage of expected fraudinduced losses plus (2) an assessment for fund administrative expenses. 102 No
corporation’s related ICF premium will be zero. 103
The assessment of differing ICF premiums on sales of stock is designed to deter
fraud. Lower fraud risk ratings will result in lower premiums paid by selling
shareholders, while shareholders of companies with a history of fraudulent activities or a
lack of mechanisms to prevent such occurrences will pay higher premiums into the ICF.
Imposing a fraud risk-related fee every time an investor sells a share of stock will be
reflected in a company’s stock price. Corporate managers are extraordinarily focused on
share price, 104 and, under the ICF Proposal, managers will have ample incentive to
maintain the best fraud risk rating possible. Investors will know the ICF premium before
the purchase of securities, so they generally will be able to factor a company’s ICF
premium into their investment decisions. 105
The dollar value of premiums collected will vary with market activity, so predicting
the amount collected and, hence, the amount market participants will pay is difficult, as
many factors affect market activity. However, assuming recoveries equal to 75% of
8570fr.pdf. For example, certain types of offerings for securities that are rated investment grade by at least one
NRSRO may be registered on a short-form registration statement without the issuer having to meet the normally
applicable minimum public float requirements. Id. In addition, under the rules of the Investment Company Act
of 1940, money market funds generally are limited to investing in securities that have received one of the two
highest ratings for short-term debt from an NRSRO. Id.
101. The NRSRO credit rating agency designation and the use of NRSRO ratings in regulation have been
subject to extensive criticism in the past. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?:
Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 624 (1999) (“In place of ratingsdependent regulation, I recommend a replacement: simply substitute credit spreads, the market risk measure of
bonds, for credit ratings.”); Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 93 (2004)
(stating, “The easiest proposal to defend on theoretical grounds is probably the elimination of the NRSRO
designation and replacement with a more market-based solution[,]” while cautioning “there are considerable
perils of eliminating NRSRO designation too quickly”). However, the reforms enacted in the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act of 2006 should alleviate at least some of the concerns of critics of NRSROs, and lessons
from this process will be transferable to a consideration of similar issues that may arise in the context of the
ICF.
102. The premium levels will not be capped. One could argue that, in the absence of caps, the premium for
repeat offenders theoretically could become so large as to decimate the company’s stock price. This would be
akin to effecting bankruptcy through ICF premiums (because no investor would want to buy the stock). This is a
serious concern, as this practice could harm innocent shareholders and employees (much as securities litigation
can today). However, adequate funding is essential for the survival of the ICF. With caps on premium levels,
the premiums in risky companies would not reflect fully the risk they pose and would require increased
premiums from shareholders of other, safer firms. In addition, employing caps would not provide appropriate
managerial incentives, as the full extent of the firm’s fraud risk would not be reflected in its stock price.
103. See Part IV.C.6., infra, for a discussion of the equitable considerations related to this design feature.
104. See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 41 (5th ed. Supp.
2007).
105. With an average annual market turnover rate of over 100%, most investors (by volume) will have sold
their shares before the next annual ICF determination. Shareholders who own stocks for more than a year will
not know in advance of the purchase exactly how much the premium will be upon sale. However, in the absence
of a fraud revelation or radical changes in the corporate governance practices of a firm, the ICF premium should
not vary dramatically from year to year.
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provable losses, 106 and based on the level of market transactions in 2006, 107 a weighted
average premium of approximately 0.035% will be required to provide recovery for
victims of securities fraud. 108 Thus, for example, if a shareholder sells 100 shares of
Company XYZ stock at $20 per share, the total premium to be paid into the ICF from this
trade is $0.70 (100 shares * $20/share * 0.00035). Using 2006 trading volume and
estimated damages 109 in securities class actions filed (with an assumption that 50% of
these suits (by dollar volume) are meritorious), 110 total ICF collections would have been
$15.3 billion in 2006. 111

106. See infra note 112 and accompanying text for a discussion on determining the appropriate level of
recovery.
107. This represents all capital market sales subject to Section 31 fees. See infra Appendix I for additional
information on how the figure is used to calculate the estimated premium. See supra note 93 for a discussion of
Section 31 fees.
108. This figure includes an assessment for administrative costs equal to 10% of claim payouts, but
excludes fund investment income and effects of the lack of premiums from market makers and specialists. See
infra Appendix I for a full description of assumptions underlying this calculation and for calculations under
additional assumptions.
109. The source of the “estimated damages” figure is Cornerstone Research data. The figure represents the
“disclosure dollar loss amount,” defined as the difference in market capitalization of a defendant firm as of the
trading day immediately before the end of the class period (with the end of the class period being generally
when the fraud is revealed) and the market capitalization of the same firm the trading day following the end of
the class period. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS, 2006: A YEAR IN
REVIEW 1 (2007) [hereinafter SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS], available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2006_YIR/20070102-01.pdf. This number is not intended
to be a measure of liability for securities fraud, as factors unrelated to fraud could have affected the prices on
these two dates. See id. However, the figure does provide an approximate sense for the losses suffered by
investors.
110. For purposes of calculating the ICF premium, the disclosure dollar loss amounts are adjusted to reflect
an assumption that 50% of suits filed are meritorious. For data on the number of securities class actions that
survive a motion to dismiss and hence generally move on to settlement negotiations, see Joseph A. Grundfest &
A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and
Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 685, 691 (2002) (finding, in a study of 167 federal court securities fraud
decisions that address the “strong inference standard,” that 34.1% of motions to dismiss are denied in their
entirety, and 36.5% are granted either in part or in their entirety without prejudice, thus making it possible for
the plaintiff “to replead in such a manner as to allow the litigation to continue.”); A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A.
Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 142 (2005) (finding that 52% of motions to dismiss are granted
in a study of 1996-2002 Second and Ninth Circuit decisions in securities fraud class actions); FOSTER, supra
note 73, at 7 (finding the dismissal rate to be 39.1% in 2004-2006, but acknowledging that this rate could be
overstated as a practical matter because it includes suits dismissed without prejudice and suits dismissed “with
prejudice that will be successfully appealed.”). It should be noted, however, that the figure used reflects a
simplifying assumption. The fact that a suit gets past the motion to dismiss phase does not mean that 100% of
the estimated market capitalization decline of the corporation upon the fraud revelation equals compensable
damages.
111. Traditional (i.e., excluding IPO allocation, analyst, and mutual fund-related claims) securities class
action filing activity has been on the decline in recent years (falling, for example, 38% from 2005-2006). See
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS, supra note 109, at 3. In addition, the level of losses associated with
the filings (defined on the basis of market capitalization losses upon disclosure of the alleged fraud) also has
declined substantially. Id. at 1. Thus, if this downward trend in fraudulent (or at least detected fraudulent)
activity continues, using 2006 data may overstate the premium required to fund the ICF. On the other hand, if
the incidence of fraud returns to historical levels, this premium estimate, depending on the level of market
activity relative to the amount of fraud, may be understated. Recent data compiled by NERA Economic
Consulting suggests that the downward trend in filings may be reversing. FOSTER, supra note 73, at 3
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The ICF holds the promise of providing significant additional compensation for
securities fraud losses, well in excess of the limited compensation (as little as 2%-3% of
losses) available today. However, shareholders will continue to bear some risk of loss. As
is the case with most insurance, the recovery from the ICF will be equal to less than
100% of provable losses. The specific level of investor recovery will be determined by
techniques similar to those employed in other insurance contexts 112 that will attempt to
strike the proper balance between the benefits of preventing an investor from losing
almost everything on an investment, on the one hand, and maintaining incentives for the
investor to monitor the companies in which she invests, on the other. 113
(describing the substantial increase (47% more in the first six months of 2007 than the last six months of 2006)
of traditional or “standard” case filings and suggesting the downward trend in filings may be reversing). In
addition, as discussed in Part III, supra, lawsuits often are not brought against small corporations because it is
often uneconomical for plaintiffs’ lawyers to do so. If the ICF proposal is adopted, though there will be screens
designed to limit frivolous suits and suits that would lead to a de minimus recovery, see discussion, infra, it is
quite possible that the level of claims under the ICF will exceed the estimated damages of lawsuits today.
Moreover, the premium level assumed for exposition purposes (0.035%) includes an assumption of annual
administrative costs of 10% of claim payouts. This could understate the expense of administering the fund.
Finally, the premium does not account for the fact that market makers and specialists will be exempt from
payment of the ICF premium. Offsetting this, of course, is that the deterrent effects of the ICF may cause the
incidence of fraud to decline, that there is increased trading because of greater investor confidence, or that the
fund will earn sufficiently high investment income to offset a significant portion of its administrative costs.
Nonetheless, it is possible that the average ICF premium could exceed 0.035%, perhaps significantly so. For a
calculation of premiums under various assumptions, see infra Appendix I.
112. For a discussion of the techniques used in the insurance industry, see, e.g., Michael L. Smith & George
L. Head, Guidelines for Insurers in Pricing Deductibles, 45 J. RISK & INS. 217 (1978) (describing how, among
other things, to price deductibles to minimize adverse selection and deter nuisance claims in property
insurance); Frank M. Bakker et al., Deductibles in Health Insurance: Can the Actuarially Fair Premium
Reduction Exceed the Deductible, 53 HEALTH POL’Y 125, 130-31 (2000) (describing efforts to relate the level
of out-of-pocket payments of insureds to the precise amount by which the demand for health care declines).
Setting the precise level of recovery to minimize moral hazard concerns will be a significant challenge facing
the ICF.
113. Requiring shareholders to bear some risk of loss will minimize moral hazard concerns (i.e., concerns
about the incentives of investors to monitor fraud-prone companies). The degree to which we must be
concerned about this type of moral hazard depends on our confidence with respect to the ability of shareholders
to monitor corporate conduct. Retail investors are unlikely to have the ability to serve as effective monitors of
corporate conduct. See Fisch, Criminalization of Corporate Law, supra note 37, at 93. However, many believe
institutional investors are well suited to provide some monitoring of the corporate governance-related activities
of corporations, but that such investors do not perform this role effectively. See, e.g., John C. Bogle Remarks,
The Mutual Fund Industry 60 Years Later: For Better Or Worse?, 61 FIN. ANAL. J., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 18-19
(“With their long record of passivity and lassitude about corporate governance issues, [mutual] fund managers
must accept a large share of the responsibility for the ethical failures in corporate governance and accounting
oversight . . . .”), available at http://www.vanguard.com/bogle_site/sp20050102.htm. But see Jill E. Fisch,
Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009, 1011 (1994) (raising questions
about whether institutions have the proper incentives to monitor corporations and whether they can do so
effectively), cited in Fisch, Criminalization of Corporate Law, supra note 37, at 93. It may seem unfair to make
retail investors responsible for some portion of their losses when they are not as effective at corporate
monitoring as institutions. However, providing additional compensation for individuals, but not institutions,
through the ICF, in effect, would be providing incentives for individuals to invest independently, rather than
through funds, which could lead to individuals being less diversified. Another moral hazard concern relates to
the incentives of investors to invest in fraud-prone companies. The degree to which we must be concerned about
this type of moral hazard depends on how confident we are that non-insider shareholders are able to assess, with
some degree of accuracy, which firms have a greater propensity for fraud. See Tom Baker, Insurance Against
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The ICF Division will determine the amount of shareholder recovery in individual
cases. Operating similarly to other government agencies, 114 the ICF Division will not act
on its own initiative to investigate secondary market securities fraud, but instead will
respond to charges filed by the SEC’s enforcement division or by defrauded shareholders
holding, either individually or in combination with other shareholders, a minimum
ownership of 1% of the outstanding equity of the company in question for a minimum of
one year. 115 The minimum ownership requirement will ensure that those bringing
charges have a significant stake in the corporation. 116 Because it is unlikely that any one
retail investor will hold a 1% stake in a public company, generally institutions will be the
only stockholders with the independent power (i.e., not as a part of a group) to initiate
proceedings. The managers of such institutions, as sophisticated businesspeople, are
unlikely to file charges that lack merit. 117 In addition, the ICF Division will have the
power to assess appropriate penalties for investors that submit claims that are later shown
to lack any foundation. 118 The threat of a penalty, coupled with the high ownership
threshold for filing charges, should deter frivolous claims. Finally, claim administration
Misinformation in the Securities Market, in 2 CANADA STEPS UP 363, 381 (2006), available at
http://www.tfmsl.ca/. See Part IV.C.6., infra, for further discussion of this point.
114. For example, the ICF Division will operate in a manner similar to the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). The NLRB is an independent federal agency that was created by Congress in 1935 to administer the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the statute that governs union/employer relations. NLRB Fact Sheet,
http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/overview/fact_sheet.aspx (last visited Sept. 18, 2007). The NLRB does not act on
its own motion, and its administrative law judge decisions (issued failing a prior settlement by the parties or
dismissal by the NLRB Regional Director that was not successfully appealed) are subject to review by the
NLRB Board and U.S. Courts of Appeals. Id.
115. Option holders will be unable to file claims because they lack an ownership interest in the corporation,
but they will be eligible for damages awards.
116. This is similar to the ownership requirement for eligibility for submitting shareholder proposals for
inclusion in a public corporation’s proxy statement under 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2007). Note, however, that
under Rule 14a-8, a shareholder must hold at least $2000 in dollar market value of voting securities in the
corporation or 1% of the corporation’s outstanding voting stock in order to be eligible to submit a shareholder
proposal, which makes the Rule 14a-8 standard significantly easier to meet than the one described above.
117. One could argue that institutions often will face conflicts of interest that keep them from filing claims.
The possibility of institutional investor conflicts of interest has been raised previously in other contexts. Many
believe private sector investors currently have conflicts of interest (e.g., banks or insurance companies that want
to do business with companies in which they hold investments) that may prevent them from voting their shares
against management and in a way that maximizes shareholder value due to fear of management reprisal. See
generally Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 467, 506 (2003)
(providing a brief background on the arguments of those who advocate confidential corporate proxy voting, but
finding that the practice has no significant effect on election outcomes). However, the high potential recovery
under the ICF (e.g., possible recovery of 75% of fraud losses) and the fact that the company will not be paying
the claims directly (though its shareholders will pay higher ICF premiums in the future) may overcome the
disincentive to file claims. In addition, any company subject to a fraud enforcement action at the SEC will
automatically have its case referred to the ICF. Thus, if the SEC Enforcement Division decides to pursue a fraud
case, the failure of a shareholder to emerge to file a claim will not prevent investors from receiving
compensation from the ICF. Finally, if the SEC still feels that claims are not being filed in meritorious cases,
the SEC could design a process (e.g., website filing) to make it easier for retail investors to make a joint claim.
A related concern is that there will be a free-rider problem (i.e., no investor will want to incur the time and
expense to make a claim because the investor’s proportional recovery will be no higher than that of any other
shareholder). To address this possibility, the ICF will make the filing process as simple as possible and will
reimburse reasonable expenses incurred in filing a claim.
118. So as not to deter potentially meritorious claims, liability will attach only if no rational person could
have thought fraud had occurred.

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art76

24

Davis Evans:

2007]

The Investor Compensation Fund

125

costs will be lowered by requiring a certain threshold overall shareholder loss before the
ICF Division will initiate a proceeding. 119
When a shareholder files charges with the ICF Division, the ICF Division will
conduct an investigation to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe a
securities violation has occurred. Employing a civil-style inquisitorial model, 120
administrative law judges (ALJs) 121 will make fraud and damage award determinations.
The decisions of the ALJs will be subject to limited federal court review. The ICF
Division will grant damage awards in cases involving securities fraud, without regard to
whether the company in question is bankrupt. The ICF Division will compute damages in
a manner similar to that currently employed in calculating damages in fraud on the
market lawsuits. 122 All damage payouts will be made from the fund, with any shortfalls
payable through loans from the U.S. Treasury. 123 With limited exceptions, 124 all

119. Since this determination would have to be made before a formal investigation is launched, the metric
would have to involve something akin to a “disclosure dollar loss” as defined by Cornerstone Research (the
difference in market capitalization of a firm as of the trading day before the alleged fraud is revealed and the
market capitalization of the same firm the trading day following the revelation). See Appendix I, note 4, infra,
for further discussion of this metric.
120. See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search
for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1188 (2005) for a description and history of
inquisitorial proceedings (“[I]n the inquisitorial model, the court itself initiates the litigation and undertakes
significant responsibility for gathering evidence, not just for ruling on the conclusions that should be drawn
from it.”). Though the proceeding will be non-adversarial, the corporation accused of fraud, in all likelihood,
will retain counsel to help it respond to inquiries from the ICF Division. However, the shareholder filing the
claim will not need to hire counsel or “present a case” during the proceedings.
121. The use of an administrative law judge (ALJ) is intended to reduce concerns about politicization (e.g.,
instances of elected officials pressuring the ICF Division to make unwarranted fraud determinations to satisfy
angry investors that have lost money), competence and agency capture. ALJs generally are less subject to
political pressures than are elected officials or political appointees and, under the Administrative Procedure Act,
in a formal adjudication, ex parte communications (e.g., a conversation between a Congresswoman and an ALJ
with the intent of influencing such judge’s decision) are prohibited. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1) (2000). Competence
also should not be a concern. Almost all securities fraud cases settle. Pritchard & Sale, supra note 110, at 128
(“[With rare exception,] [c]ases that are not dismissed on a motion to dismiss or at summary judgment, and that
survive class certification…settle.”) Thus, as a practical matter, the rulings of judges with respect to motions to
dismiss and summary judgment determine if plaintiffs recover damages. There is no reason to believe that ALJs
would lack the competence to make accurate and fair decisions. Finally, because, in the post-Enron era, the
media spotlight is trained on the efforts of the SEC to police corporate fraud, it is highly unlikely that the SEC
would be able to use the ICF as a vehicle for serving the narrow interests of those it regulates. A related concern
may be that the ALJs will have an incentive to rarely make fraud determinations, so as to protect the ICF from
liability. To minimize the likelihood of such an occurrence, under the ICF proposal, a formal “ethical” wall of
separation will be maintained between the ALJs and the ICF administrators.
122. See Finnerty & Pushner, supra note 58, for a discussion of damages calculations under the current
securities litigation regime. As currently performed, this is a complex process. Alexander, supra note 4, at 1488
(stating “the amount of damages is a complex and intractable issue at trial. Expert testimony is required to
calculate damages, and that testimony is contradictory even when the experts purport to be using the same
methodology”). In designing this feature of the ICF, a tradeoff between providing shareholder recovery equal to
the theoretically “accurate” amount of damage suffered by an investor and administrative tractability will be
required. I leave detailed consideration of this issue to future work.
123. See infra note 188 for discussion of a consideration of equitable considerations related to this feature
of the proposal.
124. Directors and executive officers of the corporation, as well as company employees involved in the
fraud will be ineligible for recovery from the ICF.
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shareholders who suffer a loss and submit a claim to the ICF Division will be eligible for
recovery from the fund. 125
Generating credible estimates for the costs of administering the ICF is difficult, but
there is evidence to suggest the costs will be significantly lower than the costs incurred in
conducting fraud on the market suits. The ICF, as proposed, has elements of both an
insurance program and a litigation system. One of the advantages of insurance systems is
their ability to provide compensation to victims at lower costs than litigation systems. 126
There are a number of studies that show that average administrative costs in private
lawsuits, including those for settled and litigated claims, are almost equal to or greater
than the compensation received by victims. 127 This means that for every dollar a victim
receives as compensation, a dollar or more is spent providing that dollar to the victim. 128
As described previously in Part III, plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in securities class actions
can total almost one-third of fraud victim recovery, and defense costs can be comparable.
These fees do not account for the judicial resources employed disposing of such cases.
The cost of insurance tends to be significantly lower than the cost of litigation. At
one extreme are government insurance programs, such as the federal Old Age and
Survivors Insurance Program (OASI), federal disability insurance, the SIPC, and the
FDIC, whose administrative costs are quite low in comparison to total program
expenditures or fund size. 129 These programs may be administered relatively
125. A claims administrator appointed by the ICF Division will be responsible for disbursing payments to
eligible investors in a similar manner to that which occurs today for securities fraud class action settlements and
Fair Funds (Fair Funds, SEC-administered funds for investor restitution following instances of securities fraud,
are described in more detail in Part V.A., infra). These processes (i.e., finding individual investors and verifying
claims) are administratively complex and rife with problems. For a description, written in 2005, of the problems
accompanying the Fair Funds distribution process, see Deborah Solomon, Paper Trails: Plan to Give
Defrauded Investors Money from Fines Faces Hurdles, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2005, at A1. The SEC
acknowledges and has begun to address the Fair Fund distribution problem. See SEC, 2006 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT
23
(2007)
[hereinafter
SEC
2006
PAR],
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar2006.shtml. The SEC recently announced the creation of new office dedicated
to Fair Funds distribution. See infra note 317. For a description of the claims administration process in
securities class actions, see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities
Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 419-20 (2005). Consistent with the reform proposal of Cox and
Thomas (see id. at 444-45), the ICF will maintain a web-based centralized clearinghouse for claim notices and
claim forms to facilitate the filing of claims. Despite this feature, the distribution process will be one of the most
significant challenges faced by the ICF.
126. See, e.g., Jeffrey O’Connell & John Linehan, Neo No-Fault Early Offers: A Workable Compromise
Between First and Third-Party Insurance, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 103, 133 (2005/06) (praising workers’
compensation plans for “largely eliminat[ing] the administrative and transaction costs derived from expensive
litigation over fault and payment for pain and suffering”).
127. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 281 (2004).
128. Id.
129. For example, in 2005, the administrative costs of OASI equaled 0.7% of total OASI expenditures, and
comparable costs for federal disability insurance represented 2.6% of total expenditures. SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 2006 at 4.2, 4.4 (2007) (calculated by
dividing
“Administrative
Expenses”
by
“Total
[Expenditures]”),
available
at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2006/supplement06.pdf. Similarly, from 2001-2005,
total administrative expenses (including overhead expenses and administrative expenses related to liquidation
proceedings) averaged approximately 2.0% of fund size for the SIPC, a quasi-governmental agency that
oversees the liquidation of failed brokerage firms and insures brokerage customer property. Calculated using
data from SEC. INVESTOR PROT. CORP., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 16, 21 (2006) [hereinafter SIPC 2005 ANNUAL
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inexpensively because there is no need to determine “fault” as we think of it in a
litigation context. 130
Another government insurance program, unemployment insurance, which shares
some important similarities with the ICF, has higher administrative costs on a relative
basis than the aforementioned programs, but still appears to operate in a cost-effective
manner. Briefly reviewing the UC system’s operations may be instructive. The
unemployment compensation (UC) system’s 131 fiscal year 2007 estimated administrative
costs are $3.9 billion or 8.7% of the estimated $44.9 billion in collections. 132 Under the
UC system, employers are taxed on their payrolls. 133 Experience rating in the UC system
requires employers with a history of higher layoffs and firings to pay higher taxes into the
system. 134 Experience rating, therefore, discourages layoffs and other forms of
involuntary unemployment. 135 Though the specific laws differ across states, generally, if
an employee voluntarily resigns (other than for good cause attributable to the
employer) 136 or is fired for gross misconduct, 137 she is not eligible for unemployment
benefits. 138 The determination of eligibility for UC benefits is handled initially by an
investigator employed by a state agency. 139 Both the employer 140 and the employee
REPORT], available at http://www.sipc.org/pdf/2005AnnualReport.pdf; SEC. INVESTOR PROT. CORP., 2004
ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2005), available at http://www.sipc.org/pdf/2004_AnnualReport.pdf; SEC. INVESTOR
PROT. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 2003 (2004), available at http://www.sipc.org/pdf/2003_Annual_report.pdf;
SEC. INVESTOR PROT. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 14 (2003), available at
http://www.sipc.org/pdf/SIPC_Annual_Report_03.pdf; and SEC. INVESTOR PROT. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT
2001
(2002)
[hereinafter
SIPC
2001
ANNUAL
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.sipc.org/pdf/SIPCAnnualReport02.pdf. The FDIC’s corporate operating budget expenses were 1.9%
of fund size in 2006. Calculated using data from FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT HIGHLIGHTS 2006
at 32, 35 (2006), available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2006highlight/2006Highlights.pdf.
130. The SIPC must evaluate investor claims and provide recoveries where warranted, but its task (i.e.,
determining if a claimant was a customer at a brokerage firm and had securities that were missing) is more
ministerial than the task of the ICF will be (i.e., determining if securities fraud occurred).
131. The UC system was created by the Social Security Act of 1935. It is a federal program that is
administered by the states under state law. OFFICE OF WORKFORCE SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION
1
(2007),
available
at
http://www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/partnership2007.pdf.
132. Calculated using data from id. at 2. This figure includes some administrative costs not directly related
to operating the state UC system. Estimated fiscal year 2007 administrative costs for the state UC system only
are $2.64 billion. Id.
133. Three states in the United States also collect taxes from employees. Id. at 1.
134. See Katherine Baicker et al., A Distinctive System: Origins and Impact of U.S. Unemployment
Compensation, in THE DEFINING MOMENT: THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 227, 245 (Michael Bordo et al. eds., 1998). No state has “complete” experience rating
(i.e., a system with no minimum or maximum rate). Id.
135. See id. at 246 & n.46.
136. An example of good cause may include a worker who suffered harassment or was forced to work in
unsafe conditions. Telephone Interview with Frank Gumina, Partner, Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek S.C.,
Milwaukee, WI (August 9, 2007) (Mr. Gumina has 16 years of experience in labor and employment law).
137. In most states, “gross misconduct” is defined as behavior that evinces an intent against the employer’s
interest. Gross misconduct can range from one instance of theft to habitual tardiness or rule breaking. Id.
138. Id.
139. The account set forth here is that of the Wisconsin unemployment compensation system. Though state
processes vary, this account is representative of the administration of UC benefit disputes in the United States.
Id.
140. The employer, of course, has an interest in the outcome because benefit payouts affect the employer’s
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have the right to appeal the investigator’s decision and have a brief hearing, 141 generally
without counsel and no pre-hearing discovery, on the merits before an ALJ or similar
official. 142
The decision of the ALJ may be appealed to a higher authority within the UC
system. 143 Any party that is dissatisfied with this review process may appeal to the state
circuit court, with further appeals from there permitted though generally rare. Thus,
resolution of disputes is handled largely within the administrative process. The UC
system is able to set tax rates through experience rating, collect funds, disburse benefits,
coordinate program administration efforts with 53 different state and jurisdictional
offices, and adjudicate contested factual issues regarding benefits eligibility (excluding
court appeals) at a cost of less than 10% of collected funds annually.
Administering the ICF program, of course, will be more costly than administering
the UC. The ICF’s administrative procedures will contain a mix of insurance and
litigation elements, like the UC program. However, the costs of the ICF still will be
significantly higher in all likelihood. Though the UC must set experience ratings for
taxation purposes, generating fraud risk ratings will be a much more complex process,
given the numerous variables that comprise the rating and the annual reviews that must
be conducted on each publicly traded company. In addition, determining whether a
claimant has met the standard for UC benefits is not as complex as the determination that
will have to be made by the ICF. Determining eligibility for payment under the ICF (i.e.,
that investment losses were due to fraud, as opposed to, for example, negligent
misstatements) requires an investigation into state of mind and the intent to defraud
(scienter) of corporate officers. This can be costly as corporate officials must be deposed
and corporate records reviewed. Finally, in the UC system, the parties usually (though not
always) appear before the ALJ without counsel. Under the ICF, corporations, like
employers in the UC system, will have an interest in intervening to contest fraud
allegations, but not only because of the effect on the fraud risk rating. Managers also will
be concerned about the potential damage to the corporation’s reputation from an adverse
fraud determination. 144 In addition, the corporation almost certainly will insist on being
accompanied by counsel, and, under the ICF Proposal, will be able to do so. On the other
experience rating and level of UC taxes. Id.
141. In Wisconsin, these hearings generally last no longer than two hours. Telephone interview with Frank
Gumina, supra note 136. Across the UC system generally, the hearings typically last 20-45 minutes. Emp. &
Training Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor [hereinafter ETA].
142. The parties generally opt not to be represented by lawyers unless another related claim is pending
(e.g., a discrimination suit). Id. Also, pre-hearing discovery generally is not permitted, though the parties have
the right to file for discovery at the hearing. Id. During the hearing, both parties are permitted to call witnesses
and present exhibits. Id.; see also Wisconsin Dep’t of Workforce Dev., Requesting a Hearing—Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.dwd.state.wi.us/uibola/FAQs-12-01/ (answering general questions about
unemployment benefit hearings).
143. In Wisconsin, this body is the three-person Labor and Industrial Review Commission (LIRC).
Telephone interview with Frank Gumina, supra note 136. Appeals are briefed only; there are no live witnesses.
Id. No new evidence is permitted, but LIRC confers with the lower ALJ on various issues, including credibility
of the witnesses, and does a de novo review. Id. In five states or U.S. jurisdictions (Hawaii, Minnesota,
Nebraska, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands), there is no second level of appeal within the UC
system. ETA, supra note 141.
144. This may even be more likely under the ICF than under the current class action regime because the
reputational penalty from a government action is likely to exceed that from a class action filed by a private
plaintiffs’ attorney. See Part IV.C.3, infra.
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hand, of course, the ICF will not have to process the volume of cases that the UC system
has to, which will offset the costs of the complexity to some degree. 145
In any event, it seems likely that the costs of administering the ICF will be
significantly lower than the costs accompanying private securities fraud litigation.
Because of the non-adversarial nature of the ALJ proceedings, costs for fraud
determinations under the ICF Proposal should be lower than the costs of private
litigation, even after factoring in the costs of appeals of ICF decisions. Fraud securities
class actions are very costly. In addition to the costs payable directly to plaintiffs’ and
defense counsel, as mentioned previously, administering such suits consumes a great deal
of judicial resources. There are a number of costs incurred in litigation that will not exist
if the ICF is adopted. For example, under the PSLRA, in a securities class action, the
court is required to select a lead plaintiff, which initially requires a determination of
which potential plaintiff suffered the greatest loss from the alleged fraud. 146 Deciding
this issue, which essentially involves deciding among competing teams of lawyers, 147
will not be required under the ICF. Also, pursuant to the PSLRA, plaintiffs do not have
the right to discovery unless they get past the motion to dismiss, which requires pleading
with particularity facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraud. 148 As John Coffee
explains, “Often, this process … involve[s] multiple motions in which the parties contest
whether this heightened pleading standard has been satisfied (with the plaintiffs typically
receiving at least one leave to replead their complaint if their initial pleadings fail this
test).” 149 Discovery disputes are also costly, as the individuals to be deposed (e.g.,
corporate officers, directors, and accountants) all have their own counsel who can put
forth arguments limiting the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ access. 150 The settlement process also
imposes costs as lawyers for all the parties attempt to negotiate a settlement with which
they are comfortable and the court will approve. Complicating this process are any
objectors—class members who believe the proposed recovery under the settlement is
insufficient or those who attempt to hold up the process in hopes of extracting some
unique personal benefit. Moreover, in recent years an increased number of institutional
investors have chosen to opt out of class actions altogether to pursue individualized
actions because they believe they can achieve a higher recovery through this process.151
145. In each of the last three last years, the UC system, nationwide, issued an average of 1,411,028
decisions in appeals (1,230,039 lower authority decisions and 180,988 higher authority decisions, on average), a
number that dwarfs any plausible estimation of the number of annual ICF claims. ETA, supra note 141.
According to Cornerstone Research, from 1996-2005, an average of 193 securities class actions (including nonsecondary market fraud cases that will not be administered by the ICF) were filed each year. SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION CASE FILINGS, supra note 109, at 1. Even if the existence of the ICF (because of the ease of filing and
equality afforded to frauds of varying sizes not existent under the current regime) led the number of securities
fraud cases administered each year to increase more than five-fold from current levels, which seems unlikely,
approximately 1000 cases is significantly fewer than the number of cases processed by the UC system each
year.
146. Coffee, supra note 62, at 1540.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1541.
149. Coffee, supra note 62, at 1541.
150. Id.
151. Anecdotal evidence suggests they may be correct. See Kevin M. LaCroix, Opt-Outs: A Worrisome
Trend in Securities Class Action Litigation, in INSIGHTS (Oakbridge Ins. Servs., Bloomfield, Conn.), Apr. 2007
(discussing institutional investors who claim to have received many times more in their opt out cases than they
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Compounding the issue is the pursuit of some of these individualized cases in state court.
Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) in 1998 to
prevent plaintiffs from circumventing the strict pleading requirements of the PSLRA by
filing an action in state court. However, SLUSA only pre-empts class actions, not
individual suits brought under Rule 10b-5. Thus, a plaintiff that opts out of the class
action is free to pursue a state action, which has the effect of adding to the defendants’
litigation costs. Indeed, these opt out suits can lead to disputes between federal and state
courts, 152 which can add even more costs to an already costly system. None of the
processes described above 153 would exist under the ICF. 154 Thus, even if one is inclined
to suggest that the ICF will be “expensive” to administer, it seems unlikely that the costs
would approach those of securities class actions.
Complexity can exist even in securities fraud cases where it is not clear that the
additional costs yield significant benefits to shareholders. Consider the Blue Rhino
Corporation case, 155 in which the class action period lasted 22 days (inclusive), 156 and
the settlement amounted to $1.25 million (with 21.5% of that amount plus expense
reimbursement of up to $230,000 going to the plaintiffs’ attorneys). 157 The civil docket
contains 112 entries with dates from May 2003 to October 2005, and many of these
entries include various briefs, reply briefs, stipulations, and orders related to procedural
rather than substantive determinations. 158 According to the settlement notice, the
estimated average distribution per share is $0.78 before deducting fees and expenses.159 I
offer no opinion on the complexity of the issues requiring resolution or the adequacy of
the settlement. However, despite the apparent expense and complexity of the process,
shareholders were entitled to receive limited compensation. Moreover, as of this writing
almost five years after the end of the class action period, this compensation still has not

would have received as a participant in the related securities class actions), available at
http://www.oakbridgeins.com/Issue%2010%20OptOuts%20A%20Worrisome%20Trend%20in%20Securities%20Class%20Action%20Litigation.pdf.
152. See Coffee, supra note 62, at 1541 n.17 (citing Ret. Sys. of Ala. v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 386 F.3d
419, 431 (2d Cir. 2004), in which a federal court of appeals invalidated a federal district courts’ injunction
ordering Alabama state court to postpone its trial until after the conclusion of the district court’s related
securities litigation trial).
153. This is not an exhaustive list. There are other procedural aspects of litigation (e.g., motions related to
jurisdictional or venue issues) that will have no place under the ICF.
154. One, of course, could argue that reforming securities class actions, rather than instituting the ICF,
could solve these problems. However, that is a “second best” solution. Reforming class actions likely would do
little to increase investor compensation for reasons described in supra Part III.
155. In re Blue Rhino Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 03-3495 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2005), available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/1028/RINO03-01/2005105_r01o_033495.pdf.
156. The initial complaint alleged a 175-day class action period (August 15, 2002 – February 5, 2003,
inclusive). Complaint at 1, In re Blue Rhino Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 03-3495 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2003), available
at http://securities.stanford.edu/1028/RINO03-01/2003519_o01c_033495.pdf.
157. Inst. S’holder Servs., Securities Class Action Services Database [hereinafter SCAS Database].
158. See Civil Docket, In re Blue Rhino Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 03-3495 (C.D. Cal., filed May 19, 2003),
available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1028/RINO03-01/2005216_r01k_033495.pdf. Total entries figure
includes three error notices, but excludes four items placed in the file that were not used. Id.
159. Notice of Settlement of Class Action at 1, In re Blue Rhino Corp. Securities Litigation, No. 03-3495
http://securities.stanford.edu/1028/RINO03(C.D.
Cal.
June
22,
2005),
available
at
01/2005622_r01n_033495.pdf. Attorneys’ fees and expense reimbursement are estimated to average $0.18 per
share. Id. at 2.
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been disbursed to shareholders. 160 This example is admittedly anecdotal, 161 but it
demonstrates that securities class actions have the potential to consume a great deal of
judicial resources, even in cases where it is not clear that shareholders receive a
significant benefit from the process.
Though the ICF offers significant cost savings potential over fraud class actions, it
has some costs that class actions do not—administering the fund and setting fraud risk
ratings. In addition, one cost will, in all likelihood, be very similar—the fraud
determination. The ICF must conduct an investigation and the ALJs, just like federal
judges at the motion to dismiss stage in securities class actions, will need to review the
evidence and determine whether fraud occurred. Of course, under the ICF, there will not
be multiple teams of lawyers filing multiple motions, but the basic process of adjudging
the commission of fraud will be the same. 162
One efficiency from implementing the ICF can come from eliminating redundant
investigation costs. Under the ICF Proposal, the ICF Division will work closely with the
SEC’s Division of Enforcement, which currently carries out fraud investigations, so
incremental investigation costs will be minimized to some extent. In addition, the SEC
currently does not cooperate or share discovery with plaintiffs’ lawyers pursuing claims
against the defendants that the SEC is investigating. 163 Thus, the duplication of effort
and costs to police the same behavior would end under the ICF Proposal. 164
160. See SCAS Database, supra note 157 (indicating that the status of the case is “settled” rather than
“settled disbursed”).
161. Though this example is unusual due to the small absolute dollar value of shareholder recovery and the
short class action period, the recovery is not that different from that which investors receive in many securities
fraud class actions. According to Cornerstone Research, the median settlement value, in 2006 dollars, of class
actions settled over the approximately 10-year period since the passage of the PSLRA through 2005 (excluding
the Enron, WorldCom and Cendant mega-settlements) is $6.7 million. SIMMONS & RYAN, supra note 7, at 2.
162. One possible way to reduce administrative costs would be to eliminate the scienter requirement so that
damages could be awarded for losses induced by gross negligence. Some suggest that, in practice, juries
(though rarely party to securities fraud determinations) and judges may find fraud liability when there is merely
gross negligence, rather than an intent to defraud or recklessness, as required under the law. See, e.g., Donald C.
Langevoort, Reflections on Scienter (and the Securities Fraud Case Against Martha Stewart that Never
Happened), 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 9 (2006) (stating, “[J]udges and juries may be applying the law as if
[negligence or gross negligence] were the standard”). Gross negligence, in all likelihood would be easier to
prove—a material misstatement exceeding a certain threshold likely would suffice—and hence more
administratively efficient for the ICF. The obvious drawback is that this would increase the number of loss
payouts significantly. In addition, while it is easy to justify compensation for fraud losses when shareholders
have been victimized by intentional misconduct, it is more difficult to defend providing compensation when
corporate managers merely have been careless (even grossly so). This is true even though one could argue that
even innocent misstatements lead to the inefficient allocation of capital. In addition, lowering the standard in
this context may lead to managers taking excess precautions because of fear of liability. There are obvious
trade-offs that must be made in this regard, but, on balance, removing the scienter requirement, though
expedient, would not be appropriate.
163. One rationale for the SEC not sharing information with private plaintiffs is that corporate defendants
are more likely to comply with disclosure requests from the SEC if they know the information will not be
shared with plaintiffs’ lawyers. Telephone Interview #1, supra note 62. SEC investigative files are exempt from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2000) (“records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law
enforcement records or information…could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings…” are exempt from FOIA).
164. It should be noted, however, that with the end of private class actions, the SEC’s enforcement budget
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On the other hand, the existence of the ICF could lead to additional costs because of
the possibility that the number of instances of fraud alleged will increase under the ICF
from current levels because of the easier filing process and potential for increased
recovery. As discussed in Part III, securities fraud class actions often are not brought
against small corporations because the expected damages are too low to be attractive to
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Also, the SEC, because of its limited enforcement budget, is unable
to pursue many of such cases, despite its relatively recent initiative to combat microcap
fraud. 165 One benefit of the ICF is that, unlike the current securities fraud class action
regime, the government will police fraud at large and small corporations through fraud
risk ratings and ICF proceedings, hence increasing overall deterrence. However, with this
benefit comes the potential added expense of more claims requiring resolution.
Ultimately, the costs of administering the ICF are uncertain. Further study in this
area is necessary. I submit, however, that in all likelihood, the costs of our current
securities class action regime exceed those of the ICF as proposed.
C. Possible Objections and Implementation Challenges
The ICF Proposal is designed to provide the deterrence and compensation benefits
outlined above at lower administrative costs than those existing under the current regime.
However, there are a number of factors that must be considered in a proposal of this
magnitude. In this section, I address some possible objections to the ICF Proposal, as
well as some key implementation challenges.
1. Mandatory Nature of the Program
One potential criticism of the ICF proposal is that participation in the ICF scheme
will be mandatory for all corporations in the United States. One could argue that the
absence of fraud risk insurance of this type in the marketplace suggests that investors do
not want the insurance and that it is not value-enhancing. A number of scholars advocate
contractual freedom in corporate law (i.e., the ability of corporations and shareholders to
opt out of the laws that will apply to the corporation). 166 The basic argument for the
“freedom of contract” view is that investors know their own interests better than
regulators and are capable of contracting for the protections they desire. 167 If firms do
not provide the features that stockholders desire, their stock prices will reflect that
failure. 168 Thus, one also could argue that even if the government were to offer such
insurance, it would be most efficient to allow corporations to opt out of the ICF scheme if
they did not believe their shareholders would value its protections.
The first argument is a familiar critique of reform proposals. 169 However, as Lucian

would have to be increased significantly.
165. See supra note 76 (discussing the SEC’s “renewed focus on prosecuting fraud in smaller companies”).
166. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 875
(2005) (“In my own view, there are good reasons for limiting contractual freedom in corporate law. Some
scholars, however, advocate complete or very broad contractual freedom.”).
167. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, Foreword, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1404 (1989) (describing the arguments of proponents of contractual freedom).
168. Id.
169. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1805
(2006) (describing what he terms “the standard contractarian argument that the marketplace can be expected to
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Bebchuk points out, “If [this] argument were valid, it would have far-reaching
consequences. It would imply that much of the protection U.S. investors now enjoy—
which results from arrangements introduced by federal rules and exchange requirements
and not previously offered . . . is value-reducing and should be dismantled.” 170 In this
context, in particular, the absence of fraud insurance does not imply that the ICF Proposal
has no merit. First, organizations such as RiskMetrics Group 171 and The Corporate
Library 172 produce corporate governance ratings and sell them to investors. This
suggests that corporate governance matters to investors and that they view external
judgments on the quality of governance as adding value to their investment decisions. Of
course, as discussed in Part IV.C.4., infra, the evidence does not suggest that the
currently available ratings would be able to predict with any degree of certainty the
likelihood of fraud occurring. That is irrelevant for present purposes. The fact that private
actors are trying to provide more information about corporate governance risk suggests
that if the ICF program could develop a method for generating accurate fraud risk ratings,
it would be value-enhancing.
Second, a fraud insurance mechanism exists today—D&O insurance, which
provides third party insurance for corporations. 173 However, as discussed in Part III,
supra, the level of compensation received by shareholders is inadequate and highly
unlikely to increase under this system. Of course, one response might be that government
intervention is not needed because investors are satisfied with the current level of
recovery, small though it may be. If that were not the case, they would “force”
corporations to provide them with greater protection from fraud losses. However, what
this position ignores is the growing trend of institutional investors opting out of class
actions and pursuing individual cases. This suggests that investors are dissatisfied with
current levels of recovery, and some are pursuing means to achieve greater compensation
that impose high costs on the legal system. 174 In addition, under the status quo, there is
not much that investors can do to “force” corporations to give them additional protection.
As discussed in Part III, supra, private insurers generally lack the capacity to insure
investors up to the full (or even almost full) extent of their losses, and, given the potential
for astronomical losses, in all likelihood, would be reluctant to enter the first party
insurance market for investors without government guarantees of some sort. 175 Thus, just
as is the case with various catastrophic risks, government intervention is likely needed for
this protection to be provided.
produce on its own all optimal governance terms” and which “can be rolled out against any proposed legal rule
(whether default or mandatory) that changes current arrangements”).
170. Id.
171. See note 221, infra, for a description of RiskMetrics Group’s corporate governance ratings.
172. The Corporate Library (TCL) employs an “A-F ” scale to indicate the degree of governance risk at a
rated corporation. TCL uses ratings from four primary component categories (“board composition and
succession planning, CEO compensation practices, takeover defenses, and board-level accounting concerns”) to
generate an overall governance rating. The Corporate Library, TCL Ratings, available at
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/UserFiles/Ratings0907.pdf (last visited October 11, 2007).
173. Baker, supra note 113, at 379.
174. Even if one were to argue that opt out suits are motivated for non-pecuniary reasons (e.g., public
pension fund manager hoping to demonstrate a pro-corporate governance stance in a more prominent fashion),
the fact remains that these suits impose additional costs on the litigation system.
175. See notes 187 & 343, infra, for further discussion of this point.
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The chief response to the second argument is that mandatory corporate participation
is a necessary feature of the ICF. Though I have outlined several benefits of the ICF in
this Article, it is possible that not all corporate managers would agree with my
assessment, particularly if they worry about the effects of the ICF premium on their stock
prices. 176 If participation were optional, many corporations could choose to opt out of the
scheme. Low participation rates make for an unattractive insurance market because
insurers seek large risk pools, allowing them to set premiums with greater confidence. 177
Thus, to have a large risk pool and an appealing insurance market, participation in the
ICF must be mandated. Certainly, not every public company in the United States must
participate for there to be a viable insurance market, but if participation is not mandatory,
there is no way to know ex ante whether sufficient numbers of corporations will opt in
voluntarily. 178
A related potential criticism of the ICF proposal is that participation in the ICF
scheme will be mandatory for all investors, as well. One could argue that some investors
will not want to pay the ICF premiums and would prefer to self-insure through
diversification to the extent possible, or just bear the risk of loss. It, therefore, is
unreasonable to force them to take a “benefit” that they would rather not have. This
argument is not without some force, and it is likely that some investors would prefer to
opt out of the ICF scheme. However, this criticism rests on the mistaken notion that
implementing the ICF Proposal would lead to imposing a tax to which investors were not
previously subject. For sure, the form of the tax under the ICF scheme is new, but a tax
for securities fraud compensation exists currently. It exists in two forms—first, in the
premiums paid by corporations to their D&O insurers for protection against secondary
market fraud lawsuits (meritorious or not) and second, in the form of direct and
indirect 179 costs incurred by companies in defending such suits (which affect earnings
and ultimately stock prices). Therefore, a more appropriate question for an investor
evaluating the ICF Proposal is not whether she wants to pay a tax; she already is doing
so, albeit indirectly. The better question, in my view, is whether the tax paid under the
ICF scheme is more efficient than the alternatives, and this Article provides some
evidence that it is. 180
176. It is possible that a number of corporate managers would welcome the end of the threat of secondary
market securities class actions and happily opt in to the ICF.
177. See Marcus Radetzki & Marian Radetzki, Private Arrangements to Cover Large-Scale Liabilities
Caused by Nuclear and Other Industrial Catastrophes, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 180, 182 (2000)
(“[S]imilar but uncorrelated risks insured must be numerous. The greater the number of such risks, the nearer
the total damage cost will approach the underlying probability.”).
178. Similarly, though there are ways to mitigate the risk of adverse selection (e.g., by charging appropriate
risk-based premiums), making participation in the insurance scheme mandatory eliminates adverse selection
concerns. See Baker, supra note 113, at 383 (“Mandatory participation requirements, if enforced, always take
care of adverse selection.”).
179. “Direct” costs include the costs specifically related to litigation such as attorneys’ fees and court costs.
“Indirect” costs include items such as management inattention to the firm’s core business during the litigation
process. See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW.
1009, 1027-28 (1996) (discussing direct and indirect costs of litigation), cited in Pritchard, supra note 4, at 953,
n.106 (describing the indirect costs).
180. It is, of course, possible for an investor to argue that she does not want to pay a tax for compensation
of any sort, whether it be through the class action mechanism, the ICF, or any other compensation scheme.
However, as discussed previously, eliminating compensation for securities fraud losses is not politically
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Furthermore, making investor participation voluntary also would undermine the
deterrence effects of the ICF. The investors who would be most likely to opt for the
protections of the ICF are individual investors because, as mentioned previously, they are
generally less diversified than institutional shareholders and are more risk-averse.
Though holding approximately 40% of the value of stocks in the United States,
individuals account for a very small percentage of total trading volume. 181 Thus, any
trading behavior that is altered due to the level of the ICF premium is unlikely to have
much effect on a company’s stock price, since investors trading a small percentage of a
particular company’s stock will be considering the company’s related ICF premium when
making trading decisions. Without significant stock price effects, the deterrence benefits
of the ICF Proposal largely disappear.
In addition, as a practical matter, voluntary investor participation is not
administratively feasible. Buyers and sellers are brought together anonymously to trade
securities. In the public markets, there is no practical way to determine which buyer has
been matched with which seller. Thus, premiums cannot be collected only from sellers
that have opted into the ICF or who are selling to buyers that have done so. This analysis,
of course, is premised on the idea that there has to be a matching of sellers and buyers.
Intuitively, this makes sense because of the implicit nature of this compensation fund
(i.e., a seller leaves behind a payment in case the stock price was inflated by fraud). This,
however, does not have to be the case because all ICF funds are fungible. However,
funding would be more predictable if there were no worry that a disproportionate number
of frequent buyers (or rare sellers) would opt in and lead to a funding shortfall. An
additional administrative problem relates to collecting the premiums. As proposed, the
ICF will require the exchanges to remit periodic payments based on trading volume. It
would be much more difficult administratively for the exchanges to collect ICF premiums
only from investors that have opted in to the program.
2. The Role of the Federal Government
Another potential criticism of the ICF Proposal relates to the role of the government
in the ICF scheme. Some view government involvement with skepticism. Thus, one
concern is that implementing the ICF Proposal would result in the creation of a federal
bureaucracy, unconstrained by competition and unaccountable to shareholders. Indeed,
other government managed compensation funds, including the FDIC, 182 SIPC, 183 and
feasible. Thus, investors will continue to pay the costs of fraud protection for the foreseeable future.
181. Though precise data on the level of retail trading in the U.S. capital markets overall is not available,
reviewing retail trades on the NYSE may be instructive. For the fifteen trading days between October 15, 2007
and November 2, 2007, inclusive, trades by retail investors represented, on average, approximately 1.7% of
total NYSE trading volume. (Calculated by author as the greater of retail buy volume or sell volume, divided by
total NYSE volume. Underlying data (the availability of which changes daily) was obtained from New York
Stock Exch., NYSE Retail Trading and NYSE Dollar Volume Summary, available at
http://www.nysedata.com/nysedata/default.aspx (follow “Retail Trading - Click here for more” hyperlink; also
follow “Dollar Volume Summary - Click here for more” hyperlink ) (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).) It is generally
believed that retail trading as a percentage of total volume is higher on the NASDAQ than on the NYSE.
182. See, e.g., Anthony M. Santomero, Deposit Insurance: Do We Need It and Why? i (The Wharton Fin.
Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 97-35, 1997) (arguing that “[D]eposit insurance has its own set of problems. It
encourages: (i) risktaking by insured institutions; (ii) neglect by depositors; (iii) intervention by regulatory
agencies.”), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/97/9735.pdf.
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the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), 184 have been criticized extensively,
which suggests there are valid reasons to be concerned about government involvement in
this context. However, some design elements of the ICF should give potential critics
some comfort. First, the SEC will oversee the ICF. Despite recent corporate governance
lapses, among academics, practitioners, politicians, and the public, the SEC generally
enjoys a positive reputation. 185 Though sometimes subject to criticism, many attribute
any of the SEC’s shortcomings to its lack of funding 186 rather than any incompetence of
its officials. Thus, the SEC should be able to manage the ICF well, assuming adequate
funding. Second, the ICF will conduct high salience work. In the post-Enron era, the
media spotlight is focused on the efforts of the SEC to police corporate fraud. Thus, it is
less likely that the ICF would be able to carry on its activities with no accountability to
the investment community.
One still may remain skeptical of the efficacy of government intervention in private
markets, despite the features of the ICF designed to minimize such concerns. However,
because the government has pricing and coverage advantages over private insurers, the
federal government is the most efficient provider of securities fraud insurance and its
involvement in the ICF scheme is justified.
First, the government can mandate corporate and investor participation. As
described previously, small markets are unattractive insurance markets, so insurance
coverage must be mandated, something only the government can do. Of course, the
government could mandate the purchase of private market insurance, 187 resulting in
many of the same benefits as would accrue from government provision of mandatory
insurance. However, doing so would result in a loss of the advantages described below.
Government provision of insurance results in pricing advantages over provision by
private insurers. The ICF, by design, will be self-financing. However, if actual damage
payouts exceed expected losses, under the proposal, the U.S. Treasury will provide an
interest-bearing loan to the ICF to make up any shortfall on damages payouts that are

183. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION: STEPS NEEDED TO
BETTER DISCLOSE SIPC POLICIES TO INVESTORS 14 (2001) (describing how critics have claimed that the
SIPC’s primary goal is not brokerage customer protection, but rather protection of its industry-supplied fund);
Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and
the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1114, 1126 (1999) (arguing, among other things, that the
Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), which created the SIPC, “subsidizes the broker-dealer industry by
shifting the costs of failures” and does not attempt to attack the root cause of brokerage firm failure, but rather
provides for merely reacting once such failures occur”); but see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES
INVESTOR PROTECTION: UPDATE ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION
CORPORATION (2003) (noting that the SIPC has implemented significant reforms to improve its operations).
184. See, e.g., RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSION INSURANCE 10 (1989) (criticizing the
PBGC’s pricing structure, benefit guarantees and failure to address moral hazard effectively).
185. David C. Nixon et al., With Friends Like These: Rule-Making Comment Submissions to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 59, 73 (2002). Admittedly, the SEC oversees the
SIPC, which has been subject to criticism. See note 183, supra.
186. See generally James D. Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L. J.
737, 757 (2003) (describing the SEC as the “heroic David”).
187. The question remains whether private insurers would have an interest in participating in this market.
According to one D&O insurance executive, some private insurers would be reluctant to provide first party
insurance for securities fraud. However, some insurers might consider participating in the program if a
government mandate for coverage assured them of a market. See Telephone Interview #2, supra note 70. See
also infra note 343, for further discussion of the likely interest of private insurers in this market.
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due. 188 The ICF, therefore, will be able to charge lower premiums than private insurers
would be able to. The government’s size and borrowing capacity allow it to “produce”
insurance at a lower cost than private insurance markets. 189 Because the level of the
economic capital charge borne by the government effectively amounts to zero, it only has
to set premiums at the level of expected loss if the intent is to price the insurance at
cost. 190 Premiums charged for private fraud risk insurance would have to include not
only an actuarial charge for expected losses, but also a charge for the economic capital
required to absorb loss volatility. 191 This also could lead to inefficient pricing because
188. The U.S. Treasury would provide this loan only after the ICF exhausted other funding possibilities,
such as borrowing under a line of bank credit. A similar pre-arranged loan guarantee is in place with the SIPC.
If the SIPC fund’s assets (including its ability to borrow on a revolving line of bank credit) are insufficient to
meet its obligations, the SIPC may borrow up to $1 billion from the SEC, which the SEC would borrow from
the U.S. Treasury. See SIPC 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 129, at 4. Though a benefit of this proposal, the
government guarantee raises equitable considerations because following any extension of government credit (if
it becomes necessary), future ICF premiums will have to be increased above projected expected losses in order
to have sufficient funds available to repay the loan, thus disadvantaging investors post-loan vis-a-vis investors
pre-loan. However, having a government guarantee in place is an important feature of the proposal because the
government’s guarantee provides benefits for all investors (both present and future), as it allows all ICF
premiums to be lower than what they would be without such a guarantee. In addition, the equitable
considerations are mitigated significantly (though certainly not entirely) when one considers that the
overwhelming majority of trading volume on U.S. markets is undertaken by large institutional investors who are
repeat players in the market and are likely to be both pre- and post-loan investors. Despite the benefits of the
government guarantee, other methods to protect against funding shortfalls, such as securitization, should be
explored. See Harry Panjer, Insurance Against Misinformation in the Securities Market: Actuarial Aspects, in 2
CANADA STEPS UP 423, 452 (2006) (discussing securitization (specifically selling to public market investors
high-yield bonds, the yield on which is reduced to reflect losses) in connection with securities misinformation
insurance in Canada), available at http://www.tfmsl.ca/. (See Part V.C., infra, for a description of securities
misinformation insurance.) But see notes 332 and 333 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
potential limits on public market participation in a securities fraud insurance scheme.
189. For a similar discussion with respect to FDIC insurance, see Kuritzkes et al., supra note 94, at 34-35.
190. For a parallel argument in the context of FDIC insurance that notes that this point is arguable because
“[t]he United States government ultimately has a finite borrowing capacity, at least at a given cost of funds,” see
id. at 34. One may argue that even though the government does not have to charge as high a premium in
advance, its ability to do so is due to its power to tax. If the ICF premium pricing is accurate, this will not be an
issue. However, if the pricing is wrong, and the government has to make up for any shortfalls in premium
collections, it will have to tax (or alternatively, use previously collected tax revenue). There are distortionary
costs to taxing (i.e., taxes can alter the behavior of citizens, so if taxes have to be raised to bail out the ICF, it
could impose other costs on society beyond the amount of the taxes). One response is that the ICF has ample
incentive to get the pricing right, though admittedly correct pricing will be a challenge. (Part IV.C.4. explores
some of these concerns in more detail.) Another response is that the government runs a number of insurance
programs (e.g., the FDIC, unemployment insurance, flood insurance), and though its track record is not perfect,
the government has proven itself competent to manage an insurance mechanism. Finally, even when the
government has gotten the pricing wrong in the past in an extreme failure, such as the savings and loan crisis
when it had to execute a large bailout, the effects were not long-term. The FDIC, which took over the
responsibility for S&L deposit insurance from the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), is
now self-supporting. Of course, one cannot argue that enduring another crisis of the order of magnitude of the
S&L crisis would be welcome. However, I use this example to show that, even in this extreme case, there
appears to be no long-term effect from distortionary taxation. That said, this concern should be explored more
fully in any further consideration of implementing the ICF.
191. See id. at 34 for a similar discussion in connection with FDIC insurance. Insurers calculate expected
losses, but actual losses may be more or less than expected (i.e., be “volatile”). Thus, private insurers must
maintain sufficient capital not only to meet expected losses, but also to cover losses that are higher than
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the presence of large corporations in the insurance pool would require a private insurer to
hold more incremental economic capital, irrespective of the relevant proportion of
expected loss, thus leading to the possibility of the insurance premiums far exceeding the
expected losses. 192 Though the organizations are criticized on many grounds, 193
commentators generally agree that the FDIC and SIPC are able to provide depositor and
investor protection at lower costs than private markets. 194 Thus, it is likely that, overall,
the ICF would have the ability to insure against securities fraud risk at a lower cost than
private insurers.
Moreover, government or single-provider fraud insurance can achieve
administrative cost savings. Competing private insurers must incur duplicative costs
related to marketing and underwriting, which can increase the price of insurance. 195 In
addition, having a single provider can be more efficient because, before an insurer pays
any claims, it will have to conduct an investigation into whether securities fraud
occurred. It would be highly inefficient for individual insurers to conduct multiple
independent fraud investigations. Of course, cooperation agreements among insurers are
possible, but insurers in all likelihood would not relish taking on what has traditionally
been the role of a judge in determining whether the requisite state of mind (scienter) was
present to warrant a finding of fraud. This is outside the scope of their competence.
In addition, having the government serve as the sole insurer in this context makes
collecting premiums more feasible administratively. The per-trade fee assessment is a key
component of the ICF Proposal; without it, issuer-funding would be required and
compensation would be limited significantly. 196 Collecting premiums on trades and then
remitting them to various private insurers based either on issuer or, worse, by trader, adds
another layer of complexity to the administration of the fund 197 and substantial costs.
Despite the administrative cost benefits of government management, there are also
disadvantages. Private sector competition and profit motives might lead to innovation and
administrative cost cutting in the private fraud insurance market—things that are less
likely to exist with the ICF because of its use of government-employed managers who
may be less sensitive to spending public dollars. 198 While this is a valid criticism of the
expected.
192. See generally id. at 37 for a discussion of this concept in connection with FDIC insurance.
193. See supra notes 182 and 183.
194. See, e.g., Joo, supra note 183, at 1115 (“It is unclear whether the private insurance market could
provide satisfactory investor insurance, particularly at a low cost comparable to that of SIPC assessments.”);
Kuritzkes et al., supra note 94, at 35 (stating that the government’s size means it can provide insurance at a
lower cost than private markets).
195. Each insurance company must engage in underwriting and risk assessment, resulting in a duplication
of effort not present if the government alone performs the function. See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our
Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST. L. REV.
537, 577 (2006) (stating, in the health insurance context, that administrative costs such as marketing and
underwriting are higher for individual insurance policies than for group or government-provided insurance).
196. See supra Part III (discussing the limits of a corporation’s ability to provide compensation for fraud
losses); see also infra Part IV.C.6. (discussing why the fee should be based on trades and not holdings).
197. See Baker, supra note 113, at 415-16 (stating that, in connection with evaluating one possible scheme
for Canadian securities misinformation insurance (described in Part V.C. infra), "There are no per-trade fees in
the private market approach because of the administrative complexity involved in collecting the fees on behalf
of multiple private market insurers”).
198. See generally Jost, supra note 195, at 579 (discussing, generally, these considerations in the context of
public health insurance); Michael B. Rappaport, The Private Provision of Unemployment Insurance, 1992 WIS.
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ICF Proposal, on balance, because of the government’s ability to “produce” insurance at
a lower cost than the private sector, as discussed above, it is likely that any potential
administrative inefficiencies will be outweighed by the government’s other pricing
advantages.
In addition, government insurance precludes market price competition, which is
usually believed, by market enthusiasts, to provide substantial benefits. However, it is not
clear that pricing competition would advance the deterrence goals of the ICF Proposal.
Currently, competitive pressures appear to make it impossible for D&O insurer premium
prices to reflect governance risk fully. 199 There is no reason to think that these pressures
would not exist if the insurance were sold to investors rather than corporations.
One also may argue that governmental involvement will impede the development of
accurate fraud risk ratings. First, though an independent, private company will perform
the risk assessments that determine the ICF premium, this government-hired ratings
agency may have poorly aligned incentives. The primary downside to getting the risk
assessment wrong will be reputational loss and, eventually, loss of the government
contract. Though these are significant risks, the rating agency will not have its capital at
risk, as is the case with private market insurers 200 or investors. Also, as a governmentsanctioned contractor, the agency will not have to compete in the marketplace for
clients. 201 Thus, it will have reduced incentives to perform competently. Second, the
agency will have no incentive to work to refine its pricing model. Private insurers
compete to underwrite accounts, so they can obtain a significant benefit from refining
their pricing models to allow them to underwrite accounts profitably that other insurers
turn away (or price inappropriately). This will not be the case with the ICF-appointed
rating agency. These are all valid concerns. However, it is clear that the government
oversees a number of insurance programs (e.g., the FDIC, PBGC, SIPC, unemployment
insurance) and has demonstrated that, even in the absence of competition, risk assessment
L. REV. 61, 105-06 (discussing, generally, some of these considerations with respect to the provision of
unemployment insurance).
199. See Posting of Kevin Lacroix, director of OakBridge Insurance Services, to D&O Diary,
http://dandodiary.blogspot.com/2006_12_01_archive.html (Dec. 03, 2006, 21:47 CST). Lacroix wrote,
It might be possible for a D & O insurer to insist on corporate governance reforms if the insurer
could offer demonstrable insurance cost savings for qualifying companies, but the reality is that the
D & O insurance sector has been and remains so competitive that it is impossible to show cost
savings. There is always a competitor willing to offer the same or similar coverage at the same (or
better) discount, and so companies who might otherwise accept their insurer’s loss prevention
requirements have little monetary incentive to do so.
Id.; see also Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the
Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 531 (2007) (“[T]he market for
D&O insurance operates as a constraint on the ability of underwriters to factor risk into price.”); id. at 526
(suggesting, based on their findings from interviews with D&O professionals, that there may be “short-term
pressure on underwriters to generate premium volume notwithstanding possible long-term losses”).
200. Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details
Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1179 (2006)
(“[I]nsurers stake their own capital on their governance assessments and suffer directly from any error in
evaluating risk.”).
201. The rating agency, however, will have to compete for the government contract and be subject to the
rigors of a competitive bidding process. This, of course, differs substantially from competing for the business of
corporations.
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can be handled competently. To be certain, government insurers have made pricing
errors, but the same can be said for private market insurers. On balance, given the other
benefits accruing from government oversight, concerns about the government’s ability to
oversee the ratings process are insufficiently strong to mandate private insurance in this
context.
Finally, regardless of one’s views on the efficacy of governmental involvement in
private markets, it is clear that, thus far, private market solutions have not emerged to
address effectively the serious problem of securities fraud. For sure, implementing the
ICF carries some risks. I submit, however, that the ICF is likely to be a better alternative
to the status quo.
3. Deterrence Effects
Though I have argued that implementing the ICF and imposing fraud risk ratings on
corporations will increase deterrence, there are questions about whether that necessarily
will be the case. One could argue that the establishment of fraud risk ratings will do little
to deter fraud. The variations in premiums among companies necessarily will be only
fractions of one percent. Therefore, one could argue that such small variations will not
have much effect on the trading behavior of investors and, by extension, the behavior of
corporate managers. Perhaps on small trades made by individuals, the premium
differentials will be too small to have much of an impact because, in dollar terms, the
differences will be small. However, this is not the case for institutional investors that are
active traders. According to recent studies, trading commissions for institutional investors
average approximately 10 basis points (bp) or 0.10% (a bp is one one-hundredth of one
percent). 202 Thus, for example, a one bp difference in ICF premium could mean a 10%
difference in sell-side transaction costs for an institutional investor. 203 Therefore, even
slight differences in ICF premiums among corporations in which an institution is
considering investing, when multiplied over the large volume of likely trades, can be
significant because of the effect on overall transaction costs. Shares of stock are largely
fungible, 204 and differences in transaction costs can make a difference in investment

202. See Sugato Chakravarty et al., Did Decimalization Hurt Institutional Investors? 8 J. FIN. MARKETS
400, 411 tbl. 3 (2005) (finding dollar-weighted average trading commissions of approximately 9 bp (postdecimalization of stock prices) to 11 bp (pre-decimalization) for a sample of 34 large institutional investors
trading NYSE-listed stocks in the years 2000 and 2001); Michael Goldstein et al., Brokerage Commissions and
Institutional Trading Patterns 50 tbl. 1 (Oct. 16, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (showing a range of trading
commissions, based on trading activity, of approximately 9-12 bp for a sample of 306 institutional investors in
1997, calculated by author by dividing the average commission per share (shown in cents) by the average price
per share), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=528288. Note that the study’s authors state that average
commissions decreased substantially from 1997 to 2003 (the final period in study). Id. at 31.
203. It should be noted that commissions are not the only trading costs incurred by investors. See
Chakravarty et al., supra note 202, at 409 (discussing non-commission trading costs such as price impact on
trade and administrative costs of “working an order” and the “opportunity costs of missed trades”). However,
commissions are direct trading costs and hence more similar to the ICF premium than other, indirect types of
trading costs.
204. As Claudio Loderer et al. explain, “[a] common assumption in finance theory is that individual assets
have perfect substitutes.” Claudio Loderer et al., The Price Elasticity of Demand for Common Stock, 46 J. FIN.
621, 621 (1991). In other words, shares of stock are fungible; a buyer easily can find a number of stocks with
similar characteristics in which to invest. However, more recent finance scholarship has called this assumption
into question. See id. at 623-625 (describing theories and studies related to this question, including, among
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choices.
Another potential concern is that implementing the ICF will have a negative effect
on deterrence; an end of respondeat superior 205 will accompany an end to fraud on the
market lawsuits. This, however, should not be a serious concern because, under the ICF
Proposal, instances of fraud committed by an employee will have a negative impact on a
company’s fraud risk rating, and by extension, its share price. Corporations, therefore,
will have ample incentive to monitor their employees’ actions. Another pro-respondeat
superior argument, made in the torts arena by Guido Calabresi, is that respondeat superior
leads to a better allocation of resources because it allows the price of goods sold in the
market to reflect injury costs. 206 Under this theory, implementing the ICF also will lead
to a better allocation of resources. A firm’s fraud risk rating will affect its share price and
cost of capital directly. In the secondary market securities fraud area, share price is where
this cost should be reflected. 207
One also could argue that, in many contexts, lawsuits, despite their drawbacks,
provide more deterrence than is available under insurance regimes. 208 The ex post
determination of liability can result in more accurate outcomes than an ex ante insurance
premium, which is necessarily based on the insurer’s estimate of the likely behavior of
the insured. The deterrence effects of the ICF Proposal rely, in large part, on the ability of
the rating agency to generate a rating that reflects the actual risk of securities fraud. As
discussed in Part IV.C.4., infra, generating fraud risk ratings will be one of the biggest
challenges for the ICF program. One of the strengths of lawsuits is the potential for more
information to be available after the fact about whether there was fraud than is available
ex ante about the likely propensity for fraud. 209 Accurate outcomes, while beneficial in
others, that stocks are not perfect substitutes for one another if the stock of one firm provides hedging
opportunities for an investor that cannot be duplicated with the stock of any other firm). Nonetheless, the fact
remains that investors have a number of investment choices, and different transaction costs will affect
investment decisions.
205. Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable and Judicially Implementing the Preposterous: The
Premature Demise of Respondeat Superior Liability Under Section 10(b), 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1381-82
(1997) (explaining that respondeat superior is a common law doctrine that holds employers responsible for the
actions of their employees in order to provide corporations and other principals with incentives to take care in
hiring and monitoring their employees).
206. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 544
(1961), cited in Prentice, supra note 205, at 1391 n.309.
207. Of course, higher fraud risk ratings will translate into lower stock prices and a higher cost of capital.
This can affect product prices to some degree because, for certain projects to be profitable, companies with
higher costs of capital will have to charge higher prices.
208. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic
Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 163-64, 166-68 (1990) (concluding, in the torts
context, that, although first-party insurance theoretically could provide optimal levels of deterrence, insurers fail
to perfectly classify risks according to consumption choices, thus leading to litigation (specifically an enterprise
liability regime) promoting deterrence goals better than insurance). The context in which this debate is often
conducted is with respect to automobile accidents and the efficacy of tort litigation over no-fault insurance
(under which insurers pay the claims of their insureds, rather than litigating fault). Many studies related to the
question of whether no-fault plans provide as much deterrence as exists under a tort regime offer contradictory
results. James C. Harris, Why the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Proves the Case for a New
Zealand-Style Comprehensive Social Insurance Plan in the United States, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1385
(2006) (“[N]o consensus at all has emerged regarding the effect of no-fault plans on accident rates.”).
209. See generally Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357,
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their own right, also generally result in better deterrence.
This is a weighty concern, but one that is mitigated somewhat by the context of
securities regulation. As described in Part III, supra, securities litigation does a poor job
of deterrence given its failure to affect a significant portion of firms (i.e., small firms) and
the fact the perpetrators of the fraud generally do not pay the judgment. Thus, while the
idealized version of litigation may provide superior deterrence to an insurance regime, it
is not clear that would be the case with respect to securities litigation.210
Ultimately, the best deterrence against fraud is likely strong enforcement action by
government regulators. According to one securities plaintiffs’ lawyer with whom I spoke,
“There is no question that the best [fraud] deterrent is a more heavily funded SEC.” 211 A
D&O insurance executive I interviewed expressed a similar sentiment by indicating that,
in his view, the presence or absence of D&O insurance has little effect on managerial
behavior; corporate managers worry more about actions initiated by the SEC and the
DOJ. 212 The reputational sanctions from a government investigation and the threat of
civil penalties and jail time likely will provide a much more powerful deterrent than the
fraud risk rating and level of ICF premiums. Thus, in connection with the ICF proposal, it
would be prudent to increase government fraud enforcement budgets significantly. 213

359 (1984) (discussing this concept in the context of tort liability).
210. In addition, one problem with an ex post litigation regime is the defendant corporation may be
bankrupt and hence judgment proof at the time of litigation, which means the threat of a damages award is not
much deterrent to the corporate managers contemplating fraud. See generally, Coffee, supra note 62, at 1551
n.64 (“Securities class actions tend less frequently to be filed in the wake of bankruptcy because the usually
deep-pocketed corporate defendant can no longer be sued once it has entered bankruptcy.”). Indeed, fraud is
often caused by the “last period” problem (i.e., managers, fearing the consequences of poor corporate
performance, engage in fraud to give them enough time to turn the company’s results around). Jennifer H. Arlen
& William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL.
L. REV. 691, 693, 703 (1992) cited in Pritchard, supra note 4, at 931. This technique, of course, may be
ineffective. One study of 111 fraud on the market cases decided between 1975 and 1990 showed that almost
25% of the firms accused of fraud later went bankrupt. Arlen & Carney, supra, at 726.
211. Telephone Interview #1, supra note 62.
212. Telephone Interview #2, supra note 70.
213. For more effective deterrence, additional government budget increases would have to accompany the
implementation of the ICF. The end of secondary market class actions would mean the end of the investigatory
work of plaintiffs’ lawyers in this area. These lawyers often bring significant resources and expertise to bear
when ferreting out corporate fraud. Telephone Interview #1, supra note 62. One plaintiffs’ attorney I
interviewed describes, for example, the hiring of private investigators to find former employees. The testimony
of a former employee that can support fraud allegations is very useful in surviving the motion to dismiss.
Though a “bad news” disclosure and a large stock price drop make the possibility of fraud obvious to most, the
harder cases are those in which there are no obvious signs of fraud, and the plaintiffs’ lawyer has to “put
together a case” before filing a complaint. Id. This process takes a great deal of time and will be lost with the
end of class actions. The ICF Division of the SEC will have to step in to this role. For sure, the SEC currently
performs its own independent investigations. It occasionally uses funding to hire private investigators, but that
is not typically done. The SEC is able to call on the government’s unique resources, as well (e.g., access to
databases with social security numbers and the ability to subpoena bank records). One plaintiffs’ attorney I
interviewed indicated that he believed that when the fraud case is sufficiently high profile, the SEC is able to
marshal the necessary resources to do a good job investigating the case. Id. However, what seems clear is that
the SEC Enforcement Division, as currently constituted, does not have the available staffing to replicate the
investigative efforts of plaintiffs’ lawyers for the hundreds of potential instances of fraud that occur each year.
Thus, with the implementation of the ICF would have to come significantly increased staffing levels at the SEC.
One possible source of funds could come from an assessment of higher Section 31 fees. (See supra note 93 and
accompanying text for a description of these fees.) Of course, this would have the effect of increasing
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4. Fraud Risk Ratings
Perhaps the strongest possible criticism of the ICF proposal is its reliance on fraud
risk ratings. The efficacy of the ICF proposal depends, in large part, on the ability to
generate fraud risk ratings that are accurate and substantially tied to the risk of fraud
occurring. Corporate governance rating systems, which share some similarities with fraud
risk ratings as proposed in this Article, currently exist. However, no study, to my
knowledge, ties the ratings generated by those mechanisms to the risk of fraud. Indeed,
my own preliminary empirical analysis, described below, suggests there is no correlation
between ratings from one leading corporate governance rating system and the incidence
of fraud.
Moreover, recent work by Tom Baker and Sean Griffith suggests that many of the
structural factors typically used in corporate governance ratings (e.g., number of
independent directors) are poorly correlated with D&O insurers’ assessments of securities
litigation risk. 214 This suggests that the metrics currently employed in existing corporate
governance rating systems will be of limited value for the ICF. One could argue that there
are significant market incentives for a private entity to develop an effective corporate
governance rating system and the failure of one to emerge suggests that this is a difficult
undertaking. One could argue further that there is no reason to think that governmental
oversight of the process will simplify the task. This is a strong objection and one for
which there is no easy response.
Admittedly, it is unclear which corporate governance mechanisms most affect the
likelihood of fraud occurring at any individual company. There is, however, some limited
empirical evidence that may prove useful in this context. For example, one study shows
that firms subject to SEC enforcement actions were, relative to a control group, more
likely to have a higher proportion of insiders on the company’s board, greater ownership
of company stock by these insider directors, no large outside stockholder, founder-CEOs
and combined CEO and board chair positions. 215 A number of other studies find similar
relationships between corporate governance practices, on the one hand, and fraud and/or
accounting restatements on the other. 216 Therefore, there is limited evidence that

transaction costs for investors.
214. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 199, at 517-25 (describing the importance of firm culture and
manager character). Note that D&O insurers are trying to assess litigation risk, not just fraud risk, since D&O
insurers have to protect corporate managers and corporations from non-meritorious suits.
215. Patricia M. Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulations: An Analysis of
Firms Subject to Enforcement Action by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1, 21 (1996).
216. See, e.g., Hatice Uzun et al., Board Composition and Corporate Fraud, FIN’L ANALYSTS J., May/June
2004, at 41 (finding “as the number of independent outside directors increased on a board and in the board’s
audit and compensation committees, the likelihood of corporate [fraud] decreased”); Anup Agrawal & Sahiba
Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, 48 J. L. ECON. 371, 371 (finding “the probability of
restatement is lower in companies whose boards or audit committees have an independent director with
financial expertise…,” but noting that they find no relationship between board independence and restatements);
Jap Efendi et al., Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option
Compensation and Other Factors, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 667, 667 (2007) (finding “[financial] misstatements
are…more likely for firms…that have a CEO who serves as board chair”); Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the Empirical Literature 13 (Oct. 24, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript) (There “is a well-developed body of evidence demonstrating a strong positive correlation between
director
independence
and
financial
reporting
quality...”),
available
at
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corporate governance mechanisms bear some relationship with the incidence of fraud. 217
In addition, insurance companies have developed mechanisms to help them decide
whether to extend D&O insurance coverage and, if so, at what premium. 218 Indeed, one
factor in determining D&O insurance premiums is a company’s corporate governance
rating. 219 If the insurers find the metrics useful when making their own pricing and
coverage decisions, it seems reasonable to conclude that the ICF Division would be able
to generate, in collaboration with an outside entity, a meaningful rating system. However,
the challenge will be determining exactly which factors are most likely to affect the
incidence of fraud.
A review of one corporate governance rating system currently in use may be
instructive. The “pre-meltdown” RiskMetrics Group (then ISS) 220 CGQ (corporate
governance quotient) index score 221 of a selected group of scandal-plagued companies
appears below: 222

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024261. It should be noted that a restatement does not
necessarily suggest that the restating firm engaged in securities fraud. See infra notes 234-237 and
accompanying text for additional factors researchers find to be associated with the incidence of fraud or
restatements.
217. One challenge in this area stems from the fact that many of the corporate governance practices of
public corporations are required or strongly encouraged either under the law or exchange listing requirements.
This will make it more difficult to make meaningful distinctions among companies for the governance variable
portion of the fraud risk ratings, as all public companies will have some minimum level of “good governance
mechanisms.”
218. In a study analyzing a cross section of Canadian public companies, a company’s D&O insurance
premium level was shown to bear a significant association with the quality of that company’s corporate
governance-related variables. John E. Core, The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Premium: An Outside
Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 449, 475 (2000), cited in Larry E.
Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
28 J. CORP. L. 1, 54 (2002). D&O premiums, however, would not be a perfect proxy for ICF premiums because,
as discussed previously, D&O premiums have to include not only the risk of fraud being committed, but also
litigation risk more generally. See Core, supra note 218, at 454 (“Business risk (such as firm size, profitability,
and relative exposure to the U.S. legal system) also increases litigation risk. Thus a firm’s D & O premium is
hypothesized to be a function of both the quality of its corporate governance and its business risk.”). The ICF
premium will reflect, apart from a charge for administrative costs, only the risk of actual fraud because
corporations will not be subject to secondary market strike suits (i.e., suits without merit filed in an effort to
extract a settlement).
219. Many D&O insurance companies purchase the corporate governance ratings generated by RiskMetrics
Group (then ISS) to assist them in setting insurance premiums. E-mail from John A. Deosaran, Vice President,
Corporate Ratings, then Inst. S’holder Servs., to author (Sept. 11, 2006, 07:16:18 EDT) (on file with author). In
addition, some insurers adjust the amount of the insurance premiums charged by up to 15% based on a
company’s Corporate Library governance score. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 199, at 522 n.159.
220. RiskMetrics Group acquired Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) in January 2007. ISS is now a
subsidiary of RiskMetrics.
221. RiskMetrics is a leading provider of proxy research and corporate governance services and maintains a
database that contains CGQs for over 8000 companies in 31 countries. RISKMETRICS GROUP, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
QUOTIENT
[hereinafter
RISKMETRICS
GROUP],
available
at
http://www.riskmetrics.com/pdf/products/RA10-CGQ.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2007). RiskMetrics uses up to
65 data points in eight broad categories (board of directors, audit, charter and bylaw provisions, anti-takeover
provisions, executive and director compensation, progressive practices, ownership and director education) to
determine a company’s CGQ. Id. RiskMetrics’ CGQs appear to be the most widely respected set of corporate
governance ratings available.
222. Id.
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Name
Adelphia Communications
Enron
Global Crossing
Tyco
WorldCom

145

CGQ Index Score
15.9%
42.1%
5.9%
5.5%
11.3%

The CGQ index score compares the corporate governance rating of the company in
question to the ratings of other companies in the relevant market index (e.g., S&P 500
firms). Tyco, for example, had a CGQ index score of 5.5%. This means that, at the time
of the rating (i.e., before the fraud revelation), 94.5% of companies in the S&P 500 had a
higher corporate governance rating than Tyco, suggesting that Tyco’s corporate
governance practices were lacking vis á vis other public companies.
In general, the corporate governance processes of the companies listed above, as
assessed by RiskMetrics, were poor relative to those of companies in the market at
large. 223 However, these data provide only anecdotal evidence with regard to whether
corporate governance ratings can assess the likelihood of fraud.
To gauge whether the RiskMetrics CGQs are correlated more broadly with the
incidence of fraud, I analyze a proprietary data set 224 consisting of the CGQs of all 100
companies that were the subject of settled securities class action lawsuits involving
secondary market fraud, as of August 2006, with class periods between January 2002
(when CGQs were instituted) and August 2006. I observe that the CGQs at both the
beginning and end of the class periods for the alleged fraudsters, as a group, failed to vary
significantly from the CGQs of the overall universe of rated corporations. The average
(median) CGQ index score at the beginning of the class period is 48.8% (48.8%), and the
average (median) CGQ index score at the end of the class period is 51.2% (56.5%). This
analysis reveals that, as the fraud continued, as a group, the firms’ scores got somewhat
better relative to the rest of the universe of rated companies.
These results cast substantial doubt on the predictive value of this metric for the
typical fraud case. This is not a condemnation of RiskMetrics’ CGQ; the metric was not
designed specifically to predict fraud, but rather to assess broadly the quality of corporate
governance practices, which have value apart from their effect on fraud risk. 225
However, this evidence does highlight the fact that the ICF probably will not be able to
employ a rating system currently in use without significant modification.
223. Enron’s relatively higher (though still below the median) score notwithstanding, had investors
incorporated this information into their investment decisions, perhaps the revelations of fraud would not have
taken the market by surprise. What is unclear is why investors largely ignored these ratings. One possibility
suggested by commentators for the lack of impact may be because the rating agencies lack access to nonpublic
information, thus failing to add to the body of knowledge investors could have if they bothered to investigate.
Apparently, however, investors neither heeded the corporate governance rating nor conducted their own
independent investigations.
224. Institutional Shareholder Services Securities Class Action Database and Corporate Governance
Quotient Database (data on file with author).
225. See generally INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., BETTER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RESULTS IN HIGHER
PROFIT AND LOWER RISK 1 (2005) (describing the results of a study that finds a correlation between good
RiskMetrics (then ISS) corporate governance ratings and superior financial performance, specifically “lower
risk, better profitability and higher valuation”), available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/CGQSummary.pdf.
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It is possible that the factors most likely to affect the risk of fraud (e.g., firm culture
and character and integrity of the managers) 226 are things that are not readily observable
or quantifiable by an external rating agency that has limited time to devote to developing
each individual firm rating. 227 Therefore, to enhance the quality of the fraud risk ratings
used by the ICF Division, under this proposal, D&O insurers and auditors will be
required to provide the ICF’s designated rating agency with firm-specific information on
some of the “softer issues” that cannot be captured in traditional corporate governance
metrics.
During an audit, auditors have the ability to assess the potential for accounting
fraud, and the insights gleaned from these processes can be useful in developing the
appropriate fraud risk rating for a particular company. 228 While it is not reasonable to
believe that auditors will always be able to predict fraud or even provide accurate
indications of all the “soft factors” that affect fraud risk, they are much closer to the
company than any ICF representative ever would be and thus could provide valuable
inputs into the rating process.
As mentioned previously, D&O insurers, to some extent, consider fraud risk when
underwriting D&O insurance policies. Though these insurers do not have formalized
underwriting standards to assess the risk of fraud, insurers, particularly now in the postEnron era, explicitly factor corporate governance variables into D&O premium
pricing. 229 While insurers generally do not want to reveal their private pricing algorithms
publicly, 230 the ICF, as a division within a government agency, will be able to compel
disclosure of these factors. Though the pricing models of D&O insurers will not be
dispositive with respect to fraud risk (because underwriting competition and firm-specific
factors, such as susceptibility to non-meritorious suits, can affect pricing), 231 the
information gleaned from D&O insurers can be separated into components, with the
factors most applicable for the ICF Division’s purposes used to generate fraud risk
ratings. 232 Moreover, because the ICF fraud risk ratings, unlike D&O insurance
226. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 199, at 517 (“Culture and character, we were regularly told [by D&O
market participants interviewed], are at least as important as and perhaps more important than other, more
readily observable governance factors in assessing D&O risk.”).
227. The ICF’s rating agency will have to be particularly careful about attempts by corporations to “game”
the system by studying the inputs to the rating and making themselves appear less risky than they actually are.
228. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (SAS
99) provides standards to assist external auditors in assessing the risk of management fraud. SAS No. 99
contains examples of fraud risk factors classified into three categories: incentive/pressure (to commit fraud),
opportunity (to commit fraud), and attitude/rationalization (to justify the fraud). Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 99 (2002).
229. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 199, at 516-27 (describing how D&O underwriters evaluate
corporate governance).
230. See id. at 528. However, insurers do disclose a version of their basic pricing algorithm to state
insurance regulators. Id. at 528, n.183. Even if the ICF proposal is implemented, D&O insurers will have
relevant information for this purpose because they still will provide insurance for primary market fraud suits,
derivative litigation and similar suits.
231. See supra note 199 (discussing how underwriting competition can affect pricing).
232. For a similar discussion in connection with the benefits of publicizing D&O insurance premiums, see
generally Baker & Griffith, supra note 199, at 536 n.212, who state
In order for the premium to have [a] signaling [of governance quality] effect, market analysts
would have to control for the financial and industry factors that predict the likelihood of investment
loss generally. These adjustments would control for each of the factors in the base price algorithm,
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premiums in the United States, will be public, the ratings will be subject to testing and
analysis by academic researchers and the investment community. 233 This should lead to
an improvement in the quality of fraud risk ratings over time. In sum, generating accurate
fraud risk ratings will be a challenge, but the evidence suggests that it may not be an
insurmountable one.
The prior discussion focuses on assessing the governance mechanisms that could
lessen the opportunity for fraud to occur. However, researchers have found other metrics,
outside of traditional corporate governance characteristics, that appear to affect the
incidence of fraud. Thus, it is fruitful to explore these characteristics (which in many
cases may be thought of as providing a “motive” to commit fraud) in connection with a
discussion of the fraud risk rating process. As one might expect, studies show a
correlation between the existence of equity-based incentives for managers (e.g., stock
options) and the incidence of financial misreporting. 234 However, perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, 235 according to one study, relative to other public corporations, firms that
restate their financial reports as a result of what the authors conclude is likely to be
intentional misconduct have higher market multiples, are more likely to raise equity
capital while the alleged earnings manipulation is ongoing, and have longer periods of
positive earnings growth and positive earnings surprises immediately preceding the
alleged manipulation. 236 The authors suggest that, at the time of the alleged misconduct,

leaving only the governance variables.
Id.
233. Sean Griffith has urged the public disclosure of D&O insurance premiums and contract terms for a
similar reason. See Griffith, supra note 200, at 1203-07 (arguing for the required disclosure of D&O insurance
premium amounts and key contract terms and stating, “[T]he only way to provide researchers and market
participants with the information embedded in the D&O insurance premium may be to mandate disclosure of
such data in U.S. securities law”).
234. See, e.g., Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of Performance-Based Compensation on
Misreporting, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 35 (2006) (finding “the sensitivity of the CEO’s option portfolio to stock
price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport” financial statements); Efendi et al., supra
note 216, at 667 (finding “the likelihood of a misstated financial statement increases greatly when the CEO has
very sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options”). But see Merle Erickson et al., Is There a Link Between
Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 113, 113 (2006) (finding “no consistent
evidence that executive equity incentives are associated with fraud”). Stock options are designed to align the
incentives of managers with stockholders. Efendi et al., supra note 216, at 668. As the company’s share price
increases, the value of the stock options increase. Therefore, managers have an incentive to engage in activities
that benefit shareholders. Unfortunately, however, stock options also have the potential to provide incentives for
managers to engage in fraud to increase the stock price. See id.
235. One does not generally think of successful firms as being more likely to engage in fraud, but as Tracy
Wang, a researcher that finds a positive correlation between profitability and the propensity for fraud, explains,
such firms are more likely to be successful at misleading the market. Tracy Yue Wang, Investment, Shareholder
Monitoring and the Economics of Corporate Securities Fraud 19 (Weatherhead School of Mgmt., Working
Paper No. 2, 2004) (“High [profitability] seems to increase the likelihood of fraud. This result may seem
counterintuitive at first glance. However, it can be intuitive because it is difficult for a (known) troubled firm to
sell a good earnings report. A firm will have incentive to fool the market and may easily succeed when the
market believes the firm is profitable based on previous years’ performance, while negative shocks or
deterioration
in
profitability
has
already
started.”),
available
at
http://weatherhead.case.edu/bafi/Documents/TracyWangpaper2.pdf.
236. Scott Richardson et al., Predicting Earnings Management: The Case of Earnings Restatements 2
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=338681.
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managers of such firms were under tremendous pressure from the capital markets to
continue to maintain prior good performance. 237
Though more empirical evidence is required to assess which measures do, in fact,
affect a manager’s propensity to commit fraud, these studies suggest that it may be
possible, after separating out the effects of litigation risk, to provide reasonably accurate
fraud risk ratings. The question, of course, is whether, in the context of a governmentsponsored insurance fund, these “motive-based” measures should be used. 238 In the
private insurance market, activities that are not inherently “wrong” (e.g., driving a
particular type of car) can lead to higher insurance premiums, and society appears to
accept that. However, it is questionable whether it would be politically feasible (and it is
clear that it would not be economically wise) to charge higher premiums for, as an
example, sales of stocks of high growth and highly profitable companies. This practice
would be akin to levying a “success tax.” Thus, using such factors in fraud risk ratings
could distort economic incentives. 239
5. Creation of a Fund Instead of Publication of Ratings Only
One may question the necessity of creating an investor compensation fund when the
government simply could mandate the creation and dissemination of fraud risk ratings for
public companies. According to traditional economic theory, an accurate stock price is
one that is equal to the present value of expected future cash flows. In an efficient market,
according to traditional theory, the current price will reflect fully all relevant information
on these expected future cash flows. 240 The risk of expected future cash flows not
materializing, including because the market has been misled due to fraud, is the sort of
information that would be reflected in the price. Therefore, in an efficient market, if the
market were supplied with a reliable fraud risk rating, 241 the stock price would reflect the

237. Id.
238. It should be noted that there is some basis in current law for taking motive-based considerations into
account in securities fraud cases. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499, 2511 (2007)
(“[M]otive can be a relevant consideration, and personal financial gain may weigh heavily in favor of a scienter
inference…”). However, rather than the general motives described in the text above, the courts generally require
the motive ascribed to be specific to the manager (e.g., evidence of significant trading by the manager in the
company’s stock during the alleged fraud period). See, e.g., GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d
228, 237 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[M]otives that are generally possessed by most corporate directors and officers do not
suffice; instead, plaintiffs must assert a concrete and personal benefit to the individual defendants resulting from
this fraud.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. D&O insurers currently charge different premiums based on industry group and signs of financial
stability. See Baker & Griffith, supra note 199, at 528-29 (describing how “many” or “most” insurers include
industry group and accounting ratios in their pricing algorithms). However, D&O insurance, as discussed
previously in note 214 supra, is designed to protect against litigation risk, even for unmeritorious suits.
Historically, firms in certain industries (e.g., technology companies) have been frequent targets of litigation,
largely due, in the opinion of many, to the volatility of their stock prices. See Coffee, supra note 62, at 1548-49
(“Whether an individual corporation will be sued in a securities class action is likely to depend principally on
three factors: (1) its stock price volatility; (2) its industry classification, with consumer goods, technology,
communications, and finance companies being the recent preferred targets; and (3) its market capitalization.”).
Thus, it is appropriate for a D&O insurer that wants to set prices appropriately to take industry into account.
Under the ICF proposal, however, pricing should reflect the risk of fraud, not the risk of litigation.
240. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review Of Theory And Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN.
383, 383 (1970).
241. One may question why we need the government to generate fraud risk ratings at all because of a belief
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risk, and there would be no need for a compensation fund to levy a premium because the
price paid by investors would take the risk of fraud into account (i.e., be lower).
As stated above, for the accurate price adjustments described above to occur, stocks
must operate in an efficient market. Market efficiency is one of the most highly contested
issues in finance, 242 and there is a great deal of evidence that is inconsistent with the
notion that current prices accurately reflect current information. 243 For example, studies
have shown that markets are slow to incorporate bad news, including, for example,
analyst sell recommendations, going concern opinions 244 and credit downgrades. 245
Thus, even if the information contained in fraud risk ratings were released, there is no
guarantee that it would be incorporated quickly and fully into stock prices as would be
the case with ICF premiums, which operate as direct offsets against share prices.
Some market efficiency adherents acknowledge that there may be times when prices
deviate from value (one of the most notable examples of which occurred during the
Internet bubble of the late 1990s). 246 However, they suggest that, over the long-term,
markets are efficient, primarily because it is not possible to exploit any inefficiencies in a
way that will provide excess returns. 247 Even if this is true, under the ICF system, if the
that the market can do a better job of predicting fraud occurrences than any government-hired rating agency
could. There is reason to believe, however, that a rating agency, sanctioned by the government, offers distinct
advantages. The rating process can generate more information than the market can obtain from corporations.
The government has the ability to compel participation in the ratings process and to force companies to provide
relevant information about fraud risk that the corporations may not want to share with the public markets. This
non-public information can be helpful in the ratings context. This is somewhat similar to the credit ratings
process. Though bond market participants, especially professional bond fund managers, are capable of
performing their own analyses about default risk, evidence shows that they rely significantly on credit ratings
generated by third parties such as S&P and Moody’s, the leading credit rating agencies. It is believed that these
ratings are beneficial, not only because they confirm the fund managers’ analysis, but also because credit rating
agencies are able to extract more information from companies because they agree to keep information given to
them in connection with the ratings process confidential. See generally H. Kent Baker & Sattar A. Mansi,
Assessing Credit Rating Agencies by Bond Issuers and Institutional Investors, 29 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1367
(2002) (discussing, comprehensively, the use of credit ratings by institutional investors).
242. See generally Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, Winter 2003, at 59 (2003) (examining a number of criticisms leveled against the efficient
market hypothesis).
243. For a description of a number of anomalies considered incompatible with the Efficient Market
Hypothesis, see id. See also Richard J. Taffler et al., In Denial? Stock Market Underreaction to Going-Concern
Audit Report Disclosures, 38 J. ACCT. & ECON. 263, 264 (2004) (“An increasing body of research suggests that
the stock market takes time to assimilate bad news, in contrast to a more timely incorporation of good (positive)
news.”).
244. A going concern opinion is an opinion issued by a firm’s auditor expressing “substantial doubt” about
the firm’s ability to continue to operate as a viable entity. See Elizabeth K. Venuti, The Going-Concern
Assumption Revisited: Assessing a Company’s Future Viability, CPA JOURNAL ONLINE, May 2004,
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/504/essentials/p40.htm.
245. Taffler et al., supra note 243, at 264-65.
246. See generally Malkiel, supra note 242, at 61 (“ . . . I do not argue . . . that . . . market pricing is always
perfect. After the fact, we know that markets have made egregious mistakes, as I think occurred during the
recent Internet ‘bubble.’”). It should be noted that there is not universal agreement among scholars that there
was a technology bubble. See Ľuboš Pástor & Pietro Veronesi, Was There a Nasdaq Bubble in the Late 1990s?,
81 J. FIN. ECON. 61, 62, 64 (2006) (questioning whether there was a bubble (i.e., tech stocks were overvalued)
in the late 1990s because of the high level of uncertainty regarding company growth rates, an important
determinant of fundamental value).
247. See Malkiel, supra note 242, at 61.
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premium assessments are accurate (which, admittedly, will be a challenge), the risk of
fraud (and any changes thereto) will be reflected immediately in stock price, without the
possibility of it taking weeks or months (or longer) for stock prices to adjust
appropriately. Therefore, implementing the ICF can lead to a more accurate reflection of
the risk of fraud in markets.
6. Equitable Considerations
Another possible critique of the ICF centers on the fairness of the way ICF
premiums will be assessed. As described in Part IV.B., supra, all sellers of stock will be
required to pay premiums into the ICF fund. The premium will be assessed, therefore,
even on sales of the stock of corporations with excellent fraud risk ratings. One could
argue that this system would lead to some unfair subsidization of shareholders of
companies that are likely to engage in fraud by shareholders of companies where fraud is
not likely to occur. Though the potential for some subsidization is present, this
subsidization is necessary for accurate premium pricing. Just as a driver with an
unblemished record (e.g., no traffic accidents) and the characteristics of a prototypical
“safe driver” does not have zero-cost auto insurance premiums, companies with “clean”
records still will have a cost levied against their shares because they will have expected
fraud losses that are greater than zero.
One may argue further that it is unfair to tax the shareholders of all corporations for
the frauds that will occur only in a subset of corporations. However, this critique ignores
the nature of insurance. No public shareholder can know with any certainty that she is
investing only in companies that will never engage in fraud, just as no homeowner can
know that her house will never catch fire. Homeowners generally do not feel cheated or
treated unfairly when their insurance premiums are used to pay claims to other
homeowners who have suffered losses from fire; the homeowners are paying for the
peace of mind in knowing that they will be protected should calamity strike. 248 The ICF
is similarly fair. The ICF will assess different premiums based on risk, but provide the
same benefit to all shareholders—compensation when calamity (i.e., fraud) strikes.
One might even argue that the ICF, by design, is unfair to most shareholders because
it subsidizes the investment in risky companies; an investor can now much more
comfortably invest in fraud-prone companies because of the insurance protection offered
by the ICF. This should not be of great concern, however, because if an investor seeks to
purchase shares in companies that have high fraud risks in hopes of making profits from
arbitrage, she is unlikely to succeed. She will internalize the cost of fraud if she sells the
shares before any fraud is uncovered because she will be required to pay the ICF
premium (which will be significantly higher than the average premium). Of course, if the
investor buys while the stock is inflated by fraud and holds until the fraud revelation, it is
true that she will be entitled to compensation under the ICF. However, the investor will
have to bear some portion of her losses (assumed here for exposition purposes to be
25%). 249 Thus, it is not clear that, if the ICF premiums are accurate, the efforts of an
248. Of course, if homeowners knew that their insurance companies were using their insurance premiums
to subsidize other homeowners engaging in particularly risky behaviors, this might capture their attention.
249. In addition, as discussed in note 92, supra, through the statutory incidence of the ICF premium lies
with the seller, the buyer in all likelihood will bear some portion of the economic burden for the ICF premium
payment.
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investor who intentionally seeks out fraud-prone companies will be subsidized by the
ICF. Of course, if the premiums are inaccurate and systematically undercharge
shareholders of likely fraudsters, traders, who are able to assess the pricing inaccuracy
(which is questionable), may be more confident investing in risky companies. This
further underscores the need for accurate fraud risk ratings.
Finally, one might argue that the appropriate tax base for the ICF premium is stock
holdings, rather than stock transactions, because the risks and rewards of stock price
movements are functions of holding stocks. One could argue further that it is unfair to tax
an investor who frequently buys and sells stocks in very safe companies more heavily
than an investor who buys and holds stocks in fraud-prone companies. However, tradebased payment is a necessary feature of this insurance program. 250 The more an investor
trades, the more likely she will be to sell the stock of a company engaging in fraud to a
shareholder who will need compensation from the ICF.
7. Effect on Financial Markets
One of the most serious potential objections to the ICF proposal is the effect
implementing the ICF proposal, which levies fees on capital markets activity, will have
on the United States’ well-functioning securities markets. Specifically, one could argue
that levying the ICF premium, which is similar to a securities transactions tax (STT), 251
would lead to increased market volatility, 252 lower trading volume, and lower (or less
accurate) overall securities prices. 253 While there is no existing compensation system
similar to the ICF from which to draw valid conclusions, one may glean some insights
from a review of the literature on STTs. There currently is no consensus among

250. See also note 256, infra, for a discussion of the administrative benefits of trade-based payments.
251. STTs are taxes assessed on securities market transactions. In addition to providing government
revenue, these taxes are designed to discourage short-term speculation in markets. In general, the theory
underlying securities transaction tax proposals is that a small (on a percentage basis) fixed transaction cost in
the form of a tax represents a negligible burden for long-term asset holders. However, the STT is more
burdensome for short-term investors who trade frequently and hence must pay the tax frequently. These
investors incur significant STT-related trading costs. See generally Robert Pollin, Applying a Securities
Transactions Tax to the US: Design Issues, Market Impact and Revenue Estimates, in FINANCIALIZATION AND
THE WORLD ECONOMY 409, 409-10 (Gerald Epstein ed., 2005).
252. Baker et al. describe why volatility is undesirable as follows:
Volatility in financial markets is generally considered undesirable, since it creates an additional
element of risk for investors. If, for example, an asset was expected to give an average real rate of
return of 5% per year, but its price could fluctuate randomly by large amounts (e.g., 20%) for
significant periods, then there is a large risk that the owner of such an asset would have to sell it for
a loss, since she may be forced to sell it when it is below its trend value. For this reason, assets that
fluctuate a great deal in price must offer a higher rate of return than assets whose prices are
relatively stable . . . . If the financial markets as a whole become less stable, then in general the cost
to firms of raising capital will increase.
Baker et al., supra note 45, at 4.
253. See Karl Habermeier & Andrei Kirilenko, Securities Transaction Taxes and Financial Markets, in
TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES 325, 328-29
(Patrick Honohan ed., 2003) (stating that “[e]mpirical studies seek answers to three main questions” and briefly
describing the results of studies on the effect of transaction taxes on price volatility, trading volume, and
securities prices).
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researchers on the effects of STTs on financial markets. 254 Several empirical studies of
STTs in foreign markets have been undertaken, but, thus far, they have not resolved the
long-standing debate. 255 This section considers volatility, volume, and price effects
below in turn. 256
a. Volatility
Several researchers have studied the relationship between STTs and volatility. A
primary appeal of STTs for their proponents is the potential to reduce market volatility,
generally because of a decrease in destabilizing or noise trading. However, critics of
STTs assert that STTs increase market volatility because increased transaction costs
make it more expensive for dealers and market makers to perform their market stabilizing
functions. 257 Dealers, like all profit-seeking professionals, require compensation for their
services and for the risks they undertake. 258 As trading becomes more expensive, as is
the case when trades are subject to an STT, dealers are unable to manage their risks as
effectively and, correspondingly, are “less willing to put their own capital at risk.” 259
Hence, as the theory goes, after implementation of an STT, there are fewer dealers
willing to stabilize securities prices, leading to higher overall volatility. However, despite
the plausibility of this theory, several researchers find that imposition of an STT has no
significant effect on volatility. 260 For purposes of evaluating the ICF Proposal, it will be
difficult to determine ex ante what effect the ICF premium will have on market volatility.
However, since sales undertaken by professional market makers will be exempt from the

254. Id. at 328.
255. One reason offered for this is the difficulty in separating the effects of STTs on price and volume from
other policy or structural changes that may be occurring simultaneously. Id.
256. In addition to the three principal objections typically expressed in connection with STTs, there is
another potential concern in this context: the lock-in effect. Edward McCaffery describes the lock-in effect as “a
wedge between an owner’s willingness to sell a given asset and a buyer’s willingness to pay for it, all on
account of the built-in tax liability.” Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV.
807, 895 (2005). With any realization-based tax, which the ICF premium is, in effect, because it is due upon
sale of a security, there is a concern about allocative efficiency. See id. Consider the following example,
borrowed in large part from McCaffery: If Shareholder A has a subjective valuation of $10 per share for stock in
Company XYZ, and Shareholder B is willing to pay her $10.25 per share for such stock, the transaction should
occur. However, if there is a tax upon sale of, say $0.50, Shareholder A, rationally taking her after-tax proceeds
of $9.75 into account, may not engage in the transaction and hold on to her stock longer than would be efficient.
Thus, if a tax rate is too high, there will be many efficient deals that do not occur, resulting in assets not being
allocated to their highest and best uses. Id. One way to address this concern (previously discussed by other
commentators for eliminating the lock-in effect in other contexts) is to impose the ICF premium once a year on
shareholder holdings, rather than on sale transactions. This solution is not optimal because it would increase
overall system administrative costs, as the ICF would have to process annual statements and collect payments
from every security holder in the country, rather than just collecting fees from a limited number of securities
exchanges and associations as currently proposed. Though this process could be streamlined somewhat by tying
it into the federal income tax process, the administrative costs in all likelihood still would outweigh taking
advantage of the current Section 31 fee collection mechanism. In any event, the lock-in effect is likely to be a
modest concern with respect to the ICF proposal because the ICF premium, as estimated, is a small percentage
of stock price.
257. See Habermeier & Kirilenko, supra note 253, at 325-26.
258. Id. at 333.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 328-29.
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ICF scheme, 261 the chief volatility-related concern with STTs (i.e., that higher
transaction costs will deter dealers from performing their market stabilizing functions)
will not be present.
b. Volume
Critics of STTs also generally assert the claim that imposition of the taxes reduces
trading volume as investors migrate to other markets or instruments where they can avoid
the tax. This migration affects liquidity and informational efficiency. 262 Trading volume
can be affected primarily in one of three ways. 263 Investors may (1) reduce the frequency
with which they trade (which is the result desired by proponents of STTs), (2) change the
location of their trading, 264 or (3) migrate their investment dollars to other securities 265
that are not subject to the tax. 266
Critics of the ICF proposal may raise similar concerns. The average ICF premium
will be small on a percentage basis, but the aggregate amount collected under the ICF
will be large. Those most affected by the ICF Proposal will be institutional investors.
Transaction costs matter to frequent traders, and creating the ICF will add to those costs
significantly. In 2005, total commissions on institutional trades totaled $13.2 billion. 267
Using recent sales data as a guide, aggregate annual ICF premiums for mutual funds
would total approximately $754 million, while aggregate premiums for pension funds
would total approximately $238 million. 268 Imposing the ICF premium, representing an
261. For a discussion of the exclusion of market makers from the ICF scheme, see supra note 91.
262. Under the standard rational expectations model, the migration of volume to other markets or other
instruments does not result in any efficiency loss, as volume, per se, is just an outcome of the trading process
and does not contain any information about underlying fundamental values. Researchers recently have
questioned this view and assert that trading volume injects information about the precision of individual signals
about value. Thus, under this view, a loss of volume can affect a market’s ability to aggregate information. See
Habermeier & Kirilenko, supra note 253, at 337-38 (discussing these points).
263. See Daniel Waldenström, Why Are Securities Transactions Taxed? Evidence from Sweden, 1909-91, 9
FIN. HIST. REV. 169, 171 (2002) (discussing three potential outcomes in connection with securities transactions
taxes).
264. The evidence on volume migration is somewhat mixed. For example, volume on the Swedish stock
market declined significantly following an increase in Sweden’s STT, but one study of 14 STT changes in
Asian markets finds no statistically significant differences in turnover before and after the tax changes.
Habermeier & Kirilenko, supra note 253, at 329. However, the conventional wisdom is that investors will
choose to invest where they can avoid the tax, assuming a similar quality of execution and access to desired
investment opportunities.
265. The concern is, because of the tax, investors could be encouraged to trade more often overall by using
securities that are not subject to the tax, while achieving the same underlying economic objectives. See id. at
328. Researchers generally acknowledge that it is difficult to design an STT that is “neutral” in that one
portfolio of assets is not favored over another with the same payoff. For the ICF premium to be pay-off neutral,
it would have to apply not only to all securities, but also be set such that a change in the value of the replicating
portfolio (e.g., bonds, call options) would equal the change of price of the underlying asset (e.g., the stock)
exactly. For this to happen, the ICF premium rates would have to be adjusted frequently. See id. at 336, for a
discussion of this point in connection with STTs. This is an expensive and infeasible proposition
administratively. Hence, it would not be possible to stem volume migration completely if the ICF were
implemented.
266. Waldenström, supra note 263, at 171.
267. Goldstein et al., supra note 202, at 2.
268. See Appendix II, infra, for the calculations.
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approximately 7.5% increase in overall direct trading costs, will have a significant effect
on the market’s largest investors. 269 Thus, one could argue that implementation of the
ICF will encourage investors to modify their trading behavior or leave the U.S. markets,
which ultimately would result in a decline in U.S. trading volume.
Concerns about the effects of the ICF premium on trading frequency are valid.
Though the evidence on the market impact of STTs is mixed, one example from the U.S.
markets may be instructive. In 1975, pursuant to the mandates of the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975, the SEC prohibited fixed (minimum) brokerage rates on the New
York Stock Exchange and ended what had been a 180-year old pricing practice. 270
Immediately following this prohibition and the advent of negotiated commissions,
average commission rates fell by 25% 271 and trading volume increased substantially 272
(an estimated 30%-100%, depending on the time period and estimation technique
employed). 273 Though there is reason to question whether a reduction in brokerage
commissions is analogous to imposing the ICF premium, 274 these data do suggest that
increased transaction costs have the potential to affect U.S. market liquidity
significantly. 275
269. This is likely to have a relatively greater effect on index funds (i.e., funds that generally make
portfolio adjustments only to bring their portfolios in line with the broad market index (e.g., S&P 500) they are
tracking), whose overall costs tend to be (and must be for competitive reasons) lower than those of actively
managed funds (i.e., funds that attempt to achieve superior returns through actively selecting investment
opportunities). See, e.g., Michael Maiello & Meghan Johnston, ETF-O-Mania, FORBES, Sept. 18, 2006, at 142,
142 (citing Financial Research Corp. statistics indicating that the average expense ratio (the percentage of a
fund’s assets used to cover managing the fund, including management fees and operating expenses) for index
funds is 0.54%, while the average expense ratio for actively managed mutual funds is 1.12%). Individual
investors often are encouraged to invest in index funds as a low-cost way to achieve diversification. Imposition
of the ICF premium on sales of an index fund, if some of the costs are passed on to the fund’s investors, which
is likely, will increase the cost of this investment strategy. However, index fund managers generally, barring
frequent index composition changes, trade less frequently than actively managed fund managers (hence, being
subject to the ICF premium less frequently), minimizing this effect somewhat.
270. Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of Deregulation, 27 J. L. & ECON.
273, 273 (1984).
271. Id. at 280. The amount of the decline varied by the identity of the trader, trading frequency, order size,
and stock price. Charles M. Jones & Paul J. Seguin, Transaction Costs and Price Volatility: Evidence from
Commission Deregulation, 87 AMER. ECON. REV. 728, 730 (1997).
272. Jarrell, supra note 270, at 274.
273. Jones & Seguin, supra note 271, at 730 (citing findings by Jarrell, supra note 270).
274. The appeal of analogizing the deregulation of brokerage commissions to the ICF premium is that
deregulation brought a one-time, substantial transaction cost reduction. See id. at 731 for a comparison of the
deregulation of brokerage commissions and STTs. However, the analogy may not hold perfectly. The amount
by which the commissions were reduced were not uniform (i.e., “institutional and active traders enjoy[ed]
greater reductions”). Id. The ICF premium will not differ by type of investor, though the effects will be felt
most by institutions and other active traders.
275. On the other hand, in 1996 Congress enacted the National Securities Markets Improvement Act
(NSMIA), which expanded the reach of Section 31 collections to include trades of NASDAQ securities.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there was no deleterious effect on NASDAQ market volume following this
change. See The Effects of the Excessive Fees Collected Under Federal Securities Laws and Their Impact on the
Financial Markets and on the Economy as a Whole: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 3 (1999) (opening statement of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter Effects of Excessive Fees] (stating, in 1999, that “the fee rates in the NSMIA
were based on projections of nearly 4 years ago…Our markets have experienced almost explosive growth, and
the result has been collections that are way above what was estimated.”). Of course, this observation tells us
nothing about how much more the stock market could have grown in the absence of the Section 31 fee.
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There are, however, features of the ICF premium that should lead one to conclude
that its market effects will not be identical to those of a traditional STT (or brokerage
commissions) and could be positive. The ICF premium, unlike commissions or a general
securities transaction tax, is an escrow in anticipation of a benefit (and an exchange of
uncertainty regarding securities fraud risk for certain costs and benefits) rather than a
direct cost without an immediately corresponding benefit. 276 The ICF premium is highly
targeted 277 and designed to provide direct compensation to those who suffer losses from
securities fraud, and is, therefore, more akin to an insurance premium. 278 Thus, trading
frequency may not decline because the additional transactions cost will be offset by
greater investor confidence in a significantly safer market. However, further study of this
issue is required; the liquidity concern cannot be minimized.
Migration to other markets, however, is of far less concern. Even if investors do not
view the ICF premium as a payment in exchange for a benefit, it is unlikely that they will
leave U.S. markets in large numbers. Even with the ICF premium, trading transaction
costs will be significantly lower in the U.S. than in foreign markets, as the United States
enjoys a significant cost advantage over most foreign markets. 279 In addition, many
foreign exchanges impose securities transactions taxes 280 that would exceed the costs
(estimated, for exposition purposes, at 0.035%) 281 imposed by ICF premiums. Thus, U.S.
trader migration to foreign markets following the imposition of the ICF premium is an
unlikely occurrence.
Because of concerns about migration of investment to substitute securities, under the
276. Of course, shareholders receive indirect benefits from tax receipts (e.g., tax receipts can lower the
national deficit and result in lower interest rates).
277. Funds collected through the ICF will be reserved for fraud compensation, not general government
revenue. However, though it is true that ICF funds are targeted for fraud compensation, the ICF premium may
still feel like a tax to investors since amounts collected will be pooled and no individual investor accounts will
be established. However, this is no different from the design of traditional insurance products.
278. Though difficult to predict, it seems reasonable to conclude that investors, because of mental
accounting effects, will be more willing to pay a premium for a targeted benefit to a specific class of
beneficiaries (i.e., shareholders who have been defrauded) because they can imagine themselves as possible
recipients of a cash payment from the fund for their losses. Indeed, many long-term investors have participated
in class action settlements in the past.
279. Baker et al., supra note 45, at 23. However, foreign exchanges are becoming more competitive. See
Effects of Excessive Fees, supra note 275 (statement of Robert H. Forney, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Chicago Stock Exchange) (arguing that foreign exchanges could pose a threat to U.S. exchanges in the
near future); see also notes 286 and 289 and accompanying text.
280. For example, the UK (0.5%), Switzerland (0.15%), France (0.15%), China (0.5%, 0.8% for Shanghai
exchange transactions), Ireland (1.0%), South Korea (0.3%), India (0.5%), Greece (0.6%), and Austria (0.15%)
all impose STTs on stock transactions that exceed the estimated ICF premium of 0.035%. See Pollin, supra note
251, at 412-14. Of course, there are markets, including those in Japan, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, and
Sweden, where no transactions taxes are imposed. Id. However, it is unlikely that a significant portion of U.S.
securities volume will migrate to these markets in response to the imposition of the ICF premium. U.S.
investors tend to overweight U.S. investments in their portfolios relative to the levels indicated as optimal by
finance models due not only to “home bias” (an irrational preference for domestic assets), but also due to
barriers to international investment, both direct (e.g., capital controls limiting foreign investment, transaction
costs) and indirect (e.g., information costs due to asymmetric information). Alan G. Ahearne et al., Information
Costs and Home Bias: An Analysis of US Holdings of Foreign Equities, 62 J. INT’L ECON. 313, 313-15 (2004).
The effects of home bias and investment barriers still would be present following the imposition of the ICF
premium, lessening the likelihood of large-scale volume migration.
281. See supra note 111 for cautionary language in connection with this estimated premium.
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ICF Proposal, sales of equity derivatives (the primary substitute for stock investment) are
subject to the ICF premium. Though there may be valid theoretical reasons for excluding
equity derivative sales from the ICF scheme, 282 because of the easy substitution of equity
derivatives for stock, a failure to include equity derivatives in the ICF scheme could lead
to a significant amount of volume migration. 283
A related concern about imposition of the ICF is that even though the U.S. capital
markets are the strongest in the world, U.S. companies nevertheless may choose to de-list
from U.S. exchanges and list abroad in order to avoid participation in the ICF.
Additionally, foreign issuers may forego listing in the United States, which would lead to
a decrease in transaction volume in our market. However, these issues are unlikely to be
of significant concern.
It is unlikely that a significant number of U.S. corporations will exit U.S. markets if
the ICF is adopted. Companies tend to exhibit a bias toward listing in their home
countries. 284 This is not to say that we should have no concerns about the U.S. capital
markets becoming uncompetitive, but, as a practical matter, U.S. corporations are
unlikely to exit U.S. markets in large numbers (particularly in the short-term) regardless
of their views on the efficacy of the ICF.
It also is unlikely that the ICF and its related premium would discourage foreign
listings. According to one study, listing on a U.S. exchange reduces a foreign
corporation’s cost of capital by 70 to 110 basis points (0.70% to 1.1%). 285 Thus, if the
study’s authors are correct, there are significant benefits that accompany a U.S. listing,
and in all likelihood they would exceed the perceived costs of the ICF scheme.
Commentators have taken note of the increased competition the U.S. capital markets

282. For example, circuits currently are split as to whether an option holder may sue the company whose
stock underlies the put or call for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5. Courts that reject option holders as proper
plaintiffs in securities fraud do so generally because (1) companies cannot control the issuance of derivatives,
(2) holding a derivative is more risky than share ownership, and (3) derivatives, unlike stock, “do not represent
capital investment” in a company. Robert C. Apfel et al., Short Sales, Damages, and Class Certification in 10b5 Actions 28 (Simon Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. FR 01-19, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=285768.
283. Under this proposal as currently constituted, debt securities, credit derivatives, and hybrid securities
(with a mixture of debt and equity characteristics) are not subject to the ICF premium. Though a wholesale
migration from equity securities to debt securities to avoid the ICF premium is unlikely, it would be prudent to
explore expanding the ICF program to include debt securities in order to avoid the migration problem. I leave to
future work a discussion of how covering debt securities might affect the administration of the ICF.
284. See generally Luigi Zingales, Is the U.S. Capital Market Losing Its Competitive Edge?, J. ECON.
PERSP. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 21) (“IPOs tend to list in the country where their business is located, even
if
this
is
not
the
most
competitive
market.”),
available
at
http://research.chicagogsb.edu/igm/research/papers/1LZingalescompetitiveness.pdf.
285. Id. (manuscript at 11) (describing a study found conducted by Luizi Hail and Christian Leuz).
According to Zingales, changes in the cost of capital were computed by comparing corporate valuation and
earnings forecasts in the period surrounding the listing decision. Id. This benefit may have decreased somewhat
in recent years, as some studies have shown negative market effects from the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. See
Zingales, supra note 284 (manuscript at 11-14). Cost of capital reductions from listing on a foreign market have
the potential to come from several sources, including from the enhanced liquidity on, and visibility afforded by
listing on, the foreign market and because the foreign listing allows a corporation to “bond” or commit to
provide better disclosure or institute better governance practices. Id. (manuscript at 7-8). Of course, foreign
listings also have costs including listing fees, disclosure costs, and exposure to additional liabilities. Id.
(manuscript at 8).
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are getting from the London Stock Exchange (LSE), 286 which has a securities transaction
tax of 0.5%. 287 Despite this STT, 288 London has captured global initial public offering
(IPO) market share from the U.S. exchanges, and even a few U.S. companies have
chosen to list their IPOs on the LSE. 289 This suggests that the existence of an STT has
not substantially affected London’s ability to attract foreign issuers. The ICF premium
likely would not diminish the U.S. exchanges’ ability to do so either. Indeed, it is
possible that the implementation of the ICF actually would encourage foreign companies
to list in the United States. Some suggest that one possible reason for the decline in the
United States’ market share is the fear of legal liability that accompanies a U.S. listing,
particularly the threat of securities class actions. 290 Though actual legal liability has
changed little in recent years, the perception of increased risk still exists, due in part to
the increasingly high value of securities class action settlements and the rare, but high
profile, cases in which directors are required to fund part of the settlements with personal
funds (i.e., beyond that which is payable by D&O insurance or the corporation). 291 It

286. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 6) (stating “[t]he main beneficiary of this loss [of U.S. global IPO market
share] is London. Rever[s]ing more than a decade of declining market share, in the last three years London went
from a market share of 5% to a market share of almost 25%”).
287. See Pollin, supra note 251, at 414 .
288. Of course, there are those who believe the abolition of the 0.5% STT would enhance the UK market
and economy. See, e.g., Don Cruickshank, Chairman, London Stock Exch., Address at the Second City of
London Biennial Meeting: The Increasing Impact of Stamp Duty on the UK Economy (Dec. 13, 2001) (stating,
with respect to the UK’s STT, “no modern economy, or aspiring modern economy, imposes such a burden on
its
wealth
producing
companies”),
available
at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/engb/about/Newsroom/Media+Resources/Speeches/speech14.htm.
289. Zingales, supra note 284 (manuscript at 2). According to Zingales,
[W]hile in the late 1990s the U.S. capital market was attracting 48% of all the global IPOs, its share
. . . dropped to 6% in 2005 and is estimated to be only 8% in 2006. Even more surprisingly, in
recent years we have observed [that] some U.S. companies choose to list in London rather than in
the United States.
Id. (manuscript at 2). He goes on to state,
While this trend is too recent to be attributable to any single factor, it does not seem to be caused
by a shift in the sectoral distribution of global IPOs, nor by a change in their geographical
distribution. That almost all these companies sought to be marketed in the United States suggest[s]
that the U.S. capital market retains some attractiveness. But the additional benefits derived from
listing do not seem to be worth the direct and indirect costs associated with this decision.
Id. (manuscript at 2-3).
290. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 18-19); see generally COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REG., INTERIM
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 4-5 (2006) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]
(stating that "differences in the legal rules governing the U.S. public markets and the foreign and private
alternatives” are part of the reason for the loss of U.S. public capital market competitiveness), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf.
291. Zingales, supra note 284 (manuscript at 18-19). Another potential reason for the decline set forth by
some observers relates to the extensive regulatory requirements imposed on U.S.-listed companies by SarbanesOxley. Corey Boles, London Remains an IPO Draw, U.S. Changes Notwithstanding, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8,
2006, at C4 (“Officials at NYSE Group Inc.'s New York Stock Exchange say [Sarbanes-Oxley] has been a
major reason why the U.S. exchange has lost ground in luring foreign listings.”). But cf. Zingales, supra note
284 (manuscript at 17-18) (suggesting that the cost of compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley is unlikely to be the sole
cause of the decline in U.S. global IPO market share because such costs do not appear to exceed the benefits of
listing in the United States).
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seems apparent that the litigation burden can affect listing choices. Thus, it is not certain
that the ICF premium, which imposes a modest fee on shareholders in exchange for the
end of secondary market securities class actions, would be unwelcome by corporations.
Indeed, the ICF could make U.S. markets more attractive to both foreign and domestic
issuers. 292
c. Accuracy and Overall Level of Prices
Finally, another potential concern is the effect the ICF premium will have on stock
prices. For many years, researchers have tried to assess the impact securities transactions
taxes have on market prices. Opponents of such taxes cite two primary concerns. First,
critics assert that STTs decrease overall price accuracy because the increased transaction
costs from the STT can make repeated rebalancing in search of the correct price
prohibitively expensive. 293 One, therefore, could argue that implementing the ICF would
reduce share price accuracy.
In my view, while this is an important consideration, the assertion that the ICF
premium would lead to less accurate prices relies on two assumptions: (1) the ICF
premium will cause trading frequency to decrease and (2) the constant turnover in stocks
is moving the market toward a more accurate price. As discussed previously, it is not
clear that imposition of the ICF premium will reduce trading frequency to any significant
extent. Furthermore, while it is true that trades reveal information about fundamental firm
values and can help to set accurate prices, some trades reflect speculation that is injecting
no information into market prices. 294 Researchers, when studying the effects of STTs,
find it difficult to separate trading that is “stabilizing” and hence leading prices closer to
fundamental values from trading that is destabilizing noise. 295 Thus, in the context of the
ICF, just as with STTs, if trading frequency is decreased because of imposition of the ICF
premium, which may not be the case, it is not clear that the trading that declines will be
the type of trading that helps generate more accurate share prices. 296
Second, critics assert that STTs result in a decline in the overall level of market
prices because investors will price in future transaction tax payments when they are
making investment decisions. Accounting for the tax will result in a lower price paid for
the security in question. Several empirical studies have been undertaken to determine the

292. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 290, at 71. The report states,
Securities class actions do not exist in the United Kingdom, or in the markets of our major
competitors. Indeed, [D&O] insurance costs are six times higher in the United States than in
Europe. Foreign companies commonly cite the U.S. enforcement system as the most important
reason why they do not want to list in the U.S. market.
Id. Of course, one could argue that we should have no interest in encouraging firms that fear legal liability to list
in the United States. Indeed, keeping such companies out may help to minimize the amount of fraud in U.S.
markets. See Zingales, supra note 284 (manuscript at 20) (exploring, but then rejecting, the possibility that the
loss of global IPO market share is the effect of “benign” regulation). Though this argument is plausible, it is
possible for honest managers to fear being subject to securities class action lawsuits that lack merit.
293. See Habermeier & Kirilenko, supra note 253, at 335.
294. See generally J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON.
703 (1990) (describing the role of noise traders in financial markets).
295. Habermeier & Kirilenko, supra note 253, at 328.
296. See generally id. (“[I]t is hard to say which part of the volume [fundamental or noise] is more affected
by [an STT].”
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effect such taxes have on stock prices. Many researchers found decreases (e.g., in the
range of 1% to 3%) in stock market prices in selected markets following the imposition
of STTs. 297 However, the results, taken together, are inconclusive, and some question the
methodology by which they were obtained. 298
In any event, this should be less of a concern under the ICF Proposal because, if the
ICF premium is set appropriately (i.e., the premium accurately reflects fraud risk), there
should be no overall lowering of market prices. Currently, investors discount stocks for
the risk of fraud 299 (even if such discounts are imperfect), 300 so imposition of ICF
premiums that accurately reflect fraud risk should not result in any further discounting
overall and may decrease such discounting substantially if investors currently are prone
to overestimate the likelihood of fraud occurring. 301 However, if the ICF premiums are
inaccurate and set at levels higher than the expected losses from fraud and there is a
lowering of overall stock prices because of the imposition of an ICF premium, 302 then
this effect may be offset by higher overall prices due to increased investor confidence,
less management time spent on litigation, and lower D&O insurance premiums (because
they will no longer cover secondary market fraud lawsuits, either meritorious or
frivolous). Most importantly, however, is that companies with better fraud risk ratings
will experience less of a negative share price impact from the imposition of the ICF
premium—the desired effect to achieve the ICF’s deterrence objectives.
8. Political Considerations
Implementing the ICF would be a challenge politically. In theory, the ICF should
appeal to those occupying various points on the political spectrum. It eliminates
secondary market securities class actions (something that generally would appeal to the
corporate community and conservatives) and also provides meaningful compensation to
defrauded small investors (something that likely would appeal to those with more liberal
political leanings). 303 However, the ICF premium will be viewed by many as a pure tax
(despite the fact that the premium confers an insurance benefit). New taxes generally are
297. Id. at 329.
298. See, e.g., id. at 329-30 (discussing the lack of appropriate data and methodological concerns).
299. See generally Paul A. Griffin et al., Stock Price Response to News of Securities Fraud Litigation: An
Analysis of Sequential and Conditional Information, 40 ABACUS 21, 22 (2004) (“[I]nformed investors assess
[securities fraud] litigation risk generally as part of their overall evaluation of a stock.”).
300. See supra Part IV.C.5. for a discussion of market efficiency and the market’s ability to price fraud
risk.
301. This certainly is possible in the post-Enron era. See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Controlling
Systemic Risk in an Era of Financial Consolidation, in 3 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND
FINANCIAL LAW 557, 578 (International Monetary Fund ed., 2005) (“[F]inancial markets often seem to be
ineffective in predicting the onset of economic crises and indiscriminate in punishing risky firms after crises
occur.”).
302. It is worth noting that any price impact would not be limited to secondary market prices. Prices at
issuance are also subject to the effects of the ICF premium, as buyers, anticipating the payment of the ICF
premium upon exit, may discount the price they are willing to pay the corporation for its shares.
303. This is not to say that compensating investors is not a priority for some conservatives. See, e.g.,
Solomon, supra note 125 (quoting Michael Oxley, former Republican U.S. House Representative from Ohio
who co-authored the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation that created the Fair Funds (see Part V.A., infra, for a
description of Fair Funds) as saying the following: “When corporate executives make out like bandits, the
money ought to go back to the investors . . . ”).
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unattractive to conservatives and the business community. 304 In addition, implementing
the ICF will eliminate the need for trial attorneys in secondary market class actions,
something likely to be opposed by the plaintiffs’ bar. I leave a more fulsome discussion
of such political considerations to future work. However, it is clear that such factors must
be taken into account when determining the political viability of the ICF.
D. Summary and Concluding Thoughts on the ICF and Securities Litigation
The evidence provided in this Article suggests that implementing the ICF, with its
mix of ex ante and ex post elements, would yield significant benefits over securities class
actions. 305 First, the perpetrators of harm (i.e., the corporate managers who commit
securities fraud) are unable to bear the full costs of the harm they create. Neither their
personal resources, nor D&O insurance proceeds, are sufficiently large to compensate
investors for the losses they suffer. Second, given the financial incentives of the chief
enforcers of the securities laws (i.e., plaintiffs’ lawyers), an entire class of likely
perpetrators (i.e., small firms with thinly traded stock) are insufficiently deterred because
they face no credible threat of suit, 306 and managers of larger firms often are able to
escape personal liability even when sued. Third, the administrative costs of securities
class actions are extremely high. Current experience notwithstanding, generally, one
thinks of litigation as having the potential to impose lower costs than regulatory regimes
because litigation costs are incurred only when harm occurs, while regulation involves an
ongoing cost that affects all market participants. However, the ICF Proposal suggests a
regulatory mechanism that has potential costs that are substantially lower than those
existing under the current regime.
The lower costs associated with the ICF, however, provide only illusory benefits if
the scheme provides less deterrence than that of securities litigation. One might argue that
the securities litigation regime is more complex and costly than an insurance regime, but
the litigation requires the parties to engage in the time-consuming and complex exercise
of determining fault. With the additional cost, one might argue, should come additional
(or more accurate) deterrence. As the discussion on fraud risk ratings in Part IV.C.4.

304. A particularly appropriate example of this sentiment involves the reaction from the investment
community when invited to participate in hearings on the amount of Section 31 fees (Section 31 fees are
described in supra note 93). See, e.g., Effects of Excessive Fees, supra note 275 (containing testimony of
several leading members of the investment community pointing to their perception of the Section 31 fee as
“excessive” because total collections exceeded the cost of funding the SEC and thus was akin to a “tax”).
Congress subsequently reduced Section 31 fee amounts by enacting the Investor and Capital Markets Fee Relief
Act in 2002. One source of dissatisfaction with Section 31 fees, namely their effect on market making activity,
will not exist under the ICF, because sales of market makers and specialists are exempt from the ICF premium,
as described in supra note 91.
305. The framework employed in this section is borrowed, in large part, from Steven Shavell. See Shavell,
supra note 209, at 359-64 (discussing when regulation is superior to legal liability for controlling risks in the
torts context and arguing that (1) regulation is superior to liability when (a) the potential perpetrator is unable to
pay for the full extent of the harm caused and when (b) there is a chance that she will not face suit for the harm
caused and (2) liability is superior to regulation when (a) the would-be regulated party has more “knowledge
about risky activities” than the regulatory authority and when (b) factoring in administrative costs because, in
the litigation context, most of such costs are borne only after harm occurs).
306. As discussed in note 76, supra, the SEC has a renewed focus on microcap fraud, but the agency, at
current staffing levels, will not be able to provide the level of deterrence necessary to minimize substantially the
risk of fraud occurring.
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makes clear, it is easier to determine if fraud has occurred ex post than it is to predict the
propensity for fraud ex ante. Thus, if the benefits of accurate deterrence exceed the
administrative costs of litigation, the additional expense is justified. The ICF, however,
holds the promise of superior deterrence because its fraud risk-rating mechanism, unlike
securities litigation, subjects all corporations to sanction. In addition, the ICF’s ex post
fraud determinations can fulfill the fact-finding role currently played by the litigation
process. That said, further study on the likely deterrent effects of implementing the ICF is
required.
Ultimately, as discussed previously, the best deterrent in this area is likely to be
government enforcement and punishment directed at managers, rather than corporations.
Therefore, combining increased funding for the SEC and DOJ with implementation of the
ICF offers the promise of fewer losses from securities fraud and meaningful
compensation for the inevitable losses that will occur.
V. A CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE REFORM PROPOSALS
The securities regulation regime is a frequent target of reform proposals. In this Part,
I consider several recent proposals that are somewhat similar to the ICF and designed to
enhance investor compensation.
A. Fair Fund Expansion
Under Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, also known as the “Fair (Federal
Account for Investor Restitution) Fund Provision,” Congress authorized the SEC to take
civil money penalties and add them to disgorgement funds 307 to create a separate fund
for each instance of securities fraud. 308 These so-called Fair Funds are designed to
provide compensation to investors injured by securities law violations. While this is a
laudable effort, the SEC itself has acknowledged that collecting sufficient amounts to
compensate shareholders in securities fraud cases is “especially problematic, if not
impossible” because the investor losses caused by the fraud tend to dwarf any profit
accruing to the wrongdoer. 309 This is because when fraud is ongoing, the gains from
selling stock at an inflated price accrue not only to the wrongdoer who sells her shares on
the open market, but also to the innocent investor who, by chance, happens to sell also
while the fraud is ongoing. Thus, there is a substantial gap between total losses (which
include the losses of all the investors on the other side of the trades with the “lucky”
investors) and gains to the wrongdoer.
From 2002 through fiscal year 2006, the SEC collected $8 billion for distribution
through the Fair Fund process. 310 However, the amounts included in the Fair Funds for
large scale frauds still have been small when compared with the magnitude of total
shareholder losses. 311 To try to increase compensation available to shareholders, the SEC
307. Wrongdoers can be ordered to disgorge profits from their illegal activities (e.g., profits on stock sales
by an officer that perpetrated the fraud).
308. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (Supp. II 2002).
309. SEC, SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 63, at 20-21.
310. SEC 2006 PAR, supra note 125, at 23.
311. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 125 (“Investors are never going to be made whole by the SEC’s
settlement with WorldCom, which is just a small fraction of the billions of dollars investors lost in the fraud.”).

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007

61

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 76 [2007]

162

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Vol. 33:1

suggested an amendment to the Fair Fund Provision. 312 As enacted, the Fair Fund
Provision only allows civil penalty amounts to be set aside in a fund for injured investors
if such penalty amounts are added to disgorgement funds. 313 However, there are cases
where penalty amounts are ordered from a defendant without a corresponding
disgorgement order. Therefore, under current law, such civil penalty amounts are not
available for distribution to injured investors. 314 The proposed amendment would make
it possible for the SEC to distribute these civil penalty funds to defrauded shareholders
even when there are no disgorgement proceeds. 315
Though allowing civil penalties to be added to Fair Funds even when there is no
disgorgement order would be a positive development, unfortunately, the amounts
available for shareholder compensation still would be extremely small in comparison to
investor losses. The sources of civil money penalties (e.g., corporations, officers) lack the
capacity to provide restitution for the full level of investor harm, and with several parties
potentially staking a claim on their funds (e.g., plaintiffs’ lawyers in securities class
actions, the SEC, and possibly the bankruptcy court), the amounts available for Fair Fund
use will continue to be inadequate.
Creation of the ICF, which collects a premium pegged to expected fraud losses ex
ante rather than collecting illicit profits from wrongdoers ex post, as is the case with the
Fair Funds, would provide a great deal more compensation to defrauded investors. All
defrauded investors will be entitled to participate in damage recoveries through the ICF
because the fund will be adequate to provide such compensation. Despite the current
limitations of Fair Funds, under the ICF Proposal, the SEC will combine the funds
collected by the ICF and Fair Funds efforts to provide even greater investor
compensation for securities fraud losses. Combining the Fair Funds and ICF premiums
provides the benefit of having the actual wrongdoers (i.e., the corporate managers that
perpetrated the fraud) provide compensation to the victims of that fraud. This
combination furthers the aims of corrective justice. 316
Recently, the SEC announced the creation of a new specialized office to coordinate
the distribution of Fair Funds to defrauded investors. 317 The experience garnered from
312. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SEC AND CFTC PENALTIES 31 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 GAO
REPORT], available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_109/109-GAO-05-670.pdf.
313. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a) (Supp. II 2002).
314. Id.
315. Id. The Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179, 108th Cong.
(2003), contained the SEC legislative recommendation. 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 312, at 32. No vote on
the bill ever took place. Id. However, there is no reason to believe the measure could not be reconsidered in the
future.
316. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 350 (2002) (“A
remedy directed at only one party does not conform to corrective justice. For the court merely to take away the
defendant’s wrongful gain does not suffice because the plaintiff is still left suffering a wrongful loss.”). Unlike
under the current regime, investors, because of the ICF, will have the opportunity for meaningful compensation
that is well above the amounts that the wrongdoers have the capacity to pay. As described above, the ICF would
provide protection in this context because the defendants generally will lack the resources to pay the claims of
the victims fully.
317. See Testimony Concerning Fiscal 2008 Appropriations Request: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on
Financial Services and General Government of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement
of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC) (“…I have ordered the creation of a new office that will focus the efforts
of all of the SEC’s offices around the country, and work full-time to return these [Fair Funds] to wronged
investors.”), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/ts051607cc.htm.

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art76

62

Davis Evans:

2007]

The Investor Compensation Fund

163

managing this new office could allow for an easier transition to administering the ICF
were the ICF Proposal adopted.
B. U.S. Insurance-Based Proposals
Two leading scholars recently set forth innovative insurance policy proposals to
provide compensation for shareholders’ fraud-related loses. David Skeel proposed
creating a federal insurance fund to provide compensation for shareholder losses
stemming from corporate fraud. 318 Skeel envisions an optional investor insurance
scheme funded by corporate contributions and administered by a new federal agency, the
Federal Investor Insurance Corporation. 319 In addition, Joshua Ronen set forth a proposal
under which public companies would purchase financial statement insurance (FSI) that
would compensate shareholders that suffered losses stemming from financial statement
misrepresentations. 320 Under this proposal, insurance carriers would hire auditors to
audit the books of their policyholders, and companies would disclose to the public the
amount of insurance coverage obtained and the premiums paid therefor. 321
Though commendable in many respects and worthy of serious consideration, the
Ronen and Skeel proposals suffer from the same key deficiency—shareholder
compensation for accounting fraud in all likelihood would not be much (if at all) higher
under these proposals than is currently the case. Under the Skeel proposal, funding would
be generated by fees levied on corporations and hence would be limited by the capacity
of corporations to contribute. Given trading dynamics, investor losses from securities
fraud occurring over an extended period easily can be of such a magnitude that a
corporation would be unable to afford insurance premiums that would capture fully the
risk of investor losses from fraud. 322 Thus, compensation for fraud under the Skeel
proposal is unlikely to be higher than that which is currently available through D&O
insurance payouts. 323
Similarly, though providing an important improvement in auditor incentives (since
the auditors’ clients would be insurance companies, not the companies being audited), the
Ronen proposal in all likelihood would not result in increased compensation. Under the
proposal, companies would pay the premiums on the financial statement insurance. 324
Ronen explores two possibilities with respect to the level of insurance coverage: 1) the
level of coverage under FSI is the same as it is under the current regime or 2) the level of
318. DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA
(2005).
319. Id.
320. Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance and GAAP Re-Visited, 8 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 39 (2002). Lawrence Cunningham also has set forth a proposal for financial statement insurance.
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to
Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413 (2004).
321. Id.
322. See supra Part III (describing the limits on D&O insurance which lead, in large part, to limits on
investor compensation).
323. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Daedalean Tinkering, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1247, 1257 (2006) (reviewing
DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE
THEY CAME FROM (2005) and stating that Skeel’s investor protection proposal does not seem to add much to
the current compensation regime (i.e., securities class actions funded largely by D&O insurance)).
324. Ronen, supra note 320, at 59.
AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 214
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coverage increases. 325 If the former were to be the case, of course, for reasons discussed
above in connection with the Skeel proposal, the payouts under the Ronen scheme are
likely to be small fractions of total investor losses. If coverage were to increase
significantly over current levels, Ronen suggests insurers would have the capacity to pay
for this increased coverage by hedging, in the capital markets, the losses the carriers are
insuring. 326 Specifically, he states that insurers could buy special put options from
institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual funds. 327 Such puts, which
would have durations corresponding to the insurance coverage period, would be
exercisable upon a decline in the stock price of the insured company caused by financial
statement misrepresentations or omissions. 328
There is, however, reason to doubt that the insurers would be able to hedge against
these losses effectively. 329 Institutional investors of the sort identified by Ronen (i.e.,
pension funds and mutual funds) in all likelihood would have little interest in taking on
the risk inherent in acting as a counterparty to this sort of hedge, 330 and there is reason to
question whether a sufficiently large group of new institutions (e.g., hedge funds) would
emerge to perform this function because of the potential for catastrophic losses from a
large-scale fraud. Selling a put to the carrier insuring a company whose fraud generated
multi-billion dollar shareholder losses could signal financial ruin for an institution. Thus,
it is unlikely, as Ronen implicitly acknowledges, 331 that any one institution would be
willing to take on such a risk. For sure, several institutions could agree to assume the risk
jointly. However, this could lead to difficult coordination issues, and, unless the group
were of substantial size, still may not satisfactorily spread the risk. This type of risk
would be best spread across numerous participants in the broader financial markets and

325. Id. at 54.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See also Cunningham, supra note 320, at 472-73 (questioning this aspect of the Ronen proposal and
describing some potential risks associated with using the capital markets for reinsurance).
330. In general, the core competence of these institutions is investing in companies, not engaging in
speculative activities. There is also evidence that these investors do not have an interest in pursuing such
activities. According to one study of derivatives use by equity mutual funds, 79.2% of funds do not use
derivatives at all. Jennifer Lynch Koski & Jeffrey Pontiff, How are Derivatives Used? Evidence from the
Mutual Fund Industry, 54 J. FIN. 791, 795 tbl. 1 (1999). Only 8.5% of the funds that use derivatives engage in
activities in which derivatives are used strictly for speculative purposes. Id. at 795. There is no reason to think
that this market opportunity (i.e., speculating on the likelihood of securities fraud) would change that appetite
dramatically. After Koski and Pontiff conducted this study, Congress enacted the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,
which repealed a rule that prohibited, in order for favorable tax status to be maintained, more than 30% of a
mutual fund’s gross income being derived from gains on short-term investments, including derivatives. Alan L.
Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 Tax Law. 133, 136 (2003). Theoretically, this tax law
change could encourage more use of derivatives by these institutional investors. However, there is some
evidence to suggest that tax changes are not enough to change the risk appetite of traditional mutual funds. See
generally Laura Santini, Hedge Fund Strategies Just Too Risky: SEC Thinks Mutual Funds Might Mimic Them,
but So Far They Haven’t, INV. DEALERS DIGEST, Oct. 20, 2003, at 9, 9 (stating, in an article written
approximately six years after enactment of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, “mutual fund analysts contend that
many mutual funds . . . have the ability to engage in hedge-like strategies [which employ derivatives]—and
don’t. The reason, they argue, is that regulation or no regulation, it’s just too risky”).
331. Ronen, supra note 320, at 55 (“The put sellers can minimize their exposure on these written puts by
constructing portfolios that are well diversified with respect to the risk of misrepresentations and omissions.”).
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may be what Ronen envisions. However, thus far, with limited exceptions, 332 the
financial markets have played only a limited role in traditional insurance, 333 and there is
some question as to whether a financial product linked to FSI would be viable when no
similar product has emerged with respect to most other types of insurance. The market
appetite for these securities fraud puts simply may not exist in sufficient amounts to
provide a robust public reinsurance market.
In sum, it is not clear that there would be substantial additional compensation
beyond current levels under the Ronen proposal. The ICF Proposal, in contrast, because
of the collection of premiums with each stock sale, promises a ready source of funding
for investor compensation. That said, because the Ronen proposal has the potential to
minimize the likelihood of misrepresentations in financial statements, there is no reason
why elements of the Ronen proposal could not be implemented in conjunction with the
ICF.
C. Canadian Securities Misinformation Insurance 334
Tom Baker, a leading U.S. insurance law scholar, developed an innovative proposal
for what he terms “securities misinformation insurance,” a program designed to
compensate Canadian market investors for losses stemming from securities law
violations. 335 Baker, in a report to The Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in
Canada, describes various ways in which the insurance program could be structured.
These methods include (1) a government-sponsored, primary insurance program, funded
by both per-trade fees 336 payable by investors and annual risk-based assessments payable
by issuers, with the fund having subrogation 337 rights against responsible parties, 338 (2)
332. One such exception is the limited use of catastrophe bonds. David M. Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser,
Extending the Theory to Meet the Practice of Insurance, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FIN. SERVICES,
2004,
at
4,
available
at
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/brookingswharton_papers_on_financial_services/v2004/2004.1cutler.pdf. Catastrophe bonds are high-yield debt
instruments, the interest and/or principal on which generally is fully or partially forgiven upon catastrophic
losses (e.g., losses due to a hurricane) to the issuer (the insurance company) or upon “catastrophic losses
measured on some composite index of insurer losses.” Neil A. Doherty, Financial Innovation in the
Management of Catastrophe Risk, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 1997, at 84, 89-90.
333. Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 332, at 4 (stating that financial markets have played a limited role in
insurance and arguing that the reason lies with “contracting difficulties,” including the challenge of “marry[ing]
insurance expertise with ready pools of capital”). For additional discussion on this point, including an
expression of the belief that some of these challenges will be overcome in the future, see also id. at 39.
334. The securities misinformation insurance program described in this section is not a concrete reform
proposal, but rather an exploration of a potential reform, and was not intended to be applied to the U.S. market.
However, because of the similarities between this program and the ICF, the program merits discussion.
335. Baker, supra note 113, at 370.
336. The fee will be proportional to the size of the trade, but not risk-rated. Id. at 405. However, in a
separate report on the actuarial aspects of securities misinformation insurance, Harry Panjer notes that a flat
percentage-based fee may be most appropriate initially, but could be replaced with a risk-rated fee at some point
in the future. Panjer, supra note 188, at 430.
337. See Baker, supra note 113, at 401 (“Subrogation is the legal term given to the right of an insurer to
step into the shoes of a beneficiary in order to recoup from the other liable parties what the insurer has paid to,
or on behalf of, the beneficiary.”).
338. Id. at 404-07. In addition to annual assessments paid by the corporations, issuers may be called on to
pay additional assessments if losses reduce reserves “below a target level.” Id. at 405. These additional
assessments also would be payable under option two. Id. at 408.
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company-provided excess insurance 339 funded by annual issuer-paid risk-based
premiums, with the fraud protection fund having subrogation rights 340 against
responsible parties, 341 and (3) mandatory 342 private market 343 excess insurance 344
funded by market-priced issuer premiums, with subrogation rights 345 against the
responsible parties for the securities protection insurer. 346 Baker’s report does not make a
specific recommendation to the task force with respect to adopting any particular option.
However, Baker does conclude that, although a securities misinformation insurance
program could provide systemic benefits for the Canadian capital markets, including
increased investor confidence and better securities law compliance, 347 increased
compensation (or “loss spreading”) is not a valid basis for this type of insurance. 348
Baker argues that the risk of securities fraud can be mitigated substantially (though not
eliminated) much more inexpensively by diversification. 349 Even undiversified investors,
according to Baker, would not want, ex ante, the protection of securities misinformation
insurance (what he calls “an expensive risk distribution strategy”) to protect them from
fraud risk. 350
This Article has attempted to make the case for investor compensation, including the
compelling case for corrective justice, and to explain the many benefits of a
compensation fund. However, Baker’s proposal differs significantly from the ICF
Proposal, and it is understandable that he characterized the three options he set forth as
“expensive risk distribution strateg[ies].” 351 One of the most attractive characteristics of
the ICF Proposal lies in the elimination of secondary market securities class actions. This
design feature affords significant administrative cost savings over the current regulatory
regime. In contrast, the three options for Baker’s proposal listed above all include
subrogation rights and, in options two and three, the continued existence of civil litigation
as fraud victims’ first recourse for compensation. Thus, the costs of administering the
insurance schemes would be additional costs above those of conducting litigation. In all
likelihood, the costs of a single insurer suing the corporation and its officers pursuant to

339. This “excess” insurance provides compensation for investors that brought successful litigation, but
were unable to collect 100% of awarded damages. Id. at 408.
340. Baker notes that because this is excess insurance, subrogation generally will be used only to collect
damages that had already been assessed in the initial litigation. Baker, supra note 113, at 410.
341. Id. at 407-10.
342. Issuers would be required to either purchase the insurance or disclose, in all investor communications,
that they did not purchase the insurance. Id. at 410.
343. Baker’s conversations and personal experiences with private insurers indicate such insurers would
have no interest in this type of insurance unless it were backed by some form of government or companysponsored reinsurance (e.g., shortfalls could be made up with issuer assessments). Id. at 411 n.76.
344. This insurance functions as an excess to issuers’ (and other potential defendants’) existing liability
policies, dropping down only if the basic insurance is uncollectible or if insurance funds have been exhausted.
Id. at 411.
345. As with scenario two, subrogation generally will be used to collect damages already assessed in
litigation. In addition, subrogation against the corporation that purchased the insurance for “fraud in the
application” would be permitted. Baker, supra note 113, at 413.
346. Id. at 410-13.
347. Id. at 419.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 386.
350. Baker, supra note 113, at 387-88.
351. Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
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the insurer’s subrogation rights as contemplated by option one would be less than the
costs of securities class actions as we know them in the United States because of the
reduced complexity of such suits. However, most of the costliest aspects of litigation
(e.g., discovery disputes) still remain. In addition, allowing civil litigation to continue
under these proposals results in the likelihood of the company paying damages,
something that, as noted by other commentators, has the effect of punishing the innocent
shareholders remaining in the corporation. 352 For sure, the threat of litigation can serve
as a fraud deterrent. However, the ICF provides deterrence through the use of fraud risk
ratings without the costs of the civil litigation system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conventional academic wisdom on securities fraud losses holds that shareholder
compensation is unnecessary. However, the conventional wisdom ignores the substantial
harm that defrauded shareholders, both diversified and undiversified, can suffer from
securities fraud. The Investor Compensation Fund offers a way to compensate
shareholders for fraud-related losses, while also increasing fraud deterrence. Of course,
implementing the ICF would be a challenging and ambitious undertaking at best, and
perhaps politically infeasible. Still, the ICF Proposal offers a promising avenue for a
fundamental rethinking of the way we compensate securities fraud victims.

352. See Coffee, supra note 62, at 1561 n.96 for variations on this argument made by leading securities
regulation scholars.
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APPENDIX I
Estimated ICF Premium Calculations1

Equity
Case2
A. 2006

Meritorious

ICF

Admin.

Sales3

Est. Damages 4

Suits/Losses5

Recovery

Costs

Est. Premium

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

(((B*C*D)+E)/A)

$43.9 trillion

$37.0 billion

50%

75%

—

0.032%

B. 2005

$34.6 trillion

$86.5 billion

50%

75%

—

0.094%

C. Base
Case - 10%
Volume
Decline
D. Base
Case - 25%
Volume
Decline
E. Base
Case - 50%
Damage
Claims
Increase
F. Base
Case - 100%
Damage
Claims
Increase
G. Base
Case - 300%
Damage
Claims
Increase
H. Base
Case + 10%
Admin.
Costs
I. Base Case
+ 25%
Admin.
Costs

$39.5 trillion

$37.0 billion

50%

75%

—

0.035%

$33.0 trillion

$37.0 billion

50%

75%

—

0.042%

$43.9 trillion

$55.4 billion

50%

75%

—

0.047%

$43.9 trillion

$73.9 billion

50%

75%

—

0.063%

$43.9 trillion

$147.8 billion

50%

75%

—

0.126%

$43.9 trillion

$37.0 billion

50%

75%

$1.4 billion

0.035%

$43.9 trillion

$37.0 billion

50%

75%

$3.5 billion

0.039%

J. Base
Case - 100%
Damage
Claims
Increase +
25% Admin.
Costs

$43.9 trillion

$73.9 billion

50%

75%

$6.9 billion

0.079%

(Base Case)
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Case2
K. Base

Equity

Est.

Meritorious

ICF

Admin.

Sales3

Damages 4

Suits/Losses5

Recovery

Costs

Est. Premium

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

(((B*C*D)+E)/A)

$43.9 trillion

$37.0 billion

50%

75%

$6.9 billion

0.047%

$43.9 trillion

$73.9 billion

50%

75%

$13.9 billion

0.095%

Case +
50%
Admin.
Costs
L. Base
Case 100%
Damage
Claims
Increase +
50%
Admin.
Costs
1

Above figures are rounded and designed to be estimates of possible premium levels. Calculations do not

factor in investment income (which, to the extent such investments include equity securities, must be those of a
market index such as the S&P 500 to minimize any appearance of impropriety), which would have the effect of
reducing the required premium to fund the ICF. In addition, calculations do not reflect the impact of exempting
sales related to professional market making activities from the ICF scheme or any additional collections
required to maintain an adequate reserve of funds. Though precise figures on the level of market making on all
U.S. exchanges is not available, researchers estimate that specialist or market maker trading represents
approximately 10% of the volume on the New York Stock Exchange (Anne M. Anderson & Edward A. Dyl,
Trading Volume: NASDAQ and the NYSE, FIN’L ANALYSTS J., May/June 2007, at 79) and as much as 50% (or
possibly more) of trading on the NASDAQ, historically a dealer market in which a market maker acts as a
transaction intermediary (Id.). The premium figures above, because they include volume attributable to market
making activity, understate the premiums required to fund payouts equal to the amount assumed above.
However, were the ICF adopted, as a practical matter, excluding market makers and specialists from the ICF
scheme would decrease not only the premiums collected, but also the number of potential claimants and the
amount of investor recoveries.
2

The 12 case scenarios are:

(A) Base Case - 2006: Data based on 2006 market sales and estimated damages (see, infra, note 4 below)
in lawsuits filed in 2006. Assumes that all claims are related to inflated prices in 2006, the year the lawsuits are
filed.
(B) 2005: Data based on 2005 market sales and estimated damages in lawsuits filed in 2005. Assumes
that all claims are related to inflated prices in 2005, the year the lawsuits are filed.
(C) 10% Volume Decline: Base Case, assuming a reduction of 10% of market sales volume due to
imposition of ICF premium.
(D) 25% Volume Decline: Base Case, assuming a reduction of 25% of market sales volume due to
imposition of ICF premium. Note the following: if the volume does decrease following the implementation of
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the ICF Proposal, we also should expect to see a relatively proportional decrease in the number of claims for
compensation from the ICF, which means the percentage premium estimates may remain constant over some
range of volume assumptions.
(E) 50% Increase in Estimated Damages: 2006 estimated damages are assumed to be 50% higher, holding
2006 sales volume constant. 2006 estimated damages are low relative to prior periods. In 2006, estimated
damages were approximately $37 billion. On average, from 1996 – 2005, the estimated damages were $123.7
billion. Of course, this 10-year period includes several large-scale fraud cases, so it is not clear that the average
figure from that period is representative of what one might expect in the future.
(F) 100% Increase in Estimated Damages: 2006 estimated damages are assumed to be 100% higher,
holding 2006 sales volume constant.
(G) 300% Increase in Estimated Damages: 2006 estimated damages are assumed to be 300% higher,
holding 2006 sales volume constant.
(H) Base Case + 10% Admin. Costs: Base Case, assuming additional assessments for administrative costs
totaling 10% of estimated fund payouts. This case provides the estimated ICF premium used throughout the
text.
(I) Base Case + 25% Admin. Costs: Base Case, assuming additional assessments for administrative costs
totaling 25% of estimated fund payouts.
(J) 100% Damage Claims Increase + 25% Admin. Costs: Assumes 2006 estimated damages are 100%
higher, holding 2006 sales volume constant, and additional assessments for administrative costs totaling 25% of
estimated fund payouts.
(K) Base Case + 50% Admin. Costs: Base Case, assuming additional assessments for administrative costs
totaling 50% of estimated fund payouts.
(L) 100% Damage Claims Increase + 50% Admin. Costs: Assumes 2006 estimated damages are 100%
higher, holding 2006 sales volume constant, and additional assessments for administrative costs totaling 50% of
estimated fund payouts.
3

This figure includes equity and derivatives sales on U.S. securities exchanges currently subject to the

SEC’s Section 31 fee. Data Source: Order Making Fiscal Year 2008 Annual Adjustments to the Fee Rates
Applicable under Section 6(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 13(e), 14(g), 31(b), and 31(c) of the
Exchange Act, Securities Act Release No. 8794, Exchange Act Release No. 55682, 72 Fed. Reg. 25,809 (April
30, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2007/33-8794.pdf.
4

Data Source: CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS, 2006: A YEAR IN

REVIEW (2007), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2006_YIR/20070102-01.pdf.
Figure represents “disclosure dollar loss amount,” defined as the difference in market capitalization of a
defendant firm as of the trading day before the end of the class period and the market capitalization of the same
firm the trading day following the end of the class period. This number is not intended to be a measure of
liability for securities fraud, as factors unrelated to fraud could have affected the prices on these two dates. Id. at
5. However, the figure does provide an approximate sense for the losses suffered by investors from securities
fraud. This figure is adjusted to exclude class action lawsuits that are unrelated to secondary market fraud. The
figure is adjusted by using the data on the percentage of filings with 10b-5 claims. This percentage is based on
number of filings, rather than dollar value of claims. Thus, it is merely an approximation for the disclosure
dollar loss amount attributable to secondary market fraud cases. Figure excludes suits related to option
backdating cases.
5

For purposes of calculating the ICF premium, the disclosure dollar loss amounts are adjusted to reflect

an assumption that 50% of suits filed are meritorious. For data on the number of securities class actions that
survive a motion to dismiss and hence generally move on to settlement negotiations, see Joseph A. Grundfest &
A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and
Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 685, 691 (2002) (finding, in a study of 167 federal court securities fraud
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decisions that address the “strong inference standard,” that 34.1% of motions to dismiss are denied in their
entirety, and 36.5% are granted either in part or in their entirety without prejudice, thus making it possible for
the plaintiff “to replead in such a manner as to allow the litigation to continue.”); A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A.
Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125, 142 (2005) (finding that 52% of motions to dismiss are granted
in a study of 1996-2002 Second and Ninth Circuit decisions in securities fraud class actions); TODD FOSTER, ET
AL.,

RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: FILINGS STAY LOW AND AVERAGE

SETTLEMENTS

STAY

HIGH—BUT

ARE

THESE

TRENDS

REVERSING?

7

(2007),

available

at

http://www.nera.com/image/PUB_RecentTrends_Sep2007-FINAL.pdf (finding the dismissal rate to be 39.1%
in 2004-2006, but acknowledging that this rate could be overstated as a practical matter because it includes suits
dismissed without prejudice and suits dismissed “with prejudice that will be successfully appealed”). It should
be noted, however, that the figure used reflects a simplifying assumption. The fact that a suit gets past the
motion to dismiss phase does not mean that 100% of the estimated market capitalization decline of the
corporation upon the fraud revelation equals compensable damages.
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APPENDIX II

Estimated Annual ICF Premiums for Mutual Funds and Pension Plans
%
Est. Total

Total

Invested

Asset-

Est. Annual

U.S.

Industry

in U.S.

Assets in U.S.

Weighted

Sales of U.S.

Est. ICF

Institutions

Assets

Equities

Equities

Turnover

Equities

Premium4

Cost

(A)

(B)

(A * B) = (C)

(D)

(C * D) = (E)

(F)

(E*F)

Mutual

Premium

$10.4 trillion1

44%2

$4.6 trillion

47%3

$2.2 trillion

0.035%

$754 million

$4.0 trillion5

44%6

$1.8 trillion

19%7

$334.5 billion

0.035%

$117 million

$2.2 trillion5

43%8

$956.1 billion

36%7

$344.2 billion

0.035%

$121 million

Funds
Public
Pension
Funds
Private
Pension
Funds
1. INV. CO. INST., 2007 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK

16

(2007), available

at

http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2007_factbook.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 23.
4. See supra Appendix I.
5. Appendix: Additional Data on the U.S. Retirement Market, 2006, RESEARCH FUNDAMENTALS (Inv. Co.
Inst., Washington, D.C.), July 2007, at 3, http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/fm-v16n3_appendix.pdf. Figures
calculated by author. Numbers adjusted to account for the overlap of mutual fund holdings by defined benefit
pension plans (estimated as 1.5% of total retirement assets). Id. at 4.
6. JULIA K. BONAFEDE ET AL., 2006 WILSHIRE REPORT ON STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS: FUNDING
LEVELS

AND

ASSET

ALLOCATION

11

(2006),

available

at

http://www.wilshire.com/Company/2006_State_Funding_Report.pdf. Note: Allocation rate for federal pension
plans assumed to equal that of state pension plans.
7. The Conference Board, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TURNOVER, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
AND

OWNERSHIP PATTERNS 11 (1998), cited in William Dale Crist & Kayla J. Gillan, Patient Pension Capital,

CalPERS Commentary, http://www.calpers-governance.org/viewpoint/speeches/crist.asp (last visited Sept. 28,
2007).
8. Ronald J. Ryan & Frank J. Fabozzi, Rethinking Pension Liabilities and Asset Allocation, J. PORTFOLIO
MGMT.,

Summer

2002,

at

1,

3

exhibit

2,

available

at

http://www.ryanalm.com/portals/5/press/20020701_Rethinking_Pension_Liabilities_and_Asset_Allocation.pdf
(showing equity allocation of 43% in 2001).
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